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Abstract
This thesis is an examination of polysemy and its effects on second language learners, 
revealing it as a greater concern than it is normally accorded in pedagogical research. Arguing 
against a reliance on the dictionary to determine the number of senses a given word has, it 
begins  with  a  thorough exploration  of  the  concept,  both from diachronic  and synchronic 
perspectives,  by contrasting it  with the related concepts of homonymy and monosemy.  A 
monosemic stance is argued for, which does not deny the existence of polysemy but argues 
for  a  framework  in  which  contextual  variations  of  a  word  are  not  considered  discrete 
meanings. The British National Corpus is consulted for data demonstrating that instances of a 
word that may appear as discrete units of meanings actually form a single, unified usage. 
With monosemy redistributed to account for more than it normally does, and with polysemy 
relegated solely to semantics (factoring out syntax,  pragmatics, etc.),  polysemy becomes a 
considerably less sloppy concept,  revealing that,  at a top-down level,  there are essentially 
only two varieties. The first of these is 'lexical metaphor,'  in which there is a clear literal-
metaphoric divide between uses, and the second is 'vicariant polysemy' in which senses are 
discrete  but  not  synchronically  explainable  by  metaphor.  Using  Hoey's  notion  of  lexical 
priming, the factored-out elements of syntax, collocation, etc. are returned to, but strictly as 
effects of the semantic process of sense generation that should not be mistaken for the cause, 
though they frequently are.
 The second part of this thesis moves from the theoretical to the applied, reviewing the 
sparse literature on the subject. Techniques for raising awareness of the issue among students 
are discussed as are dictionary skills relevant to polysemy and homonymy. Attention is then 
turned toward homonymy,  examining the problem it poses to word lists and providing the 
beginning of a solution by revealing which words on the General Service List are homonymic 
and giving the relative frequency of each meaning. A technique to assist learners in acquiring 
additional meanings of homonyms is examined, as is a technique for guessing new or novel 
meanings of polysemes in context. 
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Part 1: Theoretical concerns of polysemy
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Chapter one: The language learner and the polyseme
'I want to shoot somebody!' came a loud, heavily accented voice as I sat in the 
college's records office in Chicago's South Loop neighbourhood waiting for a transcript 
to be printed. The anxious looking student repeated himself to the astonished staff: 'I 
have to shoot someone!' Fortunately, the office was busy enough that he didn't notice 
one of the workers surreptitiously phone the security guards, who were quick to arrive 
with their guns unholstered. It was soon revealed that the student was a film major and, 
as part of his filmmaking assignment, needed an office scene with people talking on 
telephones and merely wanted to shoot some footage of people doing just that.  The 
student's equipment  was out in the hall  with his classmate who was waiting for the 
okay. 
What exactly was the root of the student's error? The quick and easy answer is 
that he used the wrong sense of shoot. But how do we know that 'to shoot someone with 
a gun' is actually a different sense than 'to shoot someone with a camera'? Is there not 
some semantic level in which shooting a gun and shooting a camera are very similar 
procedures? While the outcomes are undeniably different, both actions require aiming a 
pre-loaded, constructed apparatus at someone or something and pressing a control, after 
which the 'shooting' action is instantly completed. Furthermore, is it logically sound for 
us to change one word (gun  to  camera) and then say that another word (shoot) has 
changed? 
Although it will be argued in the next section that the dictionary is not a reliable 
authority in such a matter, the  Shorter Oxford Dictionary (SOED), which enumerates 
the 'camera' usage separately from the 'gun' usage as sub-senses under a single, larger 
sense,  informs  us  that  the  student's  grammar  was  perfectly  correct:  shoot is  the 
appropriate English verb, and he structured it with the proper grammatical arguments, a 
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subject and an object. His error was entirely pragmatic rather than syntactic or semantic, 
lying in the context in which he embedded the verb. A reasonable explanation is that he 
was using the language employed by his film professor or classmates; in the context of a 
film classroom, 'Go out and shoot some people in an office' is perfectly acceptable and 
(pragmatically) unambiguous.  The professor didn't need to say, 'with a camera.'  What 
the student failed to do was to modulate the verb's context appropriately  for the new, 
non-film environment, which could have been done linguistically with 'I need to shoot 
some people answering phones for my film project' or 'I need to shoot some footage of 
people  answering  phones,'  or  could  have  been  done  non-linguistically:  his  same 
sentences uttered as he hauled in the camera and lighting equipment would have stood a 
far greater chance of being understood, even if they were still not ideally formed. The 
error  was  also  partly  sociolinguistic;  in  Gricean  terms,  he  didn't  provide  enough 
information  to  be  cooperative.  Linguistic  errors  seldom fall  neatly  into  exactly  one 
domain.
The misuse of a single polyseme may not always culminate in the arrival of 
armed security guards, but it can still result in miscommunication or confusion, easily 
an everyday occurrence for many learners.  Consider the following sentence: Although 
the designer of this particular bridge had passed away, he would have been pleased to  
see it in its final form, connecting the false teeth with the natural ones. In all likelihood, 
you encountered some difficulty toward the end and had to reread or re-analyse the 
earlier  material  because  you  had  selected  the  wrong  meaning  of  bridge.  Another 
example, one even some native speakers have trouble with:  Bill practised his English 
every day after school until he finally had complete control over the cue ball. Here, the 
polyseme is English, jargon in the world of billiards (and bowling) referring to striking 
the white ball off-centre so as to alter its path after it strikes its target. While admittedly 
4
these garden-path sentences are constructed with the goal of throwing the reader off, 
they simulate the reading process of intermediate and advanced L2 learners.
There are, though, a couple notable differences:  first, as native or near-native 
language users, we were able to pinpoint very quickly which word was the source of our 
momentary confusion; and second, we stood a better chance of knowing the additional, 
intended meaning of that word. Even the native speaker unfamiliar with this sense of 
English  would,  I  suspect,  realise  that  that  word  is  the  source  of  confusion  and not 
another. 
Imagine, however, an L2 learner reading the first sentence who was unfamiliar 
with the dental sense of  bridge. Two outcomes are possible when learners encounter 
known forms with unfamiliar meanings: the learner will either misinterpret the sentence, 
because  the  meaning  they  know  works,  at  least  to  some  degree  and  not  with  the 
meaning intended by the author, or else meaning breaks down completely, because the 
meaning they know makes absolutely no sense in the context. The first type is easily 
demonstrated with  The volume of traffic increased during the holiday season. In the 
hardly unlikely case that a learner is familiar only with the 'loudness' reading of volume, 
she would apply that meaning because, after all, it makes perfect sense—the traffic got 
louder; there is nothing here to clue her in that it  is  incorrect. Likewise, I was once 
addressing  a  class  of  Korean  university  students  about  what  we  had  done  the  last 
semester  that  we were  together.  Ploughing on  and believing  they understood me,  I 
eventually realized, when hearing one student translate for another, that  last semester  
was being understood as 'the final semester.'  Although they knew such terms as 'last 
night' and 'last week' where last has a meaning of 'previous,' they had failed to access 
and apply that meaning, clinging to the more familiar (to them) reading of 'final,' an 
interpretation  which  prevailed  in  spite  of  such  'evidence'  as  my  talking  about  the 
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previous semester in the past tense and referring to events and happenings they should 
have remembered. A wrong—and not even unknown—reading of a single word caused 
a misinterpretation of the entire discourse. Just as we did with the garden-path sentences 
above, the students then had to re-analyse the earlier material, and I had to repeat much 
of it.  Similarly,  sound is  a  very basic  word that  most  students  know well,  and this 
familiarity alone will prevent many of them from detecting a different sense in The ship 
made its  way through the sound,  resulting in a reading which makes  sense,  despite 
forcing the learner to interpret it on a more abstract level rather than apply the rarer but 
more concrete 'sea inlet' reading. This sentence provides the student with no reason to 
suspect they may misunderstand a word and reach for a dictionary (and even if she did, 
a learners' dictionary such as the  Collins  COBUILD Advanced Learners'  (COBUILD 
hereafter) doesn't include this meaning anyway). 
Discussing this very phenomenon, Laufer (1997:26) writes: 'It often happens that 
students know one meaning of a polyseme or a homonym and are reluctant to abandon 
it  even  when,  in  a  particular  context,  its  meaning  is  different.  [...]  The  mistaken 
assumption of the learner [...] is that the familiar meaning [is] the only meaning.' An L2 
learner  encountering  the  sentence  Her  sister  teased  Julia's  hair in  her  reading 
assignment may know tease only in its 'laugh at/be sarcastic about' sense; the learner 
again has no reason to assume another meaning is possible. This is technically sylleptic 
as the 'laugh at' reading is ungrammatical—the sister should tease Julie about her hair—
but this is a judgement based on a level of competence that may be inaccessible to the 
learner. Embedding that sentence in a fuller context may offer contextual hints that a 
different meaning is present,  but, as Laufer claims,  in no way guarantees the reader 
would  realise  a  second  meaning  would  be  possible  and  they're  misinterpreting  the 
sentence, nor is there a guarantee that the learner will be able to trace the source of 
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confusion back to tease. They may walk away with a misunderstanding that the sister is 
sarcastic  and  unsympathetic,  a  misreading  that  could  potentially  colour  their 
interpretation  of  the  character  and  even  the  story  as  a  whole,  just  as  my  students' 
misunderstanding  of 'last  semester'  affected  that  entire  discourse.  And the  instructor 
might never know where this misinterpretation comes from.
The  second  outcome  when  a  learner  encounters  an  unknown  meaning  of  a 
known  word  form  is  seemingly  even  more  damaging  to  the  discourse  because 
communication  breaks  down completely.  However,  if  the  learner  stops  and tries  to 
negotiate the meaning, it may be more productive. Of course, many learners will keep 
listening or reading, hoping either that the continued discourse will provide sufficient 
context that they can catch up or that the confusing part will prove unimportant. While 
these are possible outcomes, so too is the possibility that they will just get more and 
more lost. 
These two outcomes are based on the assumption that the students know the 
form and one meaning. However, the student may be unfamiliar with the word form to 
begin with. Suppose, for example, that a learner is unfamiliar with the word  register 
when she encounters it in a reading assignment. She then turns to a dictionary which 
provides a variety of definitions and she then has to select the appropriate one. This may 
sound like a simple task, but two factors need to be considered. First,  the ability to 
select the proper sense depends on her full understanding of the context in which the 
word occurs, and this understanding is already undermined by her not knowing at least 
one word. This assumes she knows all the other words and has chosen the correct senses 
of  any  other  polysemes  in  the  immediate  context.  Any  other  unknown  words  or 
incorrectly selected senses increase the problems exponentially.  Second, dictionaries, 
even ones designed for learners, often break words down into minute distinctions. When 
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the COBUILD contains eight definitions and phrases for sort, nine each for register and 
deposit, 26 for  point,  46 for  head  and no less than 73 for  time,  we can see why the 
dictionary is a tool many choose to avoid. (The lexicographical practice of segregating 
words into subtly distinguished units of meaning under the guise of accuracy warrants 
serious examination and will be discussed in section 1.1 and frequently thereafter.) To 
narrow the dictionary definitions down, the learners will have to identify correctly the 
part-of-speech  of  the  word,  which  they  may  not  be  able  to  do  as  easily  as  their 
instructors  like  to  think,  especially  when  comprehension  is  already  compromised. 
Having to stop their main reading and then read though a multitude of often very similar 
sounding definitions can be quite a lengthy detour, even if it is not always as extreme as 
suggested here. 
There is a final possibility, that the student will know that the form has multiple 
meanings and be familiar with them all. Even here the student may have to pause and 
look  for  contextual  clues,  scanning  backwards  and  forward  for  them,  to  determine 
which meaning to apply. In cases like  the volume of the traffic, there may not be any 
clear evidence to promote one sense over the other, though the student may pick up on 
the fact that no other evidence supporting the 'loudness' reading may tip the balance in 
favour of the 'amount' reading. 
Polysemy is clearly a very real problem for learners, one greater than the small 
amount of attention it has attracted in the literature would suggest.  This thesis is an 
examination  of  precisely  the phenomena discussed above:  how do students  learn  to 
decode  and  use  polysemes?  Does  knowledge  of  exactly  one  meaning  assist  with 
understanding an instance that uses another meaning,  or does it interfere with it? Can 
students be equipped with strategies to decode the polysemes they encounter? How can 
they, unlike our film student, know how to provide the proper context for evoking their 
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intended meaning?
The  reader  must  be  burdened  with  a  request  of  patience,  however,  before 
arriving at a clear definition of what polysemy is. We may know the term to refer to 
words  with  multiple  meanings,  but  this  definition  is  parasitic  upon  definitions  of 
multiple and, more slippery, meanings. Most readers will bring with them a vague sense 
of what polysemy is, but this understanding may be based on unexamined assumptions, 
so  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  attempt  to  delimit  the  scope  of  the  term  by 
discussing  what  it  is  not.  Specifically  we  will  examine  the  dictionary  paradigm of 
polysemy,  and,  in  turn,  two  important  contrasts  to  polysemy:  homonymy  and 
monosemy. The reader's patience will be rewarded, I hope, in chapter three when we 
arrive not only at an understanding of the term polysemy but also discuss the relatively 
few types of polysemy that exist. The polysemes and monosemes examined throughout 
this thesis are relegated to content words; the learning of deictic and existential  there, 
the various uses of  on,  etc.,  will  not likely be facilitated by the strategies presented 
herein.
1.1 The dictionary paradigm
And be these juggling fiends no more believed, 
That palter with us in a double sense; 
Shakespeare, 
Macbeth
The first assumption that requires examining is not just the dictionary treatment 
of polysemy but also the authority with which we users empower the book. It is no great 
revelation that dictionaries ascribe differing numbers of senses to various words. This is 
not a fault since, after all,  different dictionaries have different purposes.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED) and the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (SOED) trace the 
etymology of a word and include senses that have long fallen out of use in English. The 
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COBUILD, on the other hand, not only ignores these senses but omits senses that do 
have  some  currency  in  the  language  but  fall  below  a  certain  threshold  level  of 
frequency. It does not, for example, include the billiard sense of English, nor the 'water 
channel' sense of sound discussed above. 
Lexicography and lexicology are areas where one might expect to find rules for 
determining  the  number  of  senses  a  word  may  have,  or  at  least  some  substantial 
literature  towards  their  development.  Several  works  on  meta-lexicography  were 
consulted,  including  Teaching  and  researching  lexicography  by  Hartmann  (2001), 
Lexicography: An introduction by Jackson (2002),  Dictionaries: The art and craft of  
lexicography  (2nd  edition) by  Landau  (2001)  and  Modern  Lexicography:  An 
introduction by Henri Béjoint (2000).  In bullet-point form, Hartmann (2001:92) asks 
questions regarding which dictionary sense is more 'core' and which are 'derived,'  in 
what order are they arranged and how are they marked. He does not, however, attempt 
to answer them. Jackson's introductory text runs over 200 pages but discusses polysemy 
only on two discontinuous pages, Landau's, just shy of 500, treats the subject for less 
than one.
For researching polysemy, this is very troubling. Language users, including not 
just  linguists  but  lawyers  and judges,  often turn to  the dictionary for  evidence  of  a 
word's meanings, but the field of lexicography does not offer the scholarly authority we 
often attribute to it in matters of meaning. The dearth of discussion in the literature may 
stem from an understandable unwillingness to waste pages of introductory texts on what 
is perceived as an inexhaustible topic with no solid answers (as it is a Pandora's box 
situation), but the implication of the near silence is that not only do lexicographers rely 
mostly, if not solely, upon their intuitions, but, perhaps worse yet, that these are enough 
and require no shaping by theoretical advances. How, then, can dictionaries agree on the 
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number of senses a word may be said to have—let  alone what  they are—when the 
subject might not even be considered worthy of discussion? 
The  topic  of  polysemy  is  allotted  more  room in  the  final  introductory  text, 
Béjoint (2000), which addresses both  practical applications such as the sequencing of 
definitions  and theoretical issues. However, that it is mostly treated at the very end of 
the book, in a chapter entitled 'Whither lexicography?'  further explicates  the lack of 
implemented  theory  in  current  practice.  Béjoint,  as  he  does  with  several  issues 
throughout  the  book, gives  no answers  but  does  not  shy away from discussing  the 
questions,  which  ultimately  strikes  at  the  nature  of  the  dictionary  itself,  raising  the 
question of what its very purpose is. The contrast of Béjoint's discussion with Jackson's 
and  Landau's  avoidance  illuminates  the  problem:  a  proper  study  of  polysemy  as  a 
lexicographical concern, and the implementation of the findings, would necessitate a 
significantly different breed of dictionary, probably one that the users would have to be 
retrained for, which would certainly result in some degree of consumer resistance since 
the user, trusting that lexicographers are trained in such matters, sees no problem with 
the current variety.1 
Ruhl (1989) reminds us that the field of lexicography pre-dates that of linguistics 
by centuries2, and that the older discipline has taken little notice of the younger one. 
Béjoint fleshes this out: 
Lexicography was not a recognized branch of linguistics [in the nineteenth 
and first  three-quarters  of the twentieth  century];  in fact  it  is  still  not  a 
central  discipline  anywhere  [in  the  world],  even  if  there  are  recognized 
experts in some countries[.] [....] Lexicographers and dictionary publishers 
did not particularly want the contribution of linguists in the compilation of 
dictionaries either. They failed to see what linguists could contribute to the 
practical task of dictionary-making[...] (Béjoint 2000: 169, 170) 
1 In what is probably every Ph.D. candidate's worst nightmare, a new volume on lexicography, replete 
with three chapters on the practicality and impracticality of polysemy, was published shortly before 
this dissertation was completed. These articles are examined in appendix 1.
2 This  is,  of  course,  debatable.  Linguistics  dates  back  at  least  to  Aristotle  (Allan  2007)  while 
lexicography can be traced back to the fifth century B.C.E. (Hartmann 2001). Ruhl, of course, refers 
to modern, i.e., Chomskian, linguistics.
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Hartmann  also  discusses  the  'diffuse  image  of  lexicography,'  seen  in  the  variety  of 
lexicographical works available, writing:
An accompanying theory has been slow in coming; there is therefore not a 
strong  skeleton  to  attach  disciplinary  flesh  to.  No  wonder,  then,  that 
practitioners [of lexicography] working in a university context still claim to 
be  part  of  'philology',  'languages',  '(applied)  linguistics,  'media  studies', 
'information technology', and other subject groups in order to improve their 
academic respectability. (2000:7)
Ruhl, however, argues that despite the rift, linguists have been very much conditioned 
by  the  'pre-theoretical  thrust'  of  lexicography  to  assume  that  words  have  multiple 
meanings when, according to his framework, which is presented and developed later in 
this  chapter  and the next,  only one meaning is  usually present.  Researchers  such as 
Rodd,  Gaskell  and  Marslen-Wilson  (2002),  to  give  just  one  example,  base 
neurolinguistic tasks on polysemy processing on how the words were divided in the 
dictionary they consulted.
The problem isn't merely the lack of theoretical structure guiding lexicographers, 
but that this gives rise to a belief that the inadequacies can be neutralised by increasing 
the number of senses given. An instance of the word that is not covered by one of the 
numbered senses is seen as a failing of the lexicographer. This has no doubt led to the 
inclusion  of  some  wrongly  overlooked  senses,  but  it  has  certainly  led  to  some 
ridiculously  fussy  additions.  Although  edited  out  of  the  eighth  edition,  the  seventh 
edition  of  the  Concise  Oxford  Dictionary included  among  its  senses  for  horse,  a 
separate definition for 'a representation of a horse,' an inclusion that says more about 
lexicography than it does about the word horse. 
Here  a  distinction  must  be  drawn  between  a  'theoretical  framework'  and  a 
'lexicographical  practice.'  An  example  of  the  latter  includes  the  practice  of 
substitutability. Landau (2001:164) prescribes: 'For many words, the definition should 
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be substitutable  for the word in context,'  and this has been a common practice with 
increasing frequency since the eighteenth century. If the word is a noun, the definition is 
a noun phrase, or if a verb then a verb phrase, etc. Ignoring the criticisms of this practice 
unrelated  to  polysemy,  the  rule  of  substitutability  affects  a  sizeable  increase  in  the 
number of senses presented for many words. As a result, lexicographers, Béjoint writes, 
'tend to multiply the meanings of polysemous words and to see polysemy where there 
are only different contextual variations.' A dictionary may, for example, give different 
definitions  of  shy relating  to 'a  shy person'  and 'a shy smile.'  'Such distinctions,'  he 
continues, 'do not contribute to the effectiveness of the dictionary in the explanation of 
meaning' (2000:205). 
Bolinger (1965:572) breathes some common sense into the issue when he 
writes,  'Dictionaries  do not exist  to define but to help people grasp meaning.' 
Béjoint (2000:234), however, writes of the ambiguity of a dictionary's purpose: 
'[W]hat is the dictionary after all? A storehouse of the language as it is actually 
used? A thesaurus of the potentialities of the language, or of the idiosyncrasies of 
words? An instrument of encoding or decoding?' thus suggesting that Bolinger's 
claim is an idealisation of what he believes the dictionary should be, worded as if 
it were the book's sole function when in fact its purpose is multifaceted. No one, I 
should think, would argue that its purpose would be solely to decode and never to 
encode, and among their other purposes, dictionaries  do exist to define, though 
we might wonder who would find definitions of  high-frequency words useful. 
Béjoint humorously points out that the chances of someone looking up the word 
dog are so slim that only a lexicographer would do it. Why then are such words 
included if the only people who could understand the definitions are those who 
already know what the words mean to begin with? Are such definitions merely 
13
academic exercises? Is  it  feasible  that  any native speaker could gain a deeper 
understanding of the definite article by looking up the in a dictionary and reading 
the multitude of senses given? Meaning is a vague thing; seldom can it be both 
described and accurately delimited by paraphrasing, a claim we shall return to.
The fact is that it is easier to change the dictionary than its users, and the easiest 
way  to  increase  the  accuracy  of  a  dictionary  is  to  increase  the  number  of  senses 
provided per word. (The only other option, while still conveying meaning through the 
medium of words, is to compose more general definitions that fit more usages, but this 
would  result  in  very  vaguely  written  definitions,  which  is  probably  closer  to  the 
cognitive  reality  of  lexical  meanings  but  further  from  user-friendliness.)  This  has 
perhaps contributed to the ambiguity of the dictionary's purpose, or rather its range of 
purposes. The use of corpora has succeeded mainly in increasing the number of senses
—thus, depending on one's view, making the dictionary either more accurate or more 
pedantic—by illuminating the usages not covered by the definitions already given. 
Fillmore and Atkins (2000) exemplify the problem by consulting a corpus to 
show all the uses of crawl not covered by the four dictionaries they consulted. (That the 
dictionaries  they  use  to  demonstrate  the  inadequate  number  of  senses  are  learner 
dictionaries  borders,  frankly,  on  straw-man logic.  Comprehensiveness  isn't  a  trait 
associated with this variety of dictionary.) Their stance is constructed on the popular 
belief, which this thesis challenges, that the meaning of a word is an entirely semantic 
property that can be partitioned into discrete regions and that an increase of the number 
of these regions yields an increase in accuracy. Such a view fails to take into account 
the role pragmatics plays  in understanding words and sentences,  something that will 
also be discussed before, and after, this chapter is concluded.
Another issue with polysemy as a lexicographical  issue relevant  to forging a 
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pedagogy is  the sequencing.  The linear  or nested order in which various senses are 
presented  reflects  lexicographical  convention  rather  than  a  reality  of  language.  The 
sequencing of a chain of definitions does not reflect the cognitive storage of meanings 
nor  any  property  of  words  external  to  the  users  (if  such  things  were  to  exist). 
Furthermore, in sequencing the meanings, the lexicographer, or publisher, must make 
some choices, whether to do it on an historical basis or one of frequency or some other 
criteria  such  as  cognitive  weight,  or  even  the  lexicographers'  intuitions,  etc.  While 
linguists  and  logophiles  might  be  aware  of  the  convention  employed  by  their 
dictionaries, the average user would seem not to be. Writing of French students' use of 
monolingual English dictionaries in a study he conducted in 1980, Béjoint (2000:147) 
reports that 'when looking up more frequent words, which they seldom did, the students 
found the definitions divided up according to criteria that they did not understand.'
At  one  point,  I  also  attempted  an  experiment  involving  the  learner  and 
polysemous entries in the dictionary. Having been told on several occasions by Korean 
learners English, of various levels of proficiency,  that they generally read no further 
than the first entry in the dictionary, I decided to construct a test to determine the extent 
of the truth in this statement. Utilising low frequency words, from the 10,000 frequency 
band of BNC lemmas, words the students weren't expected to know at all, I attempted to 
compose  sentences  which  used  the  later  numbered  definitions  to  ascertain  whether 
students would be satisfied to interpret the sentence using the first definition. For this 
experiment to work, the first definition would have to be wrong—it could not, that is, 
also work. Ultimately, however, the experiment was aborted. Since the goal of the task 
would have been translation  into Korean to determine  whether  they had chosen the 
correct  sense,  the  subjects  would  have  been  allowed  access  to  English-Korean 
dictionaries,  but  words  like  circumvent,  interrogate or  peruse,  while  all  considered 
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polysemous in several dictionaries and offering different translation equivalents for each 
sense, were all unusable because in no case was the first translation equivalent given 
clearly at  odds with a later  definition—sentences,  that  is,  composed with dictionary 
sense #3 in mind could still have been translated with sense #1, perhaps altering only 
the connotation. A few exceptions could be found with homonyms, but as such words 
are generally treated as different headwords, this would be testing a different,  albeit 
related, kind of dictionary skill; furthermore, homonyms occurring at this low level of 
frequency would have entailed testing extremely low frequency meanings (punt: 'a flat-
bottomed  shallow  boat';  tote:  'the  handle  of  a  carpenter's  plane'),  and  I  lacked  the 
resources  to  ensure  the  subjects  would  be  using  dictionaries  that  would  definitely 
include  such  meanings.  This,  again,  undermines  the  existence  of  the  self-apparent 
discreteness of senses. 
This section has been very critical  of the dictionary,  but only for the sake of 
shaking off its influence. My criticism is less of the dictionary itself but with the vicious 
cycle  of  user  expectations  of  its  authority  in  meaning  resulting  in  more  specific, 
delimited senses. Divorcing ourselves from the dictionary paradigm of words and their 
meanings, we should see that words do not necessarily have discrete, mutually exclusive 
meanings. (Some do, and these will be distinguished in chapter three.) The dissecting of 
word meanings into separate, numbered units, sequenced in linear or nested fashion, is a 
system imposed upon them by lexicographers; the task of disambiguating word senses 
is  necessary  only  because  dictionaries  have  'ambiguated'  words.  In  a  way,  the 
lexicographer is like an analogue-to-digital converter, taking a whole, continuous entity 
and  partitioning  it  into  separate,  discrete  chunks,  a  model  of  the  original.  In  this 
analogy, providing more numbered senses is increasing the resolution. Learning a word 
from a dictionary (and a word is very rarely fully learnt from a dictionary) would entail 
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a conversion back to analogue, from modular representation to unbroken whole. Yet a 
word is not an integration of these numbered definitions because that would imply that 
the modules were the reality and the word the composite, a reification of the model. 
Thus a study of polysemy as a linguistic phenomenon must distance itself from a 
reliance on the dictionary as an authority on the issue. The dictionary should not be 
anything more than a guide (and sometimes it has indeed guided me to word usages I 
was overlooking). Bolinger's claim above that it should lead the user to meaning rather 
than define is one worthy of remembering, even if harmless drudges disagree.  But the 
questions of what polysemy is, how (or even if) words are divided,  how (if  so) the 
senses are related to each other must seek their answers somewhere else. 
1.2 Homonymy, diachrony, and synchrony
Traditionally, the terms homonymy and polysemy3 are used for the phenomenon 
of  multiple  meanings.  When meanings  are  related,  we talk  of  polysemy,  and when 
meanings  are  unrelated  and  essentially  coincidental  we  call  them  homonyms.  For 
example,  cricket the insect and  cricket the game are homonyms while  hot, as in food 
that is piping hot and food that is spicy, is a polyseme; a  ray of light and a  ray that 
swims in the ocean represent homonyms, and the kind of dream we have at night and 
the  kind  we have  for  our  futures  are  polysemes.  We can  even detect  more  distant 
relationships, at  least when we turn conscious attention to them, such as  chest as in 
'torso'  and  treasure  chest,  where  both  house  important  things,  and  letter,  'a  single 
character of a writing system' and 'a missive.' Sometimes the senses are very obviously 
unrelated, as in copper the metal and copper as (old) slang for 'police officer.' The word 
fan is a clipped form of fanatic and therefore semantically unrelated to the fan we use to 
3 Some  linguists  use  the  term  regular  polysemy  for  what  is  here  called  polysemy,  and  irregular 
polysemy to denote homonymy. I will retain the traditional mononymic terms in part because I don't 
find polysemy all that 'regular.'
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cool  ourselves  off  with.  Most  dictionaries  (the  learner  variety  often being the most 
notable exception)  give separate entries for homonyms,  grouping polysemous senses 
under a single entry, and this is one lexicographical practice not deemed controversial 
here.
As the notions of relatedness and unrelatedness will later inform strategies for 
learners to deal with multiple meanings, we will retain this distinction; however, we 
cannot pretend that it is as clear-cut as the terminology suggests. Multiple meanings can 
be  seen  either  from a diachronic  viewpoint,  where  etymology comes  into  play and 
meanings  are  either  historically  related  or  not,  or  from  a  synchronic  one  where 
meanings are seen to be related or not without recourse to external authorities such as 
dictionaries, relying on the user's intuitions or justifications.
If these viewpoints were different paths to the same results, our discussion of 
them could end right there. In fact, though, they can yield vastly different conclusions. 
We know the word ear to be the organ of hearing but also a head of corn, and we can 
see a connection between the two, a head of corn can, with some imagination, resemble 
the hearing organ, and many of us have grown up with that assumption (we do, after all, 
also talk of heads of lettuce, ribs of celery, artichoke hearts and black-eyed peas, not to 
mention  elbow  macaroni,  finger  food  and  even  cauliflower  ears,  which  tend  to 
accompany  knuckle  sandwiches).  However,  the  two  are,  from  the  viewpoint  of 
etymology, unrelated. The word  corn itself has unrelated meanings. In addition to the 
food sense, we may talk about a person having a corn on her foot, and children learning 
the language may assume there is some connection, that it resembles a kernel of corn in 
some aspect (shape, size, colour), but again, there is no historical connection. Likewise, 
the word  riddle  in His  body was riddled with bullets  can be seen as related  to  the 
common sense of 'a puzzling question with a clever or humorous answer,' especially to 
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those us who do not have riddle 'a large, course sieve' in their dialects. (Not that there is 
anything  humorous  or  clever  about  being  repeatedly  shot,  but  it  is,  I  suspect,  a 
confusing and shocking experience.) We also know we can, in some dialects, pry open a 
door with a crowbar and since we could then pry into (as in peep into) the room behind 
it, we might assume that one sense branched off from the other, but again etymology 
reveals separate histories for these two senses. 
Synchrony  and  diachrony  can  clash  in  the  other  direction  as  well,  where 
meanings are felt to be unrelated but do in fact share a common history. In fact this is 
easily  the  more  common  occurrence.  The  word  volume has  at  least  three  distinct 
meanings,  or  families  of  meaning,  including  those  related  to  loudness,  tomes  and 
magazines, and amount (of liquids and, by extension, other things such as the afore-
mentioned traffic). But from a diachronic view, these meanings are all connected. Or, 
more graphically, the meanings of stool in its 'footstool' and 'faeces' senses will be felt 
by most to be very different senses but, again, there is an historical connection in a kind 
of stool that once served as a commode, though this usage is now archaic. Connections 
through now-lost meanings are by no means rare. Dictionaries also tell us that foil as in 
'aluminium foil'  and as in  the more  literary sense ('Watson and Moriarty  served,  in 
different ways, as foils for Holmes.') share a common history and are therefore, from a 
lexicographical view at least, the same lexeme. The word plant, an English word since 
the ninth century at least, gave rise in the 18th century to the 'factory' sense, mostly in 
American English. I can see the metaphor but not until I gave it conscious attention. 
And sometimes, the connection can be even more oblique, but dictionaries such as the 
Oxfords still treat the disparate senses as historically related; we have, for example, the 
tennis sense of love, the billiards and bowling sense of English alluded to above, and the 
'old  joke/song/etc.'  sense of  chestnut.  Sometimes  there are  stories  that  explain these 
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senses, but these stories, or folk etymologies, are unreliable. For example, I once heard 
that a group of workers in America would pour, on their breaks, vodka into their orange 
juice and, lacking spoons, mix them with their screwdrivers, hence the drink became 
known as a screwdriver in the U.S. There is no reason to assume the story's accuracy (it 
appears in no dictionary that I've consulted), nor does the story, even if true, connect the 
two senses of screwdriver as a polyseme in any way other than etymologically.
While  both  diachronic  and  synchronic  approaches  are  certainly  valid,  the 
remainder  of  this  thesis  will  consider polysemy  primarily  from  the  viewpoint  of 
synchrony. There are several reasons for this, but the most important is that if we, as 
teachers, cannot readily see a connection, then there is little point in explicitly learning 
and teaching obscure relationships to our students. If we want them to develop an ability 
to  deduce  related  meanings,  then  we should  remove  hazily  related  senses  from the 
playing field and focus on those that show patterns that can be taught. That there is 
some connection  between  draw 'to  sketch'  and  draw 'to  pull'  is  unimportant  to  the 
general learner who should not be burdened with distinguishing this kind of polysemy 
from pure homonymy like bridge as a unit of infrastructure and bridge the card game. 
However, knowing the basic sense of words like flavour or loud is beneficial for their 
learning the more clearly 'extended' senses seen in 'a strong 70s flavour' or 'loud ties.'
A synchronic treatment naturally involves our intuitive judgements; however, it 
is important to define what we mean by this. Simply being able to 'see a connection' will 
lead us into all sorts of problems as some of us will see connections that elude others. 
While, for example, the three senses of volume seem quite distinct to me, others see it 
quite easily as a unified whole: volume is the amount of sound, just as it is the amount 
of liquid, and tomes are writings of a voluminous amount. Likewise, an appendix can be 
part of a book following the main text or an internal human organ, a distinction that 
20
doesn't  allow for  much  connection,  except  that  some people  will  see  them both  as 
essentially optional or removable elements of the systems they are found in, systems 
that fully function without them. Here the connection is to an aspect of meaning (the 
'optionalness') peripheral to either meaning. 
Furthermore, words, or rather their meanings, can be related in different ways. 
We  have,  for  example,  not  just  the  linguistic  sense  of  morphology but  also  the 
zoological usage. Both emerge in English within 40 years of each other according to the 
OED's citations, but I would suspect that, rather than one sense generating the other, 
both  were  formed  by independent  recourse  to  Greek.  And while  we are  talking  of 
homophonic words, we can also talk of homophonic music. These uses of homophonic 
are related through their etymologies and thus should be considered polysemes, but the 
relationship  between  them is  ultimately  meaningless;  the  senses  themselves  are  not 
related. A somewhat similar case is found in Lyons' (1977) account of  port, which is 
traditionally cited as a homonym ('harbour' and 'fortified wine') though he demonstrates 
that,  if  you go back far enough, the two do share a common etymology,  raising the 
question of where the line should be drawn. 
The problem is not that intuitions are faulty and unreliable—there would be little 
point  in  forging  a  synchronic  approach  in  that  case—but  rather,  that  we're  asking 
ourselves the wrong questions. 'Do I see a connection between these two meanings?' 
yields a judgement too vague to be useful. Furthermore, the presence of a connection 
does not prove that we are dealing with two senses. I can intuit a connection between a 
robin and a chicken, but this is poor evidence that we have two senses of bird here. The 
problem is that the word polysemy, hinging on the concept of relatedness, is too vague. 
We have already seen that 'just being related' is an empty claim. If intuitions are to be of 
any value to us, they need to be addressed by very specific questions in the  form of 
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diagnostic tests which will be presented in chapter three.
Semantics  has, understandably,  paid little  attention to the related concepts of 
words that differ in one aspect of form (either written or oral) but not the other. Words 
that have the same written form but differ in their pronunciation are called homographs 
and include such instances as the noun  record and the verb  record, the present tense 
form read and the past tense form read, the word form bass as a register of music or 
bass as a kind of fish. Along the other axis, words with the same pronunciation but 
different spelling are  homophones. Examples of these include  gate and  gait,  mist and 
missed, slow and sloe, compliment and complement, discrete and discreet, and base and 
bass. It also includes  flower  and  flour, which are etymologically related.  Since these 
terms  are  often  used  indiscriminately  to  mean  homonym,  and  since  homonym is 
sometimes used to refer to either one of these subclasses, they are presented here mainly 
to sort out any confusion. The term  homonym will be used in this thesis to refer to 
instances in which both the oral and written forms are identical4. A full treatment of 
homographs and homophones is beyond the scope of this thesis, but their effects on L2 
learners are not to be slighted and so will not be completely ignored here. Laufer (1988) 
has written extensively on what she calls 'synforms,' which include not only polysemes, 
homonyms,  homographs  and  homophones  but  even  words  that  just  look  or  sound 
similar (industrious and industrial; deduce, reduce and induce etc.).
For years, and largely still, homonymy has been the main contrast for polysemy. 
It has the benefit of being a synchronic judgement that can (usually) be diachronically 
validated  and  is  thus  mostly  a  mechanical  distinction:  either  a  word  form  clearly 
represents two unrelated lexemes or it does not, and this is perhaps the most telling, if 
4 The  words  heteronym,  heterophone  and  heterograph  are  sometimes  used  to  denote  these  same 
distinctions.  In  this  paradigm,  a  homograph  is  any  word  with  the  same  spelling,  even  if  the 
pronunciation is the same, while homophones are any words that sound identically. While certainly 
more accurate, I find this distinction unrewardingly fussy.
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undiscussed, contrast between homonymy and polysemy. Homonymy is a quick fix for 
the problem of  defining  polysemy since it  is  an easier  concept  to define, relegating 
polysemy  to  whatever  remains  once  homonymy  has  been  factored  out,  and  thus 
bypassing an actual definition of polysemy.  However, another contrast for polysemy, 
one richer in its potential to unveil the properties of polysemy, is monosemy.
1.3 Monosemy
The intolerable wrestle
With words and meanings.
T. S. Elliot
It  is  Charles  Ruhl  whose  name is  most  strongly associated  with monosemy, 
arguing that what lexicographers and linguists alike consider polysemy may in fact be 
monosemy,  that what we attribute entirely to semantics is in fact largely a matter of 
pragmatics.  The solution  for  many of  the  problems raised  so far  is  to  decrease  the 
number of senses rather than increase them, not to make the numerous  senses more 
specific but rather to make the few senses more general, and therefore more capable of 
applying  to  more  situations.  (I  dismiss  this  above  as  making  dictionaries  less  user 
friendly, but Ruhl is talking of monosemy as a linguistic reality rather than suggesting a 
lexicographical  practice.)  This  position  is  outlined  in  his  'monosemic  bias'  (1989), 
which  argues  that  words  should  be  considered  monosemic  until  proven  polysemic. 
Ruhl's  paradigm is founded on the belief  that  linguistics,  at  least  in its  treatment  of 
polysemy, has been conditioned by lexicography which has never been a particularly 
scientific field and, as noted above, significantly pre-dates it. That is, dictionaries divide 
word senses primarily by the intuitions of their lexicographers, and linguistics, coming 
along centuries later, has inherited this model, with linguists relying either on their own 
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beliefs of word meaning or else lexicographers'. The monosemic bias, then, is an airing 
out of years of unquestioned, deeply rooted assumptions and re-establish the field on a 
new, solid foundation, a foundation where it should have been all along. Rather than 
summarizing Ruhl's argument here, his methodology will be repeated and demonstrated. 
A full discussion of this necessitates a lengthy treatment in order to highlight a fraction 
of the points Ruhl raises in his book-length treatment. 
To demonstrate his techniques, we will examine a single verb which is generally 
considered  polysemous.  The  word,  chosen  at  random from West's  (1953)  General  
Service  List  (GSL),  is  believe.  Ruhl's  approach  was  essentially  a  corpus-based  one 
although he seldom consulted an actual computer corpus. Despite that fact that he had 
access to the Brown Corpus, which he does draw a few of his examples from, the vast 
majority of the example sentences he uses were found in the field, presumably culled 
from the books he was reading. The methodology employed here will, however, draw 
upon the British National Corpus (BNC). The treatment of monosemy here is intended 
only as an overview, while a more thorough examination of it comprises the following 
chapter.
The  BNC search query was for all instances of  believe, believes, believed  and 
believing, but as this unsurprisingly yielded more hits than the  SARA program could 
handle, 2000 random selections, one per text, were drawn. The examples cited here are 
chosen from this large selection based on their brevity and, more importantly, their self-
contained clarity rather than sentences whose meanings are unclear without recourse to 
the larger context. Some minor, unobtrusive editing was performed on these sentences, 
generally  to  trim off  independent  clauses  in  which the token does  not appear  or to 
remove quotation marks when both do not appear in the same sentence, etc.
Ruhl's method is to 'question each proposed distinction' (1989:28) and begins by 
24
dividing  a  word  into  syntactic  categories  such  as  intransitives,  transitives,  etc., 
examining each as separate entities.  The unstated assumption is that  such categories 
contrast on one level, syntax, so a semantic contrast cannot be isolated. We will retain 
this practice here just as we will begin with basing our examination on the  OED's, to 
recreate Ruhl's methodology and therefore to retain its syntactic distinctions. Archaic 
and obsolete usages will be ignored since Ruhl's approach is largely a synchronic one 
and because such usages wouldn't be expected to turn up in the BNC.
Intransitives
The first use of intransitive believe listed in the OED is to 'to have confidence or 
faith in, and consequently to rely upon...' Sentences 1-10 illustrate this.
[1] I don't know if I believe in God.
[2] If she believed in the Prime Mover she would be praying.
[3] That she still believed in Allah and prayed regularly at the nearby mosque.
[4] We believe in child conversion.
[5] Not unless you believe in miracles, I won't.
[6]  Marketing  will  only  work  for  those  who  really  believe  in  listening  and 
responding, it starts and ends with caring for people.
[7] I think the first thing you're going to need from any candidate is that they're 
going to have to believe in Europe.
[8] But do you believe?
[9] No, I don't think I believe at all.
[10] We have been written off all season, but we must keep believing.
Sentences [1]-[3] correspond to sense I.1.a., which specifically refers to a belief in a 
person, while I.1.b is exemplified with [4]-[6], 'to believe in a thing.' The question then 
is what to do with [7]. Is Europe used metonymically to refer to the people of Europe or 
the concept? Or if it doesn't matter, then why make the distinction? The remaining three 
sentences illustrate the use of believe with no prepositional support, I.1.d. (I.1.c. reflects 
a former usage using of). 
The next relevant definition ('to believe in (a person or thing), i.e. in its actual 
existence or occurrence') can be illustrated with the following:
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[11] On such a night as this, he told himself,  one could believe in ghosts and 
phantoms,  and  yet  this  small,  fragile  old  lady  climbs  up  into  the  whistling 
darkness unafraid.
[12] Children who are young enough to believe in Santa Claus are not old enough 
to  carry  the  action  on  their  own without  the  help  of  an  adult  to  keep  things 
moving.
[13] I Believe in Doubt
The question is why are beliefs in God and in Santa Claus encoded as different senses? 
Syntactically,  these are identical  constructions:  the subject  'believes  in'  the object,  a 
person of some kind or a thing. On what basis can we say they contrast semantically? 
The point argued by Ruhl is that we can't.  The perceived difference stems not from 
different readings of  believe but from pragmatic  knowledge regarding the difference 
between God and Santa Claus. Belief in the latter is an either/or distinction; either one 
believes  that  Santa exists  or one doesn't.  However,  belief  in God is  more involved, 
entailing not just a belief that God exists but a belief that God is capable of certain feats. 
Stating a belief in God leads to assumptions about other beliefs the speaker may have, 
while Santa, according to the stories, does not visit only the children who believe in 
him; he places no demands on the faith of those he visits. The important thing to note is 
that the distinction we attribute to believe (whether we are theist, atheist or agnostic) is 
based  on  our  knowledge  of  the  words  God and  Santa  Claus,  and  thus  not  from 
knowledge of the word  believe.  It  is these nouns that lead us to consider  believe is 
polysemous  for  these  usages  even  though  its  semantic  and  syntactic  behaviour  is 
consistent in both situation. Hence, the alleged senses of the intransitive use of believe 
are really a single sense. 
Transitives
The first transitive use of believe defined by the OED is to 'give credence to (a 
person in making statements, etc.),' which can be exemplified as follows: 
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[14] You see even when they tell the truth, if they've been telling lies for a long 
time, even if they, when they tell the truth you don't believe them
[15] He claims the battery ran out before he got to his presentation on the course 
but I don't necessarily believe him.
[16] And you believe her.
[17] But you didn't believe him?
[18] 'Will they believe you, Mum?' repeated Jack.
[19] Well, I believe you, for some reason.
[20] You might be able to influence my friend, but I won't believe you and I will 
stand up to you.
The next sense is very similar, 'To give credence to, to accept (a statement) as true, ' the 
two differing mainly in their objects being either people or statements:
[21] You can't but peek at them just to be titillated, not really believing what they 
are saying, since they are concocted by charlatans.
[22] We find things out, not simply by believing what someone else tells us, but 
by considering the evidence,  reflecting upon it,  and accepting what can 'prove 
itself at the bar of reason.'
[23] You can't believe words that just drop out of the sky!
[24] But Valerie refused to believe their message.
Again,  however, this  is a distinction external  to the word in question, resting in the 
metonymy  of  the  object  slot,  the  message  vs.  the  messenger.  Rather  than  showing 
contrasting behaviour, as we are to believe, it could be argued it merely shows that the 
same meaning shines through in at least two different contexts, that we have contextual 
variations  rather  than  two  different  semantic  propositions.  The  following  sense 
stipulated by the OED is, again, another variation in the argument, which now includes 
phrases:
[25] My father once had me believing that the earth was a Mobius strip, not a 
sphere.
[26] You believe you are unique?
[27] I believe it can be done.
[28] She couldn't believe he was actually here, standing on her doorstep.
The only difference between this definition (#7) and the previous two (#5 and #6a) is in 
syntax;  no contrast  in meaning is  present.  Here we simply have clauses rather  than 
people or statements. Again, the distinction is external to the word believe or, rather, a 
result of the compositionality of all the words, not the semantic contribution of one in 
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isolation.  (If,  however,  the  OED  catalogues  not  just  a  word's  meanings  but  also its 
syntactic  behaviour,  then  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  omission  of  [object  +  object 
complement] constructions such as 'I believe her to be upright' or 'I believe him to have 
been unfaithful,' a pattern that would be not be permissible based on the information 
given.)
It should be noted that sentences [21] and [22] could be given as evidence of this 
sense as the object of their verbs are wh- clauses. But the argument proposed here is that 
there is no meaning difference between any alleged sense presented by the OED, that it 
is all one sense to begin with, that [14] and [28] are the same sense anyway. That they 
could be assigned to either definition only strengthens the argument for monosemy. The 
point could also be made that the dictionary, the OED in this case, does not intend these 
to be separate meanings and that it is merely denoting various syntactic properties of the 
word. But to claim this is to claim that the purpose of the dictionary is as a grammar 
rather  than  a  semantic-based  lexicon,  and  it  has  already  been  demonstrated  in  the 
previous section that the purpose of the dictionary is multifaceted. This could be better 
addressed  by  including  all  the  syntactic  information  under  each  sense  rather  than 
according  them separate  status.  The  question  remains  (and  I'll  make  no  attempt  to 
answer  it)  of  why the  OED decided  to  separate  them.  Why should  cases  in  which 
transitive believe takes people, words or grammatical phrases as it objects denote three 
separate usages?
According to this analysis, believe is very clearly monosemic, yet lexicographers 
treat it otherwise. Seven definitions can be found in the COBUILD (not including three 
phrases, such as 'cannot believe your eyes,' which we haven't examined here). This is 
perhaps the broadest overview of Ruhl's monosemic bias imaginable, so broad that it 
fails to raise many points central to his position, points which have influenced the work 
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presented in this thesis. Thus an expanded treatment of monosemy follows in chapter 
two.
Before  concluding,  the  relationship  between  polysemy  and  idioms  needs 
discussion.  An idiom is considered here as a multi-word unit  whose meaning is not 
predictable by the compositionality of its individual words. Thus, the afore-mentioned 
'cannot believe your eyes' would not be an idiom because the meaning is clear from the 
individual words, despite the economical use of metonymy (eyes for what the eyes see). 
In cases of actual idioms, such as make no bones about it,  it is sometimes tempting to 
consider some of these individual words (here, bones) as polysemes though this stance 
is not espoused here. A polyseme or homonym must have a degree of independence 
from any construction it finds itself in. Thus any alleged, alternate readings of the words 
that comprise an idiom are restricted to that particular idiom; if, after all, the meaning of 
a word could be found in different constructions containing that word, then the meaning 
of the idiom would be predictable by it.
Let's back up and explain why the phrase make no bones about it  is an idiom. 
Certainly,  it  defies any kind of literal  translation and therefore has the possibility of 
being either  an idiom or simply a  phrase which happens to  contain a polyseme (of 
which the only real candidate is bones). In the interest of retaining focus and avoiding a 
lengthy  exploration  of  idiomaticy  that  would  take  us  far  afield,  it  is  preferable  to 
simplify  the  results  to:  (a)  polysemy/homonymy  or  (b)  something  else.  This  latter 
category  might  include  idioms,  metaphoric  constructions  (nonce  or  established), 
fossilised forms, etc. Because it is impossible to use  bones  in any other context that 
evokes the meaning it appears to have here, it has to be relegated to (b). Failing the 
recontextualisation test, it is therefore not the word but the full construction in which it 
is embedded that seems to charge the word with this particular meaning. 
29
Productivity,  then,  is  a trait  of  any polysemic  sense or homonymic  meaning. 
When the meaning is restricted to a very specific context, unable to occur anywhere 
else, then it belongs to the non-polysemy category. Similarly,  water  in a context like 
'This explanation holds no water,' can be paraphrased variously as 'sense,' 'validity,' etc., 
a reading that can only be evoked when this noun is the direct object of hold, although 
there is more variability here (holds no water, holds little water, does not hold much  
water, etc.). Despite familiarity with make no bones about it, we would  normally not 
conceive of 'validity' as one of the meaning of bones if considering the isolated word.
Conversely, although the 'old joke' meaning of chestnut has an idiomatic feeling 
to  it  in  that  it  cannot  be  predicted  from its  food  sense,  it  can  only  belong  to  the 
polyseme/homonym category. Context is necessary to override its default sense, the one 
that jumps out when the word is discussed outside of any particular sentence, but there 
is  no one specific  context  that  is  required for this.  Being a  single  lexeme,  chestnut  
naturally  has  to  occur  in  various  environments.  If  it  were  restricted  to  any,  then  it 
wouldn't be a single-word unit; a mononym, by its very nature, has to be productive. 
This leads us to the phrase  flavour of  the month  which I do not consider an 
idiom. The meaning of each word predicts the meaning of the phrase: it may not be a 
calendar month nor a 30-day period, nor may it be a literal flavour, but it is the larger 
phrase that, as a whole, is conflated with a metaphoric meaning. There are clubs which 
send to its  members  a new variety of wine, cheese,  etc.  each month,  and a popular 
conception of these clubs is that its members rave about each new variety as if it were 
the best,  supplanting  the previous month's  praise,  so when we talk  of,  for example, 
teenage  angst  being  the  flavour  of  the  month,  it  is  not  a  metaphoric  flavour  nor  a 
metaphoric month but a metaphoric flavour-of-the-month. The polysemy here is neither 
flavour  nor  month  but the entire phrase because there are both literal and metaphoric 
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flavours of the month. 
Conclusion 
We have  examined  why polysemy  can  be  a  very  real  problem for  learners. 
Although we have not yet defined what is meant by polysemy, we have examined some 
related  basic  concepts.  Without  having  yet  defined  it,  we  have  established  by 
elimination that polysemy regards related senses, as opposed to homonymy, which are 
naturally unrelated, as opposed to monosemy, and that it should be mostly the domain 
of semantics, as opposed to pragmatics. Contextual variation, including differences in 
arguments a word may take, have no influence on its claim to monosemy.  We have 
dissociated  ourselves  from  the  lexicographical  authority  in  this  matter  and,  with 
pedagogy as our ultimate goal, have argued for a synchronic view.
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Chapter two: Monosemy expanded
entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.
('Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity')
(attributed to) William of Ockham
Synchronically,  the  contrast  of  homonymy  and  polysemy  is  generally  an 
either/or  distinction,  with  only  a  little  overlap  in  which  some  related  senses  have 
become so distinct that the user may not be sure if they are related or not. Synchronic 
intuitions  can  be  compared  to,  and  sometimes  informed  by,  diachronic  data.  The 
monosemy-polysemy contrast,  conversely,  is  a theoretical  viewpoint,  one that  stems 
from the  very way we conceptualise  the world around us,  with  conceptual  thinkers 
being  (to  generalise)  'lumpers'  and  more  analytic  thinkers  being  'splitters.'  (As  a 
conceptual thinker, Ruhl does not always spell things out and can be hard to follow at 
times. In his critique of Ruhl, Cruse (1992) wrestles with understanding Ruhl at several 
places. I hope to avoid this error here.) It is for this reason, and because of the potential 
but damning criticism that believe was too easy a target, that I present a more developed 
case for monosemy. The goal here is less to argue for monosemy than to present it as a 
theoretical  framework,  discussing points that  the treatment of  believe wouldn't  raise. 
While this remains an encapsulation of Ruhl's (1989) book-length argument, I cannot 
deny that some of myself has leaked in, and perhaps at times even taken over. 
In the first chapter, mention was made of Fillmore and Atkins' (2000) article 
which  argued that  learner  dictionaries  failed to  enumerate  enough senses for  crawl. 
Using the same word, this chapter will take the opposite view, that the verb is in fact 
monosemous. While their theoretical stance is markedly different, Fillmore and Atkins' 
methodology  does  not  differ  radically  from  Ruhl's;  both  begin  by  consulting 
dictionaries, and both then basically examine a corpus of data to support their claims. 
Where they diverge, though, is in Ruhl requiring a large amount of data to demonstrate 
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that the real meaning patterns out over the course of its presentation (a chapter devoted 
to proving the monosemy of the verb bear contains 391 example sentences containing 
the word, which he warns is probably insufficient), while Fillmore and Atkins make no 
such demands,  relying  on a single sentence as evidence.  Rather  than consulting the 
OED,  Fillmore  and  Atkins  reference  four  other  dictionaries:  The  Cambridge 
International  Dictionary  of  English  (CIDE),  The  Collins-COBUILD  Dictionary  of  
English (CCDE), the Longman Dictionary of  Contemporary English  and the Oxford 
Advanced Learner's Dictionary. I have already stated my distrust of their use of learner 
dictionaries for illustrating a lack of comprehensiveness, but since Fillmore and Atkins' 
findings  are  based on their  extrapolation  of various  definitions  of  crawl  from these 
dictionaries, we will use their definitions as well, rather than the OED.
From the learner dictionaries they consulted, Fillmore and Atkins extract nine 
definitions, not all of which are found in any one dictionary, or, rephrased, the senses 
are not divided along the same lines in each dictionary. The CIDE, for example, begins 
with a definition 'to move slowly or with difficulty...'  with example sentences which 
includes caterpillars, children and lorries, while these three examples account for three 
different sentences in the CCDE (which, in turn, does not included a dedicated sense for 
snake movement, as is included in the CIDE, etc.). In table format, Fillmore and Atkins 
note which senses are covered by which dictionaries but do not explicitly discuss the 
fact that some instances are covered by one definition in one dictionary and three in 
another. 
As summarized by Fillmore and Atkins, these nine senses are presented in table 
1:
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1. of person: dragging body
2. of person: on hands and knees
3. of baby: manner of motion
4. of traffic: move slowly
5. of insects, crabs, etc.
6. of snakes, worms, etc.
7. of person: grovel, fawn
8. of place: be crawling with
9. of skin etc.: creeping sensation
Table 1: Fillmore and Atkins' extrapolation of senses for crawl
First, I have to confess confusion over the distinction between 1 and 2 since no one 
dictionary  includes  both  senses;  it  seems  merely  to  reflect  the  different  wording 
employed by the lexicographers who are otherwise encoding the same sense. For our 
purposes, then, these two will be collapsed into a single sense. The following examples 
are again drawn from the BNC, the same corpus Fillmore and Atkins used, to illustrate 
this  sense.  I  should  point  out  that  instances  without  prepositional  support  were 
particularly hard to pin to one particular sense (The sentence  I can't stand crawling  
probably corresponds to Fillmore and Atkins' sense #7, but there is no reason, without 
consulting the larger context, that it couldn't be the first sense.)
[1] He now has severe cerebral palsy, is unable to roll over, sit or crawl.
[2] I would have to go as fast as I could while I could still see the way, and 
then rest for longer, and then probably crawl.
[3] I can crawl when I have to.
While I don't want to argue that the 'true meaning' is one of these nine specific 
senses—ideally, the monosemic bias argues that all of them are contextual variations of 
the true meaning, unless polysemy is present—I must argue that movement on one's 
hands and knees is not the true sense even if it is the prototype for many users of the 
word. Consider the following sentences, not from the corpus:
[4] He buttered his bread. 
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[5] * He buttered his bread with butter. 
[6] He kicked the ball. 
[7] * He kicked the ball with his foot. 
The  second  sentence  of  each  pair  is  a  pleonasm because  the  added  clause  repeats 
information lexically encoded into (in these cases) the verb. However, this is not the 
case with crawl, where the second sentence below is completely acceptable:
[8] He crawled to the door. 
[9] He crawled to the door on this hands and knees. 
This must be because the use of hands and knees is not lexically encoded into the verb 
crawl in the same way that the noun butter is encoded into the corresponding verb or 
that a foot is automatically assumed as an agent in the act of kicking. This is supported 
by the following  BNC  sentence which show that  there  are various ways in which a 
person may crawl:
[10] Desperate with fear, he forced himself forward, crawling on knees and 
elbows under the low canopy.
[11] He crawled on toes and elbows round the Land-Rover.
[12] A tall thin guy I had seen in the house before crawled on all fours in front 
of the television to get at Nicola's joint.
[13] From a  spy to  a  slimy toad  and from this  to  a  serpent  Satan  moves, 
crawling on his belly in the dust rather than standing upright in a pool of 
fire.
Examples [10]-[13] are not pleonastic for the same reason that He kicked the ball with  
his right foot  isn't:  the information in the on PPs that accompanies  crawl is additional 
information not already encoded by the verb and thus not part of its inherent meaning, 
which makes no demands on what parts of the body contact the ground.
We turn now to sense three, that referring to babies. The following sentences are 
every instance in the BNC in which the lemma occurs in the same sentence as baby or 
babies. This is not meant as an exhaustive account of this sense since there are also 
examples in which the verb occurs with the baby's name rather than the word baby, or 
else the baby is referred to anaphorically, but it will provide enough data to make a few 
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observations.
[14] Now yoked to her bib, a baby crawls.
[15] Until that time a baby won't hurt its feet in a walking position, they'll be 
fairly mobile won't they if you think about it, and how does a baby hold its 
feet when it's crawling?
[16] When a baby's crawling how does it hold its feet?
[17] Fit them before your baby starts crawling.
[18] So, a baby that can crawl, and lives in a house full of cats, may imitate 
the  cats  and  smoodge  up  against  its  mother's  legs—a  form  of 
communication not usual with people!
[19] He was a quiet baby, watchful, with a stillness about him which, if he had 
not  been able  to crawl and stand and almost  walk,  would have been a 
cause for concern.
[20] It  was  funny to  see  it  when the babies  started  to  crawl  and the boys 
watched over them.
[21] Venturing out with a small baby is actually easier than with toddlers, who 
want to crawl, explore and get up to mischief.
[22] The baby is shrinking fast, and can't really crawl now though its struggles 
are something to see.
[23] I spent a month at home with the children and I suddenly realized all the 
things  that  I  was missing out  on—watching  the baby grow up, start  to 
crawl, the first few words, things like that.
[24] The  baby is  crawling,  only one  or  two panting inches  at  a  time—but 
crawling forwards .
[25] There  were  several  families  under  the  trees  now,  with  little  children 
running around and babies crawling about in the grass.
[26] She could put the baby into this miniature prison and it crawled there in 
the trap.
[27] A small  baby crawled out on its  hands and knees,  its  face covered in 
grime.
Sentences [14] – [23] show the verb without any locative, goal or source elements, [25]-
[27]  show it  with  such  components  while  [24]  contains  one  instance  of  each.  This 
demonstrates a tendency for usages of the verb when discussing babies to contain no 
spatial information though they are clearly permissible, which is significant because, by 
my count, the verb crawl is, in total, accompanied by a spatial argument over 80% of 
the time. We should also note that, as [27] demonstrates, even in sentences regarding 
babies, the verb crawl does not lexically encode the use of hands and knees.
These uses raise an interesting question: should the crawling of babies be seen as 
a different sense than the crawling of adults? And if so, why? To be sure, their purposes 
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for crawling are different.  For babies it  may be the only way to move while  adults 
usually have other methods and thus it is a canonical trait. For Cruse (1986), whom I 
cite  despite  his  vocal  criticism of  Ruhl,  a  canonical  trait  is  one  which  is  normally 
present but  which does not alter the entity (as a lexical concept) if not—that is, a dog 
with three legs is still a dog, a kiwi is still a bird though it cannot fly, and a person who 
never crawls is no less a person. However, there is no lexical difference in the manner a 
baby crawls and the way an adult crawls. The only contrast is in  reason, but I see no 
reason why this should be a defining trait. A child may believe in God because he was 
raised to, while an older individual may do so because of an adult conversion process, 
but we don't encode these as different senses of believe. Furthermore, babies who have 
learned to walk still continue to crawl for some time. Is this sense one of crawl or is it 
the third? As with believe as it relates to God and Santa Claus, the perceived difference 
is external to the word, here the subject: adults or babies. It is pragmatic knowledge of 
the subjects, not semantic behaviour of the verb, that provides the contrast, and since the 
contrast is not contained in the word itself, crawl cannot be considered polysemous for 
these two uses. The contrast in arguments only demonstrates the wide range of contexts 
which this sense can occur.
Another point is that in consulting the BNC to find sentences that illustrate the 
contrast between the adult and baby senses, I had to pass over a good many examples in 
which it was  unclear which 'sense' was employed (even in [1] the possibility that the 
subject is a baby is still present). Although Fillmore and Atkins' presentation of the nine 
senses  above  are  not  actual  'definitions,'  it  is  only  their  wording  (based  on  the 
dictionaries  they used) that  segregates this usage.  I  rejected the use of  Rex crawled 
away as an example because without the fuller context, I don't know if Rex is a baby or 
adult, and this is the criterion made explicit by Fillmore and Atkins; that is, it is the 
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wording of the definition that makes an otherwise unambiguous sentence ambiguous.
The  nine  senses  will  be  resequenced  here  to  discuss  animate  subjects  first 
followed by non-living entities; this is primarily for logical flow, so as not to bounce 
back and forth between ideas. The next sense, then, regards insects and crabs. 
[28] Casually he remarked, 'There's a spider crawling up your leg.'
[29] She  scratched  and  pulled,  but  could  never  find  the  leeches  under  her 
blouse or the spiders crawling inside her tights. 
[30] There was no movement except for the tiny spider that was crawling up 
Nicky's arm.
[31] Children crowded round us; ants crawled in the dust.
[32] Then ants would crawl through the cracks in the floor and build a big nest 
in the middle of the bedroom.
[33] At three o'clock, when I had scanned every crack in the ridge, every curve 
of every dune, every patch of colour on the plain, I looked down and saw 
an ant, crawling into the wind.
[34] Clouds of flies were crawling over the faces of the dead Germans.
[35] Thomas turned and pointed to a fly crawling on the end of the table.
No sentence involving the crawling of crabs was found in the BNC (nor lobster, shrimp 
or crayfish). One common criticism against the use of corpora in linguistics is that they 
cannot demonstrate potential uses. The BNC data is not presented here as a replacement 
of  native  speaker  intuitions,  which  we  have  already  accessed  in  [4]  –  [9],  but  to 
exemplify them when available. I certainly do not maintain that crab cannot occur with 
crawl just because no evidence of it exists in this corpus. This would be a problem of 
relying solely on a corpus for dictionary making however.
Crabs are, of course, not insects (nor technically are spiders), but grouping them 
together  makes explicit the semantic trait the lexicographers  wish to highlight: a body 
parallel  to  the  ground and  propelled  by  a  multitude  (more  than  two)  of  legs.  It  is 
important to note that this does not include dogs and cats and many other four-legged 
animals, despite a similar physical construction. Why, then, are insects said to crawl but 
not dogs? Presumably because dogs can, in fact, crawl, in a method of moving that is 
distinct from their normal walking gait; they can lower their bodies to crawl under a 
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stick  or  under  a  bed.  Ants  and  spiders  seem  to  lack  this  contrast.  A  physical 
resemblance between the movement of insects and the crawling method of humans is 
easily grasped. The fact that it is but one mode of movement for humans and the sole 
means  of  movement  for  many insects  is  immaterial  here  just  as  it  was  for  babies, 
especially as flies can be said to crawl. (It may well be that the subjects of this sense of 
crawl have more than four legs, but the wording of the definition does not mention the 
number of legs.)
The next sense takes snakes and worms as its subject.
[36] Snakes that crawl out from under the stone of history
[37] This is an improved model,  because when the snake is crawling along 
with its tail on the ground the red colour is concealed.
[38] The worms crawl onto the sticks, which can then be picked up and dipped 
directly into the fry tank.
[39] The root gives off a chemical which incites the worms to hatch and crawl 
into it.
[40] CHARLES DARWIN opened a can of worms which have been crawling 
their way up the evolutionary ladder of history ever since.
[41] A thousand-legged worm crawls out of the severed wrist.
This presents a new type of movement, one without appendages though still with the 
'torso' parallel  to the ground. But why should having or not having legs account for 
different senses of crawl, especially as we've already seen that the use of arms and legs 
are not encoded into the verb? To say it should is to make having legs a criterion for 
sense disambiguation, a criterion that should be seriously undermined by the fact that 
animals with legs and animals without legs do both crawl. To break out of the circle of 
this argument, the movement of ants, babies and worms is covered by the single word 
crawl; that we should decide to make the use of appendages a criterion for splitting it is 
motivated,  or  mis-motivated,  by  a  desire  to  press  our  vast,  nebulous  pragmatic 
knowledge into neat little semantic traits. This is the crux of Ruhl's monosemic bias, 
that much of what has traditionally been assigned to semantics is in fact pragmatic. It is 
only  the  act  of  defining  the  term,  or  rather  the  difficulty  of  doing  so  in  one  neat 
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definition,  that  forces us to split  the differences into separate  definitions.  A perhaps 
unlikely analogy can be found in Daoism, which sees reality is a continuous, undivided 
whole, but once the mind conceptualises something as distinct, 10,000 more divisions 
will follow. 
My  inclusion  of  [40],  regarding  the  can  of  worms,  may  require  some 
justification because it may appear to some to be a metaphoric sense of crawl. Metaphor 
is,  undeniably,  present  but  crawl  here  does  not  fall  under  its  scope.  The  metaphor 
involves the can and worms—that is, it is a case of metaphoric worms literally crawling 
out of a metaphoric can and not an instance of worms metaphorically crawling. The fact 
that the worms are not physically present is no more relevant than the fact that Darwin 
isn't either. 
We should recall that not all of the dictionaries divided the word in this manner. 
Fillmore  and  Atkins,  for  reasons  unaddressed,  took  each  alleged  sense  from  each 
dictionary as fact and unquestioningly accorded its own individual status, assuming that 
the larger number of senses more accurately represented the word; the fact that some 
dictionaries  covered several  of these usages into a single  sense seems to have been 
given no consideration. This is perhaps not surprising since their survey is motivated by 
a belief that dictionaries don't include enough senses as it is.
We arrive now at sense 7, the 'grovelling' sense which is clearly a different breed 
than the usage(s) discussed so far.  The  BNC  provides the following examples of this 
sense:
[42] It meant she'd have to apologise to Lucenzo, to go crawling to him.
[43] He still  felt sullied by what he'd had to do  –  to crawl to someone like 
Bernard Walton.
[44] Then he came crawling back...
[45] I bet he ached to crawl back to Hilda, but Ma had him neatly encircled.
When a person crawls in this sense, they can do so without actually physically crawling. 
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However, the position argued here is that the notion of 'grovelling' is not an inherent 
semantic  trait of  crawl  but  a  pragmatic  conflation.  A person may crawl literally  or 
metaphorically,  but, if metaphorically,  the meaning of  crawl  doesn't actually change. 
That is, within the context of the metaphor,  crawl still refers to the same action in the 
usages described above; the image is still of the person manoeuvring in such a way, just 
as the metaphoric literally crawled out of the metaphoric can. The illusion of polysemy 
in this case stems partly from what we read into it, what we mentally add to that image. 
The instances of crawling in [42] – [45] represents humbleness, apology, acquiescence, 
etc. The larger construction to crawl back to ties into a larger context, that of failing to 
make it on one's own and swallowing one's pride to come back to someone, a former 
partner, producer, etc., someone with whom the person had previously enjoyed a great 
deal of success. In domestic spats, it may also tie into the notion of crawling out of the 
doghouse.  In  other  words,  there  is  more  going  on  here  than  the  words  themselves 
convey. Making crawl carry the entire meaning of 'to grovel' and all the overtones that 
entails—that  is,  making  it  completely  a  semantic  concept and  rejecting  the  role  of 
pragmatics—betrays a very rigid belief that meaning is exclusively compositional, that 
the meaning of a sentence is nothing more than the meaning of its semantic constituent 
parts. This may also reflect a bias that the majority of literature on polysemy in the last 
decade stems  from the field  of computational  linguistics  (and generative  linguistics, 
which is only a step removed). When dealing with computers, programming semantic 
properties  is  probably  an  easier  solution  than  programming  pragmatic  knowledge.  I 
don't criticise this practice,  but its influence on the study of language  as part of the 
human experience should be kept in check.
Another part of the illusion that crawl is polysemous for the 'grovel' sense may 
arise  from  a  belief  that  paraphrasing  denotes  a  change  in  meaning.  In  the  usages 
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discussed  so  far,  crawl was  the  only  word  that  could  carry  the  intended  meaning. 
(Words like  inch and  creep can work in some cases but not all,  but they do add or 
subtract  information from  crawl.  Slither may work for snakes but I don't believe it's 
appropriate for every instance involving worms, and even less for maggots, which are 
presumably covered by the etc. in the definition.) With sense #7, we now have an option 
to  replace  it  with  a  word  (grovel)  that  cannot  replace  the  other  usages  and  thus 
distinguishes it from them. This is similar to the notion that the act of defining creates 
more senses but it warrants its own discussion. Of course, 'He crawled back to her' can 
be rephrased as 'He grovelled back to her,' but 'He crawled back to the door' cannot be 
glossed with grovel. Ruhl warns on the danger of paraphrasing, or glossing, a word:
Although  glosses  are  presented  as  evidence,  faithfully  and  accurately 
representing  meaning  that  form  obscures,  they  are  rather  akin  to 
propaganda, serving external judgments that have been made in advance. 
We  have  a  typical  process  of  conscious  distortion.  First,  an  expression 
appears  puzzling  to  the  conscious  mind.  Then,  instead  of  researchers 
admitting  they  are  puzzled,  and  thus  suspending  judgment  while  they 
gather a wider range of data, they rush to a conclusion, based on paraphrase 
and compositionality. The conclusion is disguised because it is formulated 
as a gloss. The researchers then proceed to analyze, not the expression, but 
the gloss. There are no established guidelines for glosses, and so they can 
be slanted or subtly rephrased to support any prior theoretical claim. While 
it is assumed that the glossed expression is misleading, the gloss is taken as 
accurate, at least to the degree that it makes no difference in the analysis. 
The researchers then draw the conclusions that are inherent in the gloss. 
Whatever  results  is  an  irrelevancy,  because  the  original  data  have  been 
eliminated from the proceedings. (1989: 156)
By way of metaphor, it is akin to performing a literary analysis of a summary of Hamlet 
without recourse to the text itself. That we can remove  crawl  in some sentences and 
replace it with grovel while in others we can't (without changing the meaning anyway) 
is  not  evidence  of  polysemy,  partly  because  we  have  removed  the  word  from the 
equation and partly because there are no guidelines in our choice of  grovel. Why not 
fawn,  as also given in table  1,  or  humble oneself,  creep,  or  toady,  all  of  which are 
equivalents  from  the  COBUILD's  thesaurus?  Note  that  each  of  these  introduces 
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semantic and sometimes pragmatic changes. Humbling oneself is an admirable action in 
many cultures and is thus not compatible with  grovelling.  Creeping introduces stealth 
and sneakiness into the picture and obscures the intent of the person, who perhaps is 
seeking  revenge  rather  than  reconciliation or  compromise.  To  fawn and  toady are 
compatible with only a few usages of this alleged meaning of crawl. 
Of course, crawl actually can be paraphrased by grovel in the door example: He 
grovelled back to the door is perfectly acceptable if we treat door metonymically. She 
kicked him out, slammed the door in his face, and  he  eventually felt sorry and came 
grovelling back to that door. In the process of contextualising this, we've completely 
forgotten that  the grovelling sense was never a part  of the original  sentence:  In  He 
crawled back to the door, this is certainly a literal usage without a hint of grovelling. 
We removed the original from the data and jumped to the wrong conclusion.
We leave the usages dealing with animate (or at least animal) subjects and turn 
to the traffic usages (sense #4), which can be exemplified with the following: 
[46] And they walked on, slowly, very close, knowing the car crawled behind.
[47] The street  lamps were already lit,  and a few cars crawled through the 
rough-mirror streets with their lights on and their wipers flapping to and 
fro.
[48] the team was hoisted onto open trucks which took five hours to crawl the 
three  mile  distance  from Lahore  Airport  to  the  Fortress  Stadium with 
thousands and thousands of fans running alongside the procession.
[49] Behind it crawled a hoverbus of MivvyCorp employees having a party.
[50] The convoy crawls on.
[51] All the traffic on the road was also crawling along.
[52] Time crawled past.
[53] They stretched and strained in the darkness, and the hours crawled by like 
years.
As glossing is unreliable proof for the existence of a new sense, we need to distance 
ourselves from the temptation of saying this sense simply means 'to move slowly' and 
leaving  it  at  that.  If  we  have  an  extended  or  metaphoric  sense  (the  two  will  be 
distinguished in chapter three), then we have to account for why—in what ways is it 
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different  from  the  previous  usages?  It  is  easy  to  say  that  sentences  [46]  –  [51] 
demonstrate a metaphoric sense because cars can't literally crawl, and any resemblance 
we may note of a car to, say, an insect (chassis = torso, wheels=legs), fails to explain 
instances like [51] where it is traffic rather than a type of vehicle that is crawling, and 
much less [52] and [53], which I will take to demonstrate a unified sense. 
What's  interesting  about  this  usage  is  that  it  highlights  the  semantic  trait  of 
'slowness'—interesting  because  slowness  is  not  lexically  encoded  into  the  previous 
usages. A crawling adult may well be moving slower than one walking, but the verb 
does not mean 'to move slowly.' If it did, then the word slowly would be be pleonastic in 
[54] -[56], which it isn't, and the adverbs conveying the opposite would be paradoxical 
in [57] - [59].
[54] Dawn crawled slowly
[55] A cloud of steam crawled slowly upwards from the chimney of Wellshot 
Baths.
[56] The creature now crawling slowly from my bed of Bibles was......none 
other than...Tomas, the cat.
[57] Charlie ignored the order and crawled quickly forward until he came to 
the prostrate body of his friend.
[58] She began to crawl hastily away from that wall, head turned back over 
her shoulder to look at it, apparently unaware of their presence.
[59] When he's crawling fast, direct him towards a noisy beanbag.
As these sentences are perfectly intelligible, we can conclude that crawl is not lexically 
encoded for 'slowness'  and that this trait  has been pragmatically abstracted from the 
previous usages to allow [46] – [53] to convey 'slowness' without adverbial support. 
(And it should be noted that an adverb denoting 'slowness' is not redundant here either, 
as [60] shows.)
[60] The train crawled slowly along until, eventually, our destination came in 
sight.
What we may be dealing with here is  crawl's Axiomatic Lexical Shape.  Every 
word, Ruhl argues, has such a shape, consisting of a core, called the 'ground' and a 
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periphery or 'figure.' The ground is arbitrary in that it (the form and meaning) must be 
learnt outright,  while the figure is partially motivated or predictable.  In many cases, 
especially primary words such as do, the ground is so expansive that there is no room 
for the figure; there is no extended meaning of the verb do because the 'literal' is so all-
encompassing. The extended meaning is not a new sense; extending implies a widening, 
not a detaching. This, I suspect (and I have no doubt Ruhl would agree), is the case here 
with crawl. 
Historically, there may be a lexical gap that facilitated this usage of  crawl. At 
least  according  to  my  intuitions,  there  is  no  word  that  means  'to  move  slowly'  (I 
acknowledge the  convenience  of  the  paraphrase)  that  isn't  dependent  on an  already 
established use of the word:  crawl,  inch and  slow  (down).  The  OED  has its  earliest 
citations of both words in the 1600s. (I must confess, however, and this is a criticism I 
might have brought up in chapter one, that I can see no difference between the OED's 
second sense of crawl and its third. If they are the same, then the earliest citation for this 
sense may be 200 years earlier.) Any other words that may occur in a thesaurus cast 
distinctly  negative  overtones  upon  the  agent:  creep,  slither,  etc.  Creep can  be 
substituted with  crawl in [46] – [53] but not without triggering a change of meaning, 
slither less successfully.
However,  'slowness'  is  not  the only trait  of  crawl that  can be foregrounded. 
There  are,  by  my count,  at  least  five  reasons  why an  adult  may  crawl.  We'll  cite 
'slowness' as one possible reasons, though crawling isn't really a method I would chose 
if I merely wanted to move slowly. Another is to constrict one's body height so as to 
move into or out of something that  is  significantly smaller  than one's  normal,  erect 
height, such as a tent or a small tunnel. This would also include instances of hiding, for 
crawling under a window to avoid being seen, etc.  (seen already in [10]). The third 
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reason (presented in no particular order) an adult may crawl is because of injury.  A 
person's legs may be injured and thus crawling is the only option, but if he had been 
shot  in  the  stomach,  he  still  may  have  to  crawl  even  though  his  legs  would  be 
undamaged.  We  will  include  fatigue  with  injury  (the  body  is  not  operating  at  full 
capacity), as the following examples illustrate:
[61] He  crawled  to  a  local  hospital  and  was  transferred  to  Ankara  for 
treatment;
[62] Mr Barrett, father of two, of High Mickley, Northumberland, had to crawl 
for help after being hit in the leg and stomach injured.
[63] Adventurers  who  suffer  these  effects  will  feel  a  sensation  of  almost 
unbearable weakness and will see visions of exhausted people — dressed 
as adventurers like themselves — crawling to the doors of the Castle, but 
lacking the strength to escape. 
The fourth reason, and one I would have overlooked without the use of a corpora, is to 
bring one's self close to the ground so as to investigate it,  such as Sherlock Holmes 
examining  the  ground  for  footprints  or  more  minute  details,  or  for  looking  for 
something specific. 
[64] They  crawled  across  their  chosen  ground  like  detectives  armed  with 
magnifying glasses.
[65] Much later,  when she was sure that  Rose was asleep, she crawled the 
length and breadth of the room with fingers outstretched, feeling in every 
crevice, until she had the ring safe again.
A further reason for crawling is because the subject has, probably recently, been blinded 
or lost her glasses. This is not necessarily a type of injury because it could include being 
in a cave with no source of light. The subject is trying to feel her way because she can 
no longer rely on her eyes, or else she is feeling for her glasses. There are no corpus 
examples that clearly demonstrate this reason at the exclusion of one of the others, so 
we will lump this with the 'investigating' reason.
I bring up these five reasons because the reason for crawling is not inherent in 
the verb  yet  each  can be  foregrounded in  extended usages  just  as  they are  in  non-
extended  instances.  We  have  already  seen  how  slowness  is  extended  above.  An 
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extending of the 'wounded' facet can be seen in [66] and the 'investigating' one in [67]:
[66] Her burst of temper had left her empty,  drained of feeling, and all she 
wanted now was to crawl away somewhere to lick her wounds in private.
[67] Thus, 'Congress has come to dominate the national politics of federalism, 
and its members have gained that dominance by crawling inside the details 
of federal grant programmes and examining the effects of the distribution 
of federal money', instead of the states deciding it themselves.
Crawl isn't so much polysemous as it is multifaceted. Each facet is merely a direction in 
which the word can be pulled, a reason that may be highlighted, but the meaning itself 
remains constant.
The next alleged sense we'll examine is #8, 'of place: be crawling with,' and I 
will warn the reader now that the final sense (of skin crawling) will have to be discussed 
before conclusions about this usage can be reached. This 'crawling with' sense differs 
from the previous usages in that  its  subcategorisation frame requires a  with  PP, the 
object of which must be plural (or at least non-singular: ?The corpse was crawling with  
Anthropoda  but  not  *The corpse  was  crawling  with  an  ant).  So  far  we have  been 
dealing with syntactically  identical  realisations  of  crawl and looking for a semantic 
contrast. Here, an additional variable is thrown in, and for that reason alone a semantic 
contrast cannot be isolated. However,  crawl's monosemy is not threatened if it can be 
shown that the syntactic difference is the only variation and that semantically the word's 
meaning as established is still carried through. If  crawl is monosemic, and this usage 
therefore not a separate sense, then the PP cannot be considered a required complement. 
This  usage  as  proposed  by  the  four  learner  dictionaries  consulted  by  Fillmore  and 
Atkins can be exemplified with the following BNC data:
[68] As she walked, it seemed to Jane that the stars looked down, calmly and 
mockingly, at this speck in the universe, crawling with ants fighting each 
other.
[69] The area was crawling with caterpillars, upon which vast flocks of birds – 
including  the  beautiful  straw-necked  ibises  –  descended,  and,  in  their 
wake,  hundreds  of  hawks  of  three  or  four  different  species  hovered, 
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attracted by the sudden abundance of prey.
[70] Half buried in the dirty straw, beside a bone crawling with flies, lay the 
phrenology book, undisturbed since the Collector's last visit.
[71] The tub is kept in a warm place and within a few days is crawling with 
worms.
[72] His front left paw was broken and crawling with maggots.
[73] It's crawling with cops.
[74] Mrs Thatcher's car is armour-plated, the platform party leaves in a tank-
like bus, the town crawls with policemen, and all this vigilance costs ?
[75] No wonder Deptford was crawling with patrol cars.
[76] Lisbon was crawling with spies, and information changed hands for vast 
amounts of money.
[77] It's crawling with pretentious wankers.
In [68] – [72], the object of the with PP is things we have already discussed, things well 
associated with crawling. In [73] it shifts to people, particularly police in [73] – [74] 
and, metonymically, in [75], then by extension to spies. It's worth noting that the verb of 
[74] is not progressive, though the wording of the definition, 'be crawling with' (at least 
if  encountered  in  an  actual  dictionary  rather  than  Fillmore  and  Atkins'  summary) 
suggests that it should be. So why the jump from maggots to police officers? The prima 
facie explanation is that they are deemed just as undesirable by the speaker, that they are 
another form of pests, and that might be a reasonable explanation if we hadn't already 
mentioned  the  'investigating'  facet  described  above,  that  these  police  and  spies  are 
crawling (even if not physically) over an area because they are investigating, as opposed 
to the worms and flies who are crawling over their areas because that is how they move. 
The pretentious wankers, therefore,  would group with the worms (the speaker using 
metaphor to express disapproval) rather than the police. It might be tempting to note this 
and say we have two senses here since some group  together with one instance while 
others with another, but—ironically—the more divisions we make, the more unified the 
word is. In other words, a word with two related senses, which we will encounter in the 
following  chapter,  may  be  polysemous;  when  we  get  a  word  with  20,  it's  time  to 
consider  monosemy.  The  more  usages  we  have,  the  less  discrete  and  the  more 
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connected they are. 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002) group this use of crawl with other verbs whose 
subject slot can be filled with either the theme or locative with no change of meaning, as 
in Vermin were crawling over him and He was crawling with vermin. They list 24 such 
verbs, including swarm, resonate and flicker. I see this as a syntactic property of these 
words because, with crawl, the ants are still crawling, and the image of police and spies 
is still one of physical, just not necessarily actual, crawling.
We now add to this the final sense, 'of skin etc.: creeping sensation,' illustrated 
with the following:
[78] His lethal smile made her skin crawl.
[79] She could see by his self-satisfied expression that he intended to make 
himself  a fixture,  and somehow, despite her friendship with Elaine,  the 
thought of having to work closely with James on a day-to-day basis made 
Christina's flesh crawl.
[80] But  it  was  Gerry  Conlon's  account  of  being  interrogated  after  the 
Guildford bombings that made the scalp crawl.
The  notion  that  skin  can  crawl  is  an  odd  one,  as  this  is  clearly  distinct  from the 
movement of snakes and maggots. Of the total 16 instances of this usage in the BNC, 
two are followed by a  with PP, presented below and supplemented with a quotation 
found in the OED:
[81] His scalp crawled with tension.
[82] Despite the heat of the sun, her skin was crawling with goosepimples.
[83] All my skin crawled with lyce. [OED]
It is here, particularly in [83] that we see where the meaning of this use comes from, 
that it is likely (based on synchronic judgements of the diachronic data—the OED quote 
dating  from 1576)  the  same  as  the  previous  sense  ('crawling  with')  but  which  has 
formed a cluster involving skin as a subject and dropping the with PP. 
Interestingly, the OED quotation is from the 'to be all alive with' sense and not 
from the 'skin crawling' sense. In choosing the numerous sentences in this chapter, I 
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have made an effort to show instances in which only one sense of crawl was active. The 
fact is that many uses of the word do not snap to one particular 'sense,' as the remaining 
sentences attest.
[84] Fifty years ago, British prisoners of war who dared speak their mind were 
forced to crawl on their bellies to say sorry to the Japanese.
[85] Evening turned into night with considerable speed in the tropics, and by 
the  time  Howard's  smouldering  car  crawled  back  into  the  university 
grounds, it was almost fully dark.
In [84], we have both the physical  and the grovelling facet,  while [85] has both the 
'move  slowly'  facet  associated  with  cars  but  also  the  injured  one  just  as  the  OED 
quotation straddles two alleged sense. Furthermore, are the many instances of 'crawling 
into/out of bed' examples of the fatigue facet or the physical movement? Instances such 
as these show the unity of these 'senses' rather than their alleged discreteness. If these 
particular senses were discrete, then these sentences would be zeugmatic, yet they are 
perfectly understandable and well-formed.
We have now examined the nine senses which Fillmore and Atkins extracted 
from the four learner dictionaries, and which they deemed an insufficient number and 
examine several BNC sentences not covered by them. Having demonstrated that, at the 
very least, there is a theoretical framework for considering the first nine senses to be one 
unified sense, and having done so in a lengthy discourse, I feel no need to burden the 
reader further with a discussion of their proposed additions. They can be left with the 
claim that that  none of them represent anything more than contextual variations and 
none exhibit discrete semantic properties.
Throughout, I have made a few diachronic references (the development of the 
'skin crawling' usage and the lexical gap facilitating the 'move slowly' use) despite my 
previous claim that Ruhl's outlook was 'largely synchronic.' It is not without reason that 
I qualified it with 'largely.' Ruhl's notion of synchrony and diachrony may deviate from 
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the accepted understanding of these terms. His linguistic view is not a simple choice 
between  the  two.  He  defines  synchrony  as  relatively  fast  time  and  diachrony  as 
relatively slow. Synchrony, as Ruhl interprets its usual understanding, is an idealisation, 
ignoring not only past changes but present variation, a view Ruhl does not subscribe to 
any more than he believes in idealised senses. To him, synchrony idealises away any 
variation. My implementation of diachrony here has been in line with Ruhl's: language 
users do, after all, have intuitions about how certain words have developed the way they 
have (i.e., that calling a unit of corn 'an ear' branches off from the 'organ of hearing' 
usage),  and  these  intuitions  colour  their  understanding  of  the  words  as  synchronic 
entities.
Conclusion
If this chapter has proved one thing, it's that monosemy is not an easy thing to 
represent.  The  goal  of  this  chapter  has  been  to  demonstrate  Ruhl's  argument  and 
therefore to argue that monosemy accounts for more words than we generally assume it 
to, but how it should be represented—how, that is, that dictionaries should incorporate 
Ruhl's theories—has not been presented here, nor is it by Ruhl himself.
But  the  overall  goal  of  this  chapter  has  been  to  show that  monosemy,  hard 
though it may be to represent, offers a logically sound starting point, that it is better to 
start with the assumption that a word has one meaning until we've proven it has two or 
more rather than to assume it has many and start numbering them as we think of them, 
with no guidelines for when one sense becomes another. Again, it is the very act of 
defining—of moulding  one semantic  aspect  into a  paraphrase—that  delimits  it,  thus 
propagating the need for further definitions, and it is this recursion that this thesis, by 
observing the monosemic bias, hopes to avoid. 
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It can be argued that the multi-numbered senses that dictionaries do present were 
never meant to be discrete, mutually exclusive chunks of meaning, and that the 'facets' I 
propose are no different in intent to these senses. Ruhl believes, and I agree, that the 
notion of multiple meanings is deeply embedded in our understanding of words, both 
the linguist's understanding and the popular understanding. Some criteria are needed, 
and not different criteria for each word. We cannot group usages together because they 
somehow look similar and then decide post facto what the senses are. The monosemic 
bias does not argue against the existence of polysemy—it is, after all, only a bias—only 
that polysemy is too readily assumed. Multiple—and related—meanings that do exist 
within words is the subject of the following chapter.
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Cha  pter three: Polysemy and types of polysemes  
If,  as  Ruhl  asserts,  the  true,  monosemic  meaning  of  a  word  is  unconscious 
knowledge, then we have a pedagogical problem: how can it be taught? The answer is 
that it probably can't. From a purely semantic point of view, Ruhl's monosemic bias is a 
fascinating airing out of unchallenged notions that  proposes a significantly  different 
theory of meaning, but it fails to inform a second language pedagogy. If, as he claims, 
monosemy is a property of words that native speakers do not have direct access to, then 
there is little point in native speaking teachers learning it so that they convey this arcane 
knowledge to their students. The monosemic bias is a move from discrete (if arbitrary) 
points to unteachably vague concepts.
Another problem with Ruhl is that in his impressive explication of monosemy 
and his efforts to debunk the notion that verbs like bear, hit and kick are polysemous, he 
routinely fails to demonstrate what he does consider polysemous. A careful reading will 
reveal that he considers orange ('fruit' and 'colour') polysemous and light ('non-dark' and 
'non-heavy') homonymous, but these two examples are mentioned separately and very 
much in passing, and the difference between them is never explained.
The following occurrences of polysemy therefore do not attempt to be cases of 
what Ruhl would consider polysemy but rather polysemes whose senses are delimited in 
ways teachable to L2 learners. Far from being a rejection of the monosemic bias, this 
thesis is an attempt to make it practical.  Ruhl's claim that senses cannot be ascribed 
arbitrarily on a word-by-word basis retains a nuclear position here. The goal here is not 
to find as many kinds of polysemic variations as possible but as few; these are presented 
as top-down categories rather than the various subtypes. These subtypes account for the 
overly-numerous senses we find in dictionaries, processes rendered unteachable both by 
their sheer number and by their minute,  hair-splitting differences. Hence, the section 
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below  on  lexical  metaphor  does  not  attempt  to  inventory  all  the  various  kinds  of 
metaphor we could employ by examining their tenor and vehicle, to use terms from the 
classical literature on the subject. Such accounts have been avoided not just because the 
goal here is to provide an overview but also because the relevance of such details to the 
learner  is  questionable.  For  further  accounts  of  metaphor,  see  Lakoff  and  Johnson 
(1980) Kövecses (2002), and Croft and Cruse (2004). 
It is now time that we attempt a definition of polysemy. I engage here in the trite 
but necessary practice of breaking the word into its morphological structure not, I stress, 
to arrive at the definition, as the meaning of any word can drift from its root and affixes 
over time, but to highlight the direction the definition will take. Specifically, it is the 
root, -sem-, derived from the Greek sēma 'sign' and  sēmainein  'signify,' that I want to 
draw attention to, and to the fact that the same root is found in  semantic, semaphore,  
semiology and other words. I do this to propose that polysemy be defined as a semantic 
entity and not by indirect recourse to non-semantic traits, the reasons for which, along 
with several of these traits, will be discussed in chapter four. This is not a conservative 
effort  to  enforce  the  word's  original  root;  rather,  it  is  well  within  the  framework 
established so far: our observance of the monosemic bias has been to factor out the non-
semantic. Polysemy, then, must be a semantic entity.
The remainder of this thesis, then, will  consider a word polysemous if it  has 
senses that are discrete, and if synchronic intuitions can account for a reasonable theory 
in which one sense generated the other.  Both of these factors are developed below. 
Discreteness, that the senses are very clearly demarcated, assures that we are dealing 
with semantic entities and not contextual variations that are the domain of pragmatics. 
That a path can be seen for generation is to remove most cases of homonymy as well as 
instances of vague relatedness. This may lead to diachronically 'incorrect' judgements, 
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but this is fine. Such theories have at least as legitimate a claim to 'linguistic reality' as 
do  etymologies  as  they  are  fashioned  by  the  users  of  a  language  rather  than  the 
specialists. If we can see a connection between the ear of corn and the ear with which 
we hear,  we  can  teach  it,  and  if  we are  not  aware  of  the  'lost  sense'  bridging  the 
'footstool' and 'faeces' senses of  stool, then teachers should not be expected to learn it 
(and similar cases for many other words) nor should students necessarily be burdened 
with such knowledge. (I do, however, have no problem with teachers using such senses 
to explain and perhaps provide a mnemonic when the knowledge is available. I do so 
myself.) 
Within this framework, this chapter will reveal that there are only two types of 
semantically-defined  polysemy.  These  will  be  thoroughly  discussed  with  diagnostic 
tests to help identify them. Although argued at  length above that pragmatics merely 
creates a false illusion of polysemy, some of these pragmatic operations are sufficiently 
discrete that they are demonstrable and teachable, and these will be discussed as well. 
These  pragmatic  effects  are  not  considered  pure  polysemy  here  but  are  discussed 
because of their relevance to the L2 learner who lacks the pragmatic knowledge to see 
them as unified senses.  The goal of this  chapter,  then,  is  re-evaluate  polysemy as a 
strictly  semantic  entity  and re-distribute  it  among the appropriate  linguistic  spheres, 
semantics being just one part of the picture.
3.1 Lexical metaphor
The first type of polysemy we will examine is the kind that relies heavily on 
metaphor and has a clear-cut literal/metaphoric divide. The order in which the various 
types of polysemy are presented is determined by the application of the diagnostic tests 
employed to reveal them, which need to be executed in this order. 
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An example of lexical metaphor, one I will use time and again throughout this 
thesis, is flavour with its literal meaning of that which is perceived via the sense of taste 
(aided by smell) and a metaphoric sense referring to vague qualities perceived by other 
senses, usually orally or aurally, as in a painting or melody having a Spanish flavour. A 
lexical  metaphor must be a single lexical  unit—in other words, generally one word. 
Saying an explanation 'holds water' certainly employs metaphor but is not mononymic 
and therefore not a matter of polysemy, which is why I have chosen to call the first type 
'lexical metaphors' rather than just 'metaphors.' Lexical metaphors are words that have 
both a literal and a metaphoric meaning, both of which have synchronic currency in the 
language. This means that, on one hand, deflower whose literal meaning is, at best, very 
rare would not qualify and neither, on the other hand, would a nonce metaphoric usage. 
A  further  distinction  must  be  drawn  between  metaphoric  meanings  and  'extended 
meanings.'  As the previous chapter proposed, extending a meaning does not entail  a 
new, detached sense; metaphor does. 
Lexical metaphors can usually be unveiled by the word   literally  .   If this seems 
simple, it isn't. Care must be taken that literally is bound to the word in question, that its 
scope is  restricted  to  that  one word,  and that  the proper  meaning of  literally (itself 
arguably  polysemous)  is  activated.  For  example,  in  She  sells  seashells  by  the  
seashore...literally,  the word  literally does not select  one word. It is not clear if  it's 
intended to mark the literal meaning of  seashore, seashells, sells, or the sentence as a 
whole. An easy way to restrict the scope of literally is to add it just before the word in 
question, although this approach is frequently ineffective when the word isn't a verb: 
She literally sells seashells by the seashore is fine if we're testing sells, but it does not 
work well if we wished to test one of the nouns: *She sells seashells by the literally  
seashore. The best technique is to reiterate the word we seek to test, either right away or 
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at the end of the sentence, adding literally to the reiteration, thus: She sells seashells—
literally  seashells—by  the  seashore  or She  sells  seashells  by  the  seashore,  literally  
seashells.  This  technique  is  a  catch-all  and  can  be  used  with  any  part-of-speech, 
including  verbs.  (Incidentally,  if  the  meaning  of  these  sentences  sounds  odd  with 
literally added, it's because lexical metaphor is not present in any of these words. This is 
part of the test as we shall see.)
It  is  also  important  to  ensure  that  literally is  being  used  with  the  desired 
meaning. Frequently it is used not to highlight a literal meaning but as an intensifier. I 
once heard a friend say, to express his shock, 'I died. I literally died.' Obviously, this is 
not  the  usage  we wish  to  apply  in  our  test.  This  does  not  influence  how tests  are 
constructed;  the  task  of  selecting  the  right  meaning  comes  when  we  access  our 
intuitions.
Test #1: Lexical metaphor
Action: Add the word  literally to a sentence, ensuring that it is bound to exactly one 
word and that it is not acting as an intensifier.
Results:
A. Uninterpretability or a bizarre change of meaning: lexical metaphor is present.
B.  No  change  of  meaning  and  the  word  literally is  distracting:  either  no  lexical 
metaphor is present or the literal  meaning is being employed. Try the same word in 
other sentences.
C. Uncertain change of meaning: metaphor may be present elsewhere in the sentence.
D.  Other  meanings  activated  but  not  selected:  not  lexical  metaphor  but  probably 
'vicariant polysemy,' the next type discussed, or even homonymy.
Examples and discussion:
Result A is the kind this test seeks to illuminate. It is, in fact, quite rare in its 
purist form. Consider the following sentences testing flavour:
[1] Christchurch has a British flavour.
[2] This cake has a chocolate flavour.
[1a] Christchurch has a British flavour, literally.
[2a] This cake has a chocolate flavour, literally.
In this case, I've avoided the catch-all method of reiterating the target word in favour of 
succinct and more natural sound sentences, but the scope of literally is bound just the 
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same. The meaning of [1] is quite normal, but in [1a] it is drastically changed. I imagine 
someone tasting the ground and perhaps buildings of Christchurch. It is this kind of 
bizarre meaning that demonstrates the existence of lexical metaphor. Examples [2] and 
[2a] illustrate the literal sense of this polyseme for the sake of contrast. 
Result  B,  no  change  of  meaning,  can  be  seen  (in  addition  to  [2a]  and  the 
seashells sentences) with: 
[3] This is a happy song, literally.
Whether  literally is bound to  happy or  song doesn't really matter because neither is a 
lexical metaphor. 
Result C is an uncertain change of meaning. It again shows why I have been 
careful to call this type 'lexical metaphor' and not just 'metaphor,' and also takes us to 
one of the senses of crawl that Fillmore and Atkins (2000) proposed which we skipped 
over in chapter two.
[4] The clouds literally crawled across the sky.
It's  not  entirely  clear  if  literally is  changing the meaning of  crawl (which  we have 
already deemed  monosemous)  or  not  even  though  we  know clouds  cannot  literally 
crawl. Does the literal meaning of crawl mean to move on hands and knees like a baby? 
or does it mean to move with the torso close to the ground, like an ant? or does it mean 
to move slowly? The problem of interpreting [4] is not in the verb at all.  What has 
happened is that we have personified clouds, and once we've entered into this metaphor 
(clouds = people), then we may freely attribute any human or animal characteristic we 
see fit, including not just crawling but flying, standing still, and crying. To make crawl 
carry the entire  burden of  the metaphor  is  to  misattribute  it.  Lexical  metaphor  is  a 
metaphor restricted to one single lexeme, as with flavour in [1] and [2], which is not the 
case with the crawling clouds.
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Another possibility is that the word is part of a larger construction, such as the 
flavour  of  the  month/day/moment,  phrases.  Here,  the  metaphor  stems  not  just  from 
flavour but from the larger constituent. It is not a metaphoric 'flavour' of the month; it is 
a metaphoric 'flavour of the month.'
An example of result D, when other meanings present themselves but none of 
them are actually selected, is:
[5] This soup is hot, literally.
Two senses of  hot rise to the surface, that the soup is either piping hot or spicy, but 
literally does not select  either of these. One is not more literal  than other nor  is the 
difference between the two attributable  to metaphor.  It  is  either  vicariant  polysemy, 
discussed in 3.2, or else homonymy.
Before  moving  on  to  the  next  section,  an  alternate  test  will  be  pointed  out. 
Sometimes when the resulting sentence is awkward and yields uncertain results, there is 
a cross-check at our disposal, which is to replace literally with metaphorically speaking. 
The  truth  value  of  Christchurch  has  a  British  flavour,  metaphorically  speaking 
reinforces it as a lexical metaphor, as does the redundancy of the final two words. But 
This is a happy song, metaphorically speaking  is just as odd as it was with  literally, 
further suggesting that lexical metaphor is not present. This is useful in events where the 
sentence with  literally ends up creating a new metaphor; for example forcing a literal 
reading  of  rich in  This  cake  is  awfully  rich (literally  rich)  would  result  in  a  new 
metaphor (food = people, which is not the metaphor that my mind normally construes 
for this use of rich). The 'metaphorically speaking' cross-check helps us sort through the 
confusion.
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3.1.1 Traits of lexical metaphor 
One trait of our definition of metaphor is the mutual exclusiveness of each sense. 
Hence we can say they are  discrete  despite  the metaphoric  being dependent  on the 
literal.  Generally,  a  lexical  metaphor  cannot  be  used  to  evoke  both  senses 
simultaneously.  The  literal  use  of  flavour covers  the  culinary  domain,  and  the 
metaphoric covers everything but the culinary.  The only time they can overlap is in 
humorous or 'clever' usages such as puns, as seen in 'Our menu has a local flavour.' (I 
would  argue  this  is  still  the  metaphoric  sense,  unless  flavour specifically  means 
'flavouring' or 'spice,' but I acknowledge there is still some punning going on.) Outside 
the cartoon world, a neck tie can only be  loud in one sense. Contrast this with  hot,  
which is polysemous but not a lexical metaphor, in 'My soup is hot.' We mean either it 
is 'spicy'  hot  or 'temperature'  hot  but this sentence cannot mean both, even though the 
soup may well be both. It is possible to activate both senses simultaneously,  and the 
means for doing so form the diagnostic test for the second type of polysemy, discussed 
below.
We can also see how the literal  sense might  have generated  the  metaphoric. 
There is a lexical gap in which no dedicated word refers to a 'vague quality,' so certain 
traits—but not all—of an existing word,  flavour, were imported along with the word 
form.
Another  trait  of  lexical  metaphor  is  that  the  two senses  of  lexical  metaphor 
polysemes  frequently entail  a  change of  subcategorisation.  The examples  of  flavour 
above fit the same syntactic frame (A has a B  flavour), and there are other instances 
where the patterns are identical (A has a B flavour, A gives B a C flavour), but there are 
syntactic patterns that are unique to each. For example, the literal use can be used 'bare' 
as in [6], but the metaphoric cannot be used in this manner. (A few rare exceptions are 
discussed in chapter four, which more closely examines traits of lexical metaphor.)
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[6] In addition hops provide bitterness as well as flavour. (BNC)
This provides a problem. Since literal and metaphoric senses occur in different 
environments, both cannot always fit into the same test pattern. Sometimes a different 
subcategorisation is required to override the literal meaning:
[7] He peppered his steak.
[8] *He peppered his speech.
[9] He peppered his speech with snide comments. 
But note that it is not pleonastic to say:
[10] He peppered his steak with a solid gold pepper shaker/pepper pot.
because the  with PP in  [10]  is  an adjunct  that  adds  more  information  while  it  is  a 
required complement in [9], as demonstrated by the ungrammaticality of [8].
A third trait regards collocations. That collocations will differ for each sense is 
perhaps obvious since we've already seen that the literal and metaphoric senses occur in 
different semantic domains, but it's worth noting that the literal sense, being bound to a 
specific domain, will frequently have strong collocates while the metaphoric, free of this 
constraint, has few or none. According to BNC data, the literal use of flavour collocates 
with  full,  strong,  distinctive,  slightly and  texture,  among many others,  but  very few 
content words collocate only to the metaphoric sense, of which international is one. A 
complete list of both is presented in chapter four. Likewise, the metaphoric verb pepper 
has no strong content-word collocation (based on frequency);  'four-letter'  is the only 
lexical item that occurs more than once, and only two instances of it can be found. (This 
is ignoring instances like peppered catfish, which is the name of a species and not a dish 
made with pepper.) 
The collocations for metaphoric senses are not without patterns, however, but 
the human observer, and not the computer, is required to determine them. For example, 
the words  Scottish,  Grecian,  Brazilian,  British and  German occur only once or twice 
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each with flavour and are therefore not strong enough to be collocates, but we can see 
the pattern that the computer misses, that adjectives formed from the names of countries 
(or other socially defined groups like Californian) do occur with the metaphoric sense 
of flavour. 
Also, some collocates of the literal sense can be found in the metaphoric sense as 
well, as with distinctive here:
[11]  but  still  one might  hope that  the  writer  would succeed in  suggesting the 
highly distinctive flavour of his talk, his inimitable way of retailing a diverting 
anecdote leisurely and with a modicum of circumlocution, from which in due time 
the point of the story is sure to emerge. 
[12] No sooner had this year's tournament finished, than work began on the £10m 
octagonal shaped 14,000 seater stadium, which will have giant palm trees growing 
through the stairways to help maintain the distinctive flavour of South Florida. 
(BNC)
This also happens with  rich and bitter-sweet and could potentially happen with many 
other  words.  What  this  shows is  an awareness of  the metaphor  by users,  who then 
extend it. The lemma give, on the other hand, acts more as a function word in this case 
and  is  therefore  considered  part  of  the  subcategorisation,  but  in  both  cases  the 
metaphoric extension is importing something from the literal base.
3.1.2 Special cases of lexical metaphor
A  few  instances  can  be  found  that  resist  the  'literally'  test.  As  we've  seen, 
metaphoric  senses  have  a  well-defined  dividing  line  between their  literal  senses,  as 
flavour has a culinary/non-culinary border. The subtype discussed here delineates the 
metaphor  and the literal  along the lines  of the concreteness  and abstractness  of the 
arguments they take. Take, for example, the word regurgitate. Essentially meaning 'to 
vomit,'  the  word  has  taken  on  a  metaphoric  reading,  that  students  can  regurgitate 
information their teacher has just given them means they have taken in the information 
but  it  has  not  been  fully  digested  (another  word  reinforcing  the  same  conceptual 
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metaphor). However, the literal sense is restricted to concrete direct objects ('pellets' is a 
common  one  in  the  BNC)  while  the  metaphoric  sense  covers  only  abstract  nouns 
('information' or 'theories'). 
Because the two uses of regurgitate are so neatly divided by their arguments, the 
'literally' test fails to be applicable: we cannot compose a successful sentence frame for 
our test. One cannot regurgitate information literally, nor pellets metaphorically (unless 
the  pellets  themselves  metaphoric,  which  is  a  different  case).  This  problem  was 
circumvented  above  by  talking  about  the  flavour  of  Christchurch,  which  has  both 
concrete and abstract aspects, and by avoiding instances like the 'flavour of the speech' 
which cannot be construed literally. However, regurgitate leaves us no option. For this 
subtype,  no  test  is  offered,  only  a  word  of  caution:  metaphors  that  hinge  on  the 
abstract/concrete distinction of the word's arguments will fall through the cracks of the 
'literally'  test.  These  senses  will,  however,  still  be  considered  metaphors  because  a 
concept from one domain—bodily functions in the case of  regurgitate—is applied to 
another. Similarly, we can stretch a piece of rubber and we can stretch theories, we can 
cultivate crops and we can  cultivate friendships, and we can  orchestrate symphonies 
and we can orchestrate campaigns. (The word symphony is considered a concrete noun 
here because orchestrating one canonically involves writing down the physical  notes 
and  its  aural  realisation  is  still  a  physical  event.)  However,  words  that  take  either 
concrete  or  abstract  arguments  are  not  necessarily  metaphoric,  as  is  the  case  with 
pinpoint,  except  when  we're  talking  about  literally  sticking  pins  in  a  map,  but 
pinpointing a location and pinpointing a problem are not metaphorically distinct. This 
word is discussed more below. 
The following sentences illustrates another special case.
[13] He carted his parents around when they came to visit him.
[13a] He literally carted his parents around when they came to visit him.
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It could be argued that [13a] (when read to indicate he put his parents in some kind of 
cart)  is  not sufficiently ludicrous  to signify a change of meaning,  but the degree of 
bizarreness is not a testable quality. However, the low level of bizarreness is a red flag 
that always needs investigating. In this case, we can delve deeper and theorise that the 
metaphor  refers  to  the  noun  cart  and  therefore  the  verbal  usage  does  not,  strictly 
speaking, contain a metaphor, other than that which it imported from the noun. 
3.2 Vicariant polysemy
This second type of polysemy is the afore-mentioned variety of which hot is an 
example. Readers may have already begun objecting to 'spicy' hot not being considered 
a  metaphoric  extension of  'temperature'  hot.  In  fact,  I've  no  doubt  that  traditional 
rhetoric could explain it as a metaphor, but that it fails the 'literally' test reveals it as a 
different kind of polyseme. Whatever its etymology, the 'spicy' sense is not as parasitic 
upon the 'temperature'  sense as the metaphoric  reading of  flavour is  upon its  literal 
counterpart.  The  'spicy'  sense  is  more  autonomous,  and  the  two  senses  are  more 
balanced.
The notion of vicariance is borrowed from biology. Vicariant species are those 
that have developed as separate entities but which are considered to have developed 
from a common ancestor. Applying this to our semantic scenario, vicariant polysemes 
are those that are clearly related but which have developed as separate entities (and not 
explainable by metaphor).
We've already noted the lack of zeugma in hot. Food can be simultaneously hot 
in more than one way, even though the word itself will only denote one sense. It is thus 
ambiguous. Although language use in real life (as opposed to semantic texts) is seldom 
ambiguous, this is one of the few examples that frequently is. Many of us have had the 
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experience of dining at, say, an Indian or Mexican restaurant, and when we take the first 
bite of our newly-arrived food, our dinner mate asks if it's hot, and we're not really sure 
which  sense of  hot they  are  using.  It  is  this  ambiguity  that  allows  us  to  test  these 
instances.
Our test is to add the phrase 'and in more ways than one' to the sentence frame. 
The same care we exercised with 'literally' needs to be applied here as well to ensure the 
scope of this phrase is bound to the word we seek to test. Reiterating the word with the 
phrase added will usually work.
Test #2: Vicariant polysemy
Action:  After  performing the 'literally'  test,  add 'and in  more  ways  than one'  to  the 
original sentence containing the test word and ensure its scope is bound to the candidate 
polyseme.
Results:
A. Two or more full meanings are activated: vicariant polysemy.
B.  Nonsense because  only one  meaning  is  present;  the  added phrase is  distracting: 
monoseme.
C. One meaning is pragmatically suppressed.
D. Two or more readings may be possible but the distinction raised is unimportant: 
facets (Cruse 2000).
E. Multiple but compatible interpretations possible: microsenses (Cruse 2000).
F. Two or more readings possible but more information is needed to understand the 
sentence—embedding  in  full  discourse  would  probably  make  it  clear: 
underspecification (Copestake 1995).
G.  Multiple but incompatible meanings are present; the word form is homonymic.  
Examples and discussion:
 This test has more results than the previous one, the distinctions between which 
are often quite small, so we need to be careful. First, though, we examine the results that 
reveal vicariant polysemy.
[14] I found the soup hot, which it was in more ways than one.
Sentence 14 clearly activates both senses of hot, and both senses are compatible. 
As already noted,  soup can  be both  spicy hot  and piping  hot  and  while  hot would 
usually mean one or the other, this sentence frame shows that the two are not mutually 
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exclusive as is the case with lexical  metaphor.  Note that this test activates a second 
sense not intended by the original sentence.
Some other examples that demonstrate vicariant polysemy follow.
[15] She's acting funny, and in more ways than one.
[16] Yesterday, I had a dream, and in more ways than one.
[17] For some time now, he's had the odd fantasy about his assistant—odd in 
more ways than one.
[18] The doctor joked that his wife had a good heart, and in more ways than one. 
[19] Her heart is weak, and I mean heart in more ways than one.
The  words  funny,  dream,  odd and  heart each  have  meanings  that  are  on 
somewhat equal footing. There is funny 'ha ha' and there is funny 'crazy.' There are the 
dreams we have when we sleep and those we have for our future. Odd can mean 'weird' 
or it could mean 'occasional' (not to mention another meaning, that relating to numeric 
parity,  that  is suppressed by the context here), and  heart can refer to the organ that 
pumps blood or to the symbol of love (not to mention 'centre,' etc.). The word heart is 
tested twice because [18] could also pass the 'literally' test. It is best to begin with the 
'literally'  test  but  also  to  employ  both  tests.  (So  far  we've  been  dealing  with  the 
dangerously simplistic notion that polysemes have exactly two meanings, when in fact 
they could have three or more, each a different kind of polysemy.)
A special case needs mentioning.
[20] She listens primarily to romantic music, romantic in more ways than one.
The two meanings of 'romantic' here include Romantic music, or music of the Romantic 
era as opposed to the Baroque, Classical or Modern eras, and romantic music in the 
sense of Jackie Gleason's  Music for Lovers  or the latest  pop ballad.  This raises two 
points. First, for many, the word romantic is, strictly speaking, not polysemous because 
its  written  form is  different,  one  being  capitalised.  However,  this  distinction  is  not 
rigidly adhered to, and moreover, it is certainly not a different form in the same way that 
ground (as in 'touch the ground') and ground (as in 'ground beef') is. We'll allow some 
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leniency here. The second point that  is raised is the sloppiness of the test frame we 
composed. Saying that someone listens to one kind of music in more ways than one 
borders on the paradoxical. Rather:
[21] She listens to romantic music, romantic in more ways than one.
This kind of care is a constant issue.
A final example of this kind of polysemy is given here:
[22] She ate the pepper, and I mean pepper in more ways than one.
While the awkwardness of this sentence is acknowledged, it nonetheless highlights the 
lexemes of  pepper the vegetable  and  pepper the condiment.  ('She ate  both kinds of 
pepper' sounds less awkward, but this construction is unreliable as a polysemy test as it 
could mean she ate a jalapeño and a chilli,  or some black pepper and some cayenne 
pepper,  while  'in  more  ways  than  one'  implies  more  discrete  differences.)  The 
awkwardness  stems  largely  from  the  two  uses  of  pepper being  different  syntactic 
entities—one is a countable noun and the other non-countable. Allan (1980) points out 
that most nouns can be either count or non-count 
The condiment use fits neatly into 
Instances such as these are often hard to write convincing test frames for because the 
different  syntactic  qualities  of  each  sense  restrict  the  form  from  operating 
zeugmatically, which is what the test frame tries to accomplish. I would argue that these 
are not actual polysemes for this very reason, that  they are different parts-of-speech 
(both nouns, but different kinds of nouns), but of course, the learner of English as a 
second language may lack knowledge of this distinction and see pepper as polysemous.
Moving on to  result  B,  monosemy,  we can use the  same sentence  as  in  the 
previous test. 
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[23] This is a happy song, and in more ways than one.
Again, no matter which word we chose to attach the phrase to, there is no other meaning 
evoked. Every word here is a monoseme.
Result C regards pragmatically suppressed readings.
[24] I wrote a letter this morning, and in more ways than one.
This is technically ambiguous but one of the readings, that I spent the morning writing, 
say, the letter t, is suppressed because, I would hope, my interlocutors do not find me so 
boring as to engage in such an activity.  It's best to try more sentence frames, although 
there  may  not  always  be  natural  sounding  ones.  'I  just  wrote  a  letter'  is  slightly 
preferable, but one reading still makes for a pretty boring achievement.
The remaining results will be dealt with fairly quickly here for two reasons: first 
because they are not considered polysemy but unified senses, and second because they 
are developed elsewhere by other authors. Result D types exemplifies what Cruse (Croft 
and Cruse, 2004) calls 'facets.' 
[25] Dr Johnson plans to buy a new knife—a new knife in more ways than one.
Knife seems  to  have  only  one  meaning,  but  there  are  a  variety  of  knives  used  for 
different purposes. Dr Johnson could require both a kitchen knife and a surgical knife. 
This is considered monosemic and is discussed here only for completeness as the test 
can produce this kind of result. 
Likewise, result E, Cruse's notion of microsenses (Croft and Cruse, 2001), can 
be revealed as well:
[26] This is a good book, and in more ways than one. 
The two aspects that are raised here are book as a product of literature (the story, prose, 
poetry,  etc.) and  book as a product of publishing (the paper quality,  the binding, the 
cover,  etc.).  This  is  considered  a  single  sense  even  though  both  aspects  can  be 
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distinguished and selected separately; unless the new e-books provide an exception, the 
two aspects are married and generally cannot be divorced from each other. Again: a 
single sense in which the test produces results that require discussion here. Recalling 
our L2 learners, they are hardly likely to be stumped by This is a good book, no matter 
which facet is highlighted. The test presented here should not be considered a means of 
distinguishing between facets and microsenses.
Next is result F, this time a kind of word discussed by Ann Copestake (1995) 
regarding underspecification. 
[27] He plans to buy some new keyboards, and in more ways than one. (or: He 
plans to buy more than one kind of keyboard.)
This could mean he plans to buy a computer keyboard and a musical keyboard. That it's 
not clear which of these two disparate types is intended by the speaker is not evidence 
of polysemy but the result of keyboard being underspecified. Likewise, reel (reel-to-reel 
tapes,  fishing  reel,  etc.)  and  card (playing  ~,  business  ~,  credit  ~,  etc.)  are 
underspecified  without  the  attributive  modifiers.  These  are  instances  in  which  the 
abstract  'underlying  meaning'  (Nation  1990)  is  clearly  the  real  meaning.  Certain 
readings can also be pragmatically suppressed here: When someone says 'I gave him my 
card,'  it  generally does not mean the ace of spades, although certain contexts would 
allow that reading.
Finally, there is result G, which determines that the word is a homonym of some 
sort,  either  a  pure  or  a  cognitive  homonym.  The  distinction  between  these  two  is 
discussed below. An example of this is the previously discussed case of The ship made 
its way through the sound. Adding and in more ways than one would indeed invoke two 
different meanings, meanings that have no clear relationship to each other and which 
can  only  be  simultaneously  present  under  the  guise  of  wordplay.  This  is  a  clear 
indication of homonymy. As chapter four will explore, such contrasting meanings will 
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usually avoid each other's contexts, so test sentences will often be difficult to compose; 
try,  for example,  to  compose  a  sentence that  is  ambiguous  for  the two homonymic 
meanings of bridge without being unhelpfully vague—even I like bridge or It's a bridge  
clearly selects exactly one meaning due to the contrast in countability between the two 
noun phrases. The difficulty of composing a suitable test frame attests to the semantic 
discreteness of the two identical word forms.
3.3 Pragmatics and word meaning
Although  I've  argued  at  length  that  pragmatics  alone  fails  to  account  for 
polysemy but rather for contextual variations, the illusion of polysemy is strong enough 
that these 'senses' are teachable.  Unlike the above two types of pure polysemy, these 
pseudo-polysemes do not have discrete sense boundaries. The noun seed, for example, 
is either a literal sense or a metaphoric sense, and modern either means 'contemporary' 
or else it refers to a movement or era in art history (if you'll pardon this morphological 
atrocity,  pre-post-modern),  but  with pseudo-polysemes,  the clear-cut  distinctions  are 
lost.  Here,  senses  may  blend  into  each  other  with  no  clear  boundary  or,  a  more 
preferable way to view it, there is but the one sense and a variety of contexts. 
The first type of pseudo-polysemy is context-dependent polysemy. Of course, all 
polysemes—and all words—depend on their context for meaning, but here the effects 
are especially robust. The word foot,  for example, cannot mean 'foot of the mountain' 
unless either of the mountain is linguistically present, or in anaphoric proximity, or else 
the  referent—an  actual  mountain—is  physically  present  either  with  the  speaker  or 
listener or both. The sentence 'It won't be long until we reach the foot' is comprehensible 
(with  the  'foot  of  the  mountain'  reading)  only  when  spoken  by  someone  either 
approaching or descending a mountain. Of course, another meaning of  foot may have 
been  intended,  but  that  is  exactly  the  point:  the  mountain  must  be  linguistically  or 
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physically present to convey the intended meaning,  otherwise the Gricean maxim of 
cooperation is flouted and another meaning is evoked. Other instances of this type (very 
frequently body parts) include head of the family/household, leg of the journey, bowels  
of the earth, butt of one's jokes5, etc. Abstract nouns such as journey cannot, of course, 
be physically present but are still present in their own way when they are included in the 
phrase. You cannot use leg alone in this sense unless you were already talking about a 
journey or actually on one.
Another pseudo-polyseme is the 'expanded context lexeme.' The adjective lay is 
an example of this. Originally, and still, used to mark someone or something as separate 
from the clergy (as in 'lay brothers,' 'lay Catholics,' etc.) its use has been expanded to 
include any non-speciality area, for example 'lay psychological theory,' 'lay press' and 
'lay judges.'  There are also many instances in which context is needed to determine 
which use is intended; by themselves, it is not clear if the phrases 'lay administration,' 
'lay students' and 'lay intellectuals' are meant as non-religious or the more general non-
speciality. It is this lack of clear boundaries that strongly suggests they are not separate 
lexemes.  Furthermore,  words  with  allegedly  discrete meanings  that  hinge  upon 
connotation, such as academic or discriminating, are also expanded context lexemes.
If  contexts  can be expanded,  then so,  too,  can they be narrowed or focused. 
Focused context lexemes are words which 'pop up' in different but not directly related 
domains.  To  illustrate  this,  we  return  to  Nation's  concept  of  'underlying  meaning.' 
Imagine,  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  that  the  underlying  meaning  is  something  that 
exists underground. Now imagine some gopher holes that lead from this underground 
entity to the surface. Let's take the word denomination. The main meaning of the word 
is below ground, and there are two gopher holes here, one leading to the religious use 
5 This  use  of  butt  stems  homonymically  from archery,  but  language  users  for  whom  butt  has  an 
anatomical meaning will likely interpret this phrase accordingly.
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(the  Anglican  denomination)  and another  to  the  monetary  use  (five  dollar  
denomination). These meanings are connected underground, but up on the surface they 
are very distinct; the religious usage does not lead to or generate the currency usage. 
There is, of course a more general meaning, as in 'Thus it was that in March 1983, IBM 
launched the IBM XT, a denomination that still stands today' (BNC). This use is tuned 
to the underlying meaning and not to either of the gopher holes. (According to the BNC, 
the combined religious  and monetary  uses  account  for  98% of  the instances  of  the 
token.) Another example of this is solution with its mathematics and chemistry-related 
gopher holes. The paradigm can be used to explain underspecification as detailed above 
with card and reel.
This  contrasts,  however,  with  instances  like  compose, which  can  take  as  its 
object such words as symphony, sonata, poem and essay. Although there is a small leap 
from the first two music-related words to the second two language-related ones, they are 
not as distinct as the religion/currency divide of denomination. This is true in spite of 
compose defaulting to music (as in 'He composes for a living.' and 'He is a composer.'). 
However,  gopher  holing  may  explain  how  these  usages  differ  from  'to  compose 
oneself/one's face,' etc.
 When we begin to consider just how many words are polysemous, we start to see 
polysemy everywhere, including places where it doesn't really exist. A good example of 
this is  liquidate. No doubt there is metaphor present. We liquidate assets, stocks, etc., 
and we can even liquidate problems and such things as feudalism. However, nothing we 
liquidate actually becomes a liquid; we don't liquidate ice to make water, or fruit to 
make jelly (these are melted or liquefied). But it's not a polyseme because there is only 
one sense present, albeit  a metaphoric one. The word is formed by adding -ate to a 
theoretical liquid-, a base that doesn't actually exist in the language with this particular 
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sense. This is not the case with passionate, affectionate or pollinate (despite a spelling 
change  in  the  base  pollen).  This  is  similar  to  referring  to  a  movie  as  'cheesy'  but 
probably not as 'cheese,' although this is a full polyseme as food can also be described 
as 'cheesy.' 
Another  variety  of  'pragmatic  polysemy'  involves  forms  clipped  from larger 
lexical items. How, after all, do we know that the speaker of I like rock is talking about 
a kind of music, a kind of candy, or  geological formations? Of course, in naturally-
occurring contexts, this sentence could almost never be ambiguous for these meanings 
for a variety of reasons. For ambiguity to be present here, there would have to be a 
rather peculiar and very sudden topic shift, and stones are not something that people 
frequently profess their admiration of. Rock, in the musical sense, is a clipped form of 
rock  'n'  roll.  Sometimes  words  are  clipped  to  shorter  forms  that  also  happen to  be 
already established words, albeit  it  generally unrelated meanings.  Other examples of 
this include:
[28] I need some gas. (North American dialects)
[29] He wants to be an anchor.
[30] She is their biggest fan.
[31] He dropped the case.
Most of the time, though, these words would never be confused with their twins. It's 
hard to  make a  sentence  in  which  rock is  ambiguous for the music  and for  'stone,' 
largely because of the semantic gulf between the two meanings and that the musical 
sense is always uncountable. Likewise, anchor and fan refer to people in one sense and 
inanimate  objects  in  another  and  are  therefore  also  unlikely  to  cause  confusion. 
Although 'He dropped the case.' could be ambiguous (with case referring to suitcase or 
some other  kind of  casing,  or  to  a  lawsuit),  it's  not  very  likely  to  be so,  to  native 
speakers at least, in context. As we'll see later, the 'luggage' meaning of case avoids the 
primings (collocations) of the other meaning.
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Instances such as these are very obvious to native speakers. We know we say 
anchor to avoid pinning a gender to the term, which many of us learned originally as 
anchorman. But students learning the language today will lack this insight. To them, 
anchor in the news sense would simply be another meaning for the word. And that, in 
fact, is assuming they learn the meanings in order of the word's diachronic development, 
which I would think unlikely in this case; I suspect that most learners would encounter 
the journalistic sense long before the nautical one, which many may never chance upon. 
This reverse sequence would,  again I  suspect,  obscure the metaphorical  relationship 
between the two senses, at least until both senses are fully internalised. 
Frequently, words substitute for others, as in:
[32] A small  company will probably focus its attention on each artist's  project 
more than a major label ( = recording company).
However, it is not sufficient to say that label is (semantically) polysemous, containing 
the meaning of 'recording company' when the process is easily explained by a pragmatic 
operation, namely metonymy. Metonymy is somewhat similar to metaphor, except that 
where metaphor involves words from a different semantic domain substituting for one 
from another, a metonym is sourced from the same domain; that is, one aspect of the a 
word's referent can substitute for the word itself, as in mill to refer to a steel-producing 
factory. We could—and dictionaries do—attribute this to semantics if we wanted, but 
this involves expanding the number of senses of a great many words, which we have 
been arguing against at length. As language teachers, surely it would be much easier to 
teach  students  the  few processes  of  substitutability,  such  as  metonymy,  meronymy, 
hypernymy,  hyperonymy,  etc.,  rather  than burden a  student's  vocabulary acquisition 
with all the various meanings of all these words.
This raises a point that needs addressing. If operations such as metonymy and 
meronymy  are  pragmatic,  then  why is  metaphor  accorded  the  status  of  a  semantic 
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procedure above? In fact,  lexical  metaphor  probably could be argued to  be entirely 
pragmatic. Pragmatics is never out of the picture; the ability to use a sense and know 
your  listener  or  reader  will  understand you  is  a  pragmatic  issue  no  matter  what  is 
happening semantically.  But here we are attributing semantics  only to those uses in 
which the metaphoric sense has (to use a lexical metaphor) some established currency in 
the language,  as  in  the case of plant to  refer  to  a  factory.  Nonce metaphors  would 
certainly be pragmatic, whether lexical (where the scope of the metaphor is restricted to 
a single lexeme) or extended (as in the literary device which is beyond the scope of this 
paper). Established lexical metaphors differ in their familiarity, allowing the speaker or 
writer to use them without necessarily including the linguistic scaffolding to ensure the 
metaphor is conveyed—a concept explored in the following chapter.
There are instances where substitutability may well involve semantics (though 
such cases will always involve pragmatics as well). There can always be cases where 
one sense of word A is synonymous with one sense of word B, as is probably the case 
where  volume is  interchangeable  with  amount,  whether  in  the  'volume of  liquid'  or 
'volume of sales' instances. 
The  various  pragmatic  procedures  that  we  employ  in  language  use  would 
probably be impossible to catalogue; Ruhl (1989:36) writes: 'Listing pragmatic rules 
may be an infinite task: all knowledge of the world can be included. In dealing with 
language, we are used to expecting only a few possibilities; but pragmatic rules can be 
much more  various,  since our full  knowledge is  much more  various.'  For  the same 
reason, a few examples of pragmatics, as contrasting to semantics, are presented here. 
Sometimes we need reminding of the extent of the role pragmatics plays. We all know 
what a book is, but every book is different; even different copies of the same publication 
are discrete referents. Yet the word book covers all these instances very neatly and we 
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generally don't get bogged down trying to determine just what the word means. Such 
logomachy is reserved, I'm afraid, for theses such as mine. Yet with some words we do. 
Levenston (1990) makes the  assumption that  pinpoint is polysemous because it takes 
both  concrete  and  abstract  objects  (pinpoint  a  location,  pinpoint  a  problem),  but  I 
consider this a pragmatic distinction rather than a semantic one; rather than showing the 
different senses of pinpoint, it actually does just the opposite and demonstrates just how 
variable the contexts are that this monoseme can be present in. (Contrast this with the 
earlier discussion of regurgitate, which was deemed a polyseme for having abstract and 
concrete arguments.)
3.4 Syntax and word meaning
Here  I  can be  brief  because  the  topic  lends  itself  to  brevity  and  would  not 
necessarily benefit from the same full treatment accorded to semantics and pragmatics. 
My wish here is only to demonstrate that what may appear to be polysemy may in fact 
be an entirely syntactic operation, the seeming semantic contrast being a by-product. 
The words I address here are those such as expect,  touch, promise, reveal  and tell but 
when used in the following examples:
[33] She declined the job offer because she was expecting.
[34] It was a very touching movie.
[35] He is a promising young actor.
[36] She wore a revealing dress.
[37] This is perhaps the most telling, if undiscussed, contrast between homonymy 
and polysemy.
Note that the apparent polysemy is present only in the -ing form. Expecting in [33] can 
be paraphrased as 'pregnant' but not if conjugated differently; any other form requires a 
direct object to convey pregnancy. This is true of the other words as well: the movie is 
one that touches the  speaker's heart, the actor promises to do well,  contrast  (my own 
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sentence  from  above)  tells  us  something  important,  and  I'll  leave  to  the  reader's 
imagination what the dress reveals. While these words may appear to be polysemes, the 
difference in their uses is explainable by syntax (and, as always, pragmatics—the reader 
knows what has been deleted and is capable of supplying it).  These  are all  verbs in 
which, when being converted to adjectives, a right-position argument (usually the direct 
object)  has  been deleted  but  pragmatically  still  present.  Once syntax  is  factored  in, 
semantic change is no longer isolable.
Conclusion
Although a brief  list,  the semantic  portion of our taxonomy can probably be 
considered comprehensive if  two points  are remembered.  First,  the list  is  guided by 
Ruhl's  monosemic  bias  and therefore  attempts  to  find as  few types  of  polysemy as 
possible rather than as many. What some people see as two senses may be claimed to be 
contextual  variation  of  a  single  sense  here  and  therefore  not  a  threat  to  this  list's 
exhaustiveness. For example some researchers, particularly in the  generative domain, 
see chicken as being polysemous for the animal and its meat, with proof being that if we 
have two words cow and beef (or pig: pork, deer: venison, etc.) but not for chicken (or 
turkey,  crab, etc.), then  chicken must be polysemous by way of analogy (cow→beef; 
therefore chicken1→chicken2). However, the validity of applying a pattern found in one 
instance to another fails to persuade me. A person eating the meat of a chicken is still 
eating the bird; the fact that it's been killed, cut up and cooked doesn't change that. The 
split of cow and beef and other similar cases (pork, venison) may be the oddity, not the 
non-partitioned  chicken. The second point that needs to be remembered regarding the 
list's comprehensiveness is that we're only examining the kinds of polysemy relevant to 
second language learners. A learner's familiarity with chicken as a bird but not as a meat 
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(if that's even possible) would certainly not impede their  understanding of  She likes 
chicken soup. In other words, any attempt to argue that these are two different senses 
would hopefully be accompanied by why the distinction is important. As stated earlier, 
sense  enumeration  is  often done willy-nilly  with no clear  motivation.  It's  a  bit like 
asking how many word senses can dance on the head of a needle and then proceeding to 
expound them all. 
The  discussion  of  pragmatic  polysemy,  however,  does  not  pretend to  be 
exhaustive.  As  noted  above,  pragmatics  involves  world  knowledge  which  may  be 
inexhaustible. Words are discrete and countable; their real-world referents are not. The 
idea of a word as simple as book including every book ever written in any language as 
well as every edition of them, not to mention books not yet written, always rewards a 
moment's pause; the staggering scope of even the most basic words speaks volumes to 
the economy of language. (And polysemy is part of the machinery that maintains the 
economy of words.)
Linguists often compose sentences to demonstrate ambiguity, but we know that 
very few sentences are actually ambiguous in real discourse. (The word mean in Clark 
Terry blows a mean trumpet certainly does not carry the meaning of 'average' here.) It is 
therefore easy to forget just how ambiguous sentences can be to L2 learners, including 
not just the garden-path sentences that began the first chapter but sentences that might 
not  strike native speakers  as ambiguous at  all.  Much work remains  to  be done.  As 
teachers we need to make learners aware of the extent polysemy plays in the language 
so that they look for it in instances where they understand all the words but not the 
overall  meaning.  Once  they  look  for  it,  there  still  must  be  instances  in  which  the 
polyseme is more salient as the source of confusion than others. I would suspect, for 
example, that a learner failing to understand 'She was upset about the general flavour of 
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the  meeting'  could  pinpoint  flavour as  a  contender  for  polysemy,  especially  when 
assuming a meeting has already been referred to. (Whether they can accurately guess 
the meaning is another matter, but pinpointing it is the first step.) I would also think that 
the polysemy of  CD ('compact disc'  or 'certificate of deposit')  in 'The CD market in 
London started in 1967 with the issue of the first US dollar CD[.]' is easily identifiable 
because of the context, at least for learners who know we didn't listen to CDs in 1967, 
but it's easy to imagine situations in which the context is not so clear-cut, such as the 
verb  of  'His  expression  registered  disillusionment.'  I'm  not  so  convinced  that  the 
polyseme can be so easily identified in the final word of 'I want to buy her that ring, but 
I'm a little shy.' (Divorced from context, that's ambiguous even to native speakers. The 
intended  meaning  of  shy here  was  'not  having  enough  money.')  Would  a  learner 
encountering the sentence 'She didn't accept the job offer because she was expecting' 
realize that the woman was pregnant, or would they make some assumption that she was 
expecting another job offer to come through? And of course, sentences may have more 
than one unknown polyseme:  He finally made his way to the battery and, in a fit of  
anger, discharged his magazine in one go. This raises another question. Are very well-
known words (like battery and magazine) harder to suspect of polysemy than those of 
known but rarer words? 
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Chapter four: The flavour of polysemy and the polysemy of 
flavour 
[Environment is] a big, booming, buzzing confusion.
William James
The previous  chapter  examined the different  types  of polysemy,  recognising, 
from a semantic point-of-view only two: lexical metaphor and vicariant polysemy. This 
chapter examines  how the senses of polysemes contrast  beyond the semantic  realm. 
This sequencing is significant. A polyseme—that is, a word of 'many meanings'—must 
be distinguished by these meanings. However slippery the notion of 'meaning' may be, 
something  I  believe  the second chapter  has demonstrated,  the temptation  to  analyse 
polysemy  by  observing  non-semantic  differences  must  be  avoided.  Data  on  the 
collocations of a word can be generated with precious little human involvement and 
syntactic behaviours can be easily formalised; a word's semantic properties, however, 
are not subject to precise, formal delineations. It is the shifts in meaning that trigger 
shifts beyond the meaning, in collocation for example, not the other way around, and 
these effects are not so discrete that they can be used to pinpoint the causes. This cart-
before-the-horse  approach,  that  polysemous  meanings  can  be  determined  by  their 
syntactic properties and collocational behaviours, has influenced much of corpus-based 
lexicography.  The problem is that it  becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy;  it  is easy to 
demonstrate with a few examples that polysemic senses have differing contexts, but this 
can be taken as criterion without recourse to meaning, taking the -sem- out of polysemy 
yet continuing to call it such when something like polysyntax or polycontext might more 
accurately describe the results. It is with that caveat in mind, that effect not be mistaken 
for cause, that we now turn our attention to effects of polysemy beyond the semantic.
Hoey's  (2005) theory of lexical  priming provides a useful  heuristic  for us to 
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examine the extra-semantic properties of a polyseme although I will freely deviate from 
his framework to make other observations regarding the ways different senses contrast. 
The claim Hoey makes is that words are primed to behave in certain ways, or more 
accurately, that language users are primed to use and expect words to behave in certain 
ways. The word consequence, for example, is primed to  associate with the concept of 
underlying  logic  and  so  consequences  tend  to  be  denoted  as  logical,  inevitable,  
probable,  etc. Another priming is of negative evaluation, providing consequences that 
are  disastrous,  awful,  regrettable,  etc.  A  third  priming  of  consequence  reflects 
importance:  a  serious  consequence,  a  significant  consequence,  an  important  
consequence,  etc.  A  final  priming  entails  unexpectedness  as  consequences  can  be 
surprising, unforeseen, curious, etc. 
Words  prime  in  various  ways,  including  not  just  semantic  associations, 
collocations and colligations, but position in a sentence and even within a text. Hoey's 
chapter on lexical priming and polysemy is fuelled by a hypothesis that I summarise 
here, taking liberties for the sake of brevity,  as: polysemic senses avoid each other's 
primings, and when one sense is found with the primings of the other sense, the result is 
either ambiguity (momentarily or permanent) or humour. Hoey identifies two meanings 
of consequence, one regarding outcomes and the other regarding importance (i.e., to be 
of little consequence) and uses corpus data to demonstrate their contextual differences. 
For example,  the 'importance'  meaning  nearly always  occurs  within a  PP,  as in  the 
example I just gave, though it can occur elsewhere, as an object (for example of have), 
which is a position which the 'outcome'  usage of  consequence  avoids.  On the other 
hand, it is only the 'outcome' sense that has the semantic associations with LOGIC and 
NEGATIVE EVALUATION, while the 'importance' sense, but not the 'outcome' one, 
has a semantic association with DENIAL (i.e., of little consequence, of no consequence, 
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of no great consequence, etc.) 
In our exploration of Hoey's claim,  the word  flavour  will serve us once again 
although at times I will draw support from additional words. Where the second chapter 
reproduces Ruhl's methodology to convey his theory using new data, the word  crawl, 
this chapter emulates Hoey to convey his, this time returning to the word  flavour. At 
some turns I will make points that conflict with those of Hoey, but this is in the interest 
of developing his theory and certainly not to reject it.
4.1 Methodology
Using the  BNC, all instances of uninflected flavour  were examined with non-
noun uses deleted by hand, resulting in 1,495 concordance lines. The program used was 
Wordsmith  Concord to  employ  its  tagging  feature.  Each  instance  of  the  word  was 
tagged for whether it showed the literal meaning or the metaphoric. This accounted for 
94% of the data, with 946 literal noun uses and 412 metaphoric nouns, a ratio of 1:2.3. 
The remaining 6% were either deleted or accounted for. The largest of these, at 4%, is 
the special case noted in the previous chapter: flavour of the month. Within the phrase, it 
is  the  literal  meaning  being  used,  but  it  is  the  phrase  itself  that  is  being  used 
metaphorically.  (There  were  no  references  to  flavour-of-the-month  clubs  or  their 
offerings, which would be the literal use of the phrase.) These instances, and variations 
including  flavour  of  the  moment/year/etc.,  were removed  from consideration  on  the 
grounds that the multi-word construction comprises a single lexical unit.
Of the remaining 2%, only one case introduces a dedicated sense; it is of recent 
vintage and regards computers as can be seen in [1].
[1] SGI's Irix flavour of Unix is only available to strategic partners.
Thirteen such cases, accounting for just  under 1%, are found in the data.  The other 
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instances that were not deleted but saved for further analysis include a 'special' category, 
something  of  a  catch-all  for  instances  that  didn't  fit  comfortably  under  the  other 
headings. An example of this is given. 
[2] Variety's the very spice of life That gives it all its flavour 
While metaphoric, it is not the same metaphoric reading that the 'literally' test unveils 
but rather an extension of the metaphor introduced earlier in the sentence. Similar is [3]:
[3] But the flavour of the month was no flavour at all.
As  flavour  appears twice,  this sentence appears twice in the data. The first instance 
presents no problem and was relegated to the 'phrase' category, but the second one is, 
like  the  instance  in  [2],  a  play  on  words  not  easily  accommodated  by  the  other 
categories.  The  remaining  category  of  data  that  needs  to  be  considered  is  that  of 
zeugma, examples that clearly employ, or at least evoke, more than one sense (also a 
type of wordplay). This is seen below:
[4] Capture the flavour and atmosphere of Italy with grilled chicken and herbs on 
a bed of rice.
[5] We've used both Danish Blue and Lurpak in our recipes to show you a few 
ways of bringing a flavour of the Continent to your cooking.
[6] Cooking in the classical French style, something spiced with the flavour of the 
Orient,  an  evocation  of  the  Arabian  nights  or  India,  national  dishes  from the 
Balkans, Greece or the Mediterranean, the Italian pizza, the Spanish paella, the 
Hungarian goulash or  a  genuine  American  hamburger,  are  always  within easy 
reach.
In each case, the metaphoric meaning is used in the context generally reserved for the 
literal. I would argue that each use is actually the metaphoric (again, for the literal use to 
work, flavour would have to have the meaning of 'flavouring'), but there are confusing 
contextual clues. This will be developed more fully below.
There  remain,  then,  three  types  of  data  to  discuss.  These  were  rejected  as 
unimportant and I don't believe doing so will be remotely controversial.  The first of 
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these are cases in which Flavour was a proper noun, as in [7] and [8]
[7] TRIED and Tested, Giant Arc, Flowers of Sacrifice and Flavour are among the 
bands taking part in the second local music extravaganza 
[8] Flavour looks at her oddly.
The next type of data that was removed were those instances which did not occur in a 
complete sentence or utterance. Sentence [9] makes a pretty convincing case why these 
are difficult to disambiguate. 
[9] Need a turn up. Absolutely nothing sir. Yes Stew Look for that bit. that'll do, 
for  the  only  one  that'll  do me  any good.See  what  ay?  flavour.Twenty.Twenty 
nine.Twenty one for two.Twenty one. Four. Four.Ten Noisy! Oh dear! Eighteen. 
God I do ! Eighteen.
Also  included  in  this  category  were  titles  and  headers.  Although  it  seems  to  be 
zeugmatic and may offer some insights on those grounds, what can be done with a title 
that is simply 'Oriental flavour'? Finally,  one instance is, I believe, a typo where the 
writer intended favour:
[10]  Still,  scam or  no scam,  there's  no denying,  especially  not  from Galliano 
themselves, that the tag is currently working full steam ahead in their flavour.
Once the tagging was completed, each sense was moved to its own concordance 
file so that the patterns of each meaning could be examined separately rather than all 
lumped together. There are a few ways in which the two main senses of flavour contrast 
which I find especially revealing of the process of metaphorisation and even the way 
language  encodes  our  conceptual  system.  These  aspects  include  the  word's  co-
hyponyms  and  its  tendency  to  coordinate  with  other  NPs,  its  use  in  comparative 
constructions,  its modification and its  ability to modify.  From here, we shall  briefly 
examine the computer variety seen in [1] and then the zeugmatic and special instances 
removed from the main analysis and the larger issues they raise. Finally, a development 
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of Hoey's view to accommodate specific data is made.
4.2 Results
The goal here is to use a different word to test Hoey's claim that the different 
senses  of  polysemes  avoid  each  other's  collocations,  colligations  and  semantic 
associations. The term collocation is well known these days but Hoey restricts its use to 
content  words  while  colligation  covers  function  words.  The  usefulness  of  this 
distinction cannot easily be denied though the terminology in effect makes collocation 
polysemous for lexical collates and the larger, umbrella term that includes both lexical 
and functional words. I prefer, then, to use the term lexical collocation for clarity. For 
the purposes of the current project, a collocation (of either type) is a word that occurs a 
minimum of five times in a 4:4 window—that is, within four words to the left of the 
word or four words to the right. 
Semantic associations are patterns of collocations, meta-collocations if you will. 
While  computers  are  undeniably  useful  for  highlighting  collocations,  semantic 
associations  require  the human eye.  The word  flavour,  for  example,  collocates  with 
words like salty, fishy, malty and nutty. If the computer has the last word, it will be left 
at this stage, but the researcher should be able to see a pattern that these words form: 
they are all adjectives formed from nouns denoting food. Although I have conflated 
them with syntactic information, these are semantic associations.
4.2.1 Co-hyponymy and co-ordination
Table  1 shows all  the nouns that  collocate  with the literal  sense but  not  the 
metaphoric. 
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(In cases where these words are polysemous with other parts-of-speech, such as leaves  
and taste, I checked that there were at least five nominal uses.) Two categories, which 
account  for  70% of  these  cases,  suggest  themselves.  Eighteen  words  denote  edible 
substances  (i.e.,  food  or  drink)  either  generally (food,  sauce)  or  specifically  (fish,  
cheese, whisky) while eight words are co-hyponyms with flavour—that is,  flavour is a 
hyponym of 'edible substance' as are these other eight words, which are:  appearance,  
aroma, colour, fragrance, quality, scent, taste  and texture.  The first category may be 
obvious, but this second category is important for two reasons. First, the metaphoric use 
of flavour lacks any co-hyponyms. Flavour is an expected, perhaps required, trait of any 
edible substance; this is not true of any entity that may be said to have flavour in its 
metaphoric  sense.  There  are  many things  about  which  we  may  talk  of  as  having  a 
metaphoric flavour, but nothing exists that must have a metaphoric flavour. The second 
reason why this is  important  is  because of a priming it  reveals.  The literal  sense is 
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Table 2: Nominal collocates of 'flavour,' literal  
sense only
Word Total Word Total
TEXTURE 30 APPEARANCE 6
COLOUR 26 HERBS 6
FOOD 15 DIFFERENCE 6
FRUIT 14 VARIETY 5
AVERSION 14 FRAGRANCE 5
AROMA 13 RECIPE 5
EXPOSURE 12 PLENTY 5
TASTE 12 COOKING 5
CHEESE 9 JUICE 5
LEAVES 9 ORANGE 5
QUALITY 9 COFFEE 5
MEAT 8 SAUCE 5
DEPTH 7 FISH 5
LEARNING 7 WHISKY 5
CREAM 6 WATER 5
FRUITS 6 TEST 5
YOGURT 6 SPICES 5
ENHANCERS 6 BEER 5
SCENT 6
primed to occur in coordination with these and other nouns. A separate search for all 
instances of  flavour  within a 4:4 window of these eight  words reveal  it  to occur in 
coordinating patterns in 85% of these instances. A few examples are provided. 
[11] To release the aroma and flavour of the coffee beans, they must be roasted, 
the process which also gives them their brown colouring.
[12] Light  whisky is stored in seasoned charred oak casks,  which impart  little 
colour or flavour.
[13] It has an enticing scent and flavour of just pressed grapes cut with a fresh 
note of lemon.
[14] We were looking for a good flavour and meaty texture.
(As an aside, it is worth mentioning that the literal verb  flavour  also behaves in this 
matter although these instances were not factored into the tally.) The metaphoric sense 
is not primed to behave in this way. This is not to say that it can't—there are instances 
of  it  coordinating  with  bias,  direction,  image,  intent,  outlook,  reputation,  accuracy, 
nuances, rhythm and tone—but there are no words with which the metaphoric  flavour 
occurs  in  co-ordination  more  than  once,  which  brings  us  back  to  its  lack  of  co-
hyponyms.  The  literal  sense  is  approximately  four  times  as  likely  to  occur  in 
coordination  than is  the metaphoric.  This  demonstrates  Hoey's  claim that  one sense 
avoids  the  primings  of  the  other,  in  this  case  in  regards  to  co-ordination  and  co-
hyponymy.
4.2.2 Comparatives
Both  the  literal  and  metaphoric  uses  of  flavour  occur  occasionally  in 
comparative  constructions,  limited  in  my  corpus  searches  to  instances  where  the 
comparative word occurs in the same NP as flavour. These are either adjectives ending 
in -er ([15]) or constructions using more ( [16] and [17]). 
[15] Stemming solely from the Gascony region of France's South West, it has a 
smoother, richer flavour than Cognac.
[16] The latter are the hottest, the dried berries having a more subtle flavour.
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[17] Orwell's political allegory Animal Farm and Stan Barstow's Joby add a more 
modern flavour.
The behaviour of these two differ dramatically. The literal and metaphoric uses 
take the  more  construction somewhat equally. These uses account for 3% of the total 
literal  instances  and  2% of  the  metaphoric.  However,  lexical  comparatives  such  as 
sweeter, fuller, lighter, etc. occur only with the literal set. 
It is important, however, to cross-check absolute claims from corpus data with 
native speaker intuitions. Some of these -er words are adjectives, such as sweeter, and 
some  are  intensifiers  or  both  such  as  stronger.  I  don't  believe  stronger  flavour  is 
generally  possible  with  the  metaphoric  sense  (without  sounding  awkward  or 
deliberately extending the metaphor discussed in the zeugma section) although I find the 
use of stronger as an intensifier, as in a stronger international flavour, quite possible. It 
doesn't occur in the corpus data although it could. However, it is safe to conclude that 
comparative adjectives modifying flavour are far more likely with the literal sense than 
the metaphoric. 
A quick note: the word than is included only with the literal usage in the BNC 
(comprising 44% of the total uses of  flavour  in comparatives), but here, again, native 
speakers  should  be  perfectly  able  to  compose  instances  of  the  metaphoric  used 
comparatively including the than PP.
I must, however, return to the claim that  more occurs equally between the two 
senses because a closer look reveals divergent patterns within the distributions. Both 
[16] and [17] show a  more + adjective + flavour  construction, but the corpus account 
reveals another pattern:
[18] Hereford beef is more fatty which gives it more flavour, and that's what the 
customer wants. 
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It is probably not surprising that more flavour occurs with the literal sense only; in fact, 
it accounts for nearly a quarter of the instances in which  more  occurs with the literal 
flavour. However, this is an issue that extends beyond a discussion of comparatives and 
into the next topic, modification. (In certain respects, this chapter is guilty of the same 
practices I criticize of lexicography in its attempts to drive certain aspects of words into 
neat  little  divisions  when  they  are,  in  fact,  continuous  wholes.  Since  the  aspects 
examined in this chapter are not as modular as the organisation suggests, it is only at the 
end of the chapter that each aspect can be said to be, cumulatively, considered.)
4.2.3 Modification
We now pose the question: are the two main senses of  flavour  modified in a 
same or different manner? To answer this, all instances in which the literal  and the 
metaphoric uses of  flavour  occurred were analysed for the type of modification they 
took. There are four possible categories: pre-modification only, post-modification only, 
both pre- and post-, and no modification. Pre-modification is defined as anything in the 
NP  to  the  left  of  the  head  (always  flavour)  barring  determiners  but  including  pre-
determiners  while  post-modification  is  anything  in  the  NP  right  of  the  head.  Only 
instances in which flavour headed the noun phrase were considered, so cases in which it 
was  in  the  attributive  position  were  removed;  examples  of  this  include  flavour 
enhancer, what flavour toothpaste, etc., and these cases are the subject of a subsequent 
section. Included in the tally were instances of comparative adjective phrases such as a 
more  distinctive  flavour  than the  mass-produced cheese. Instances  such as  a bit  of  
flavour  were included,  despite being the object of a prepositional phrase,  on the basis 
that  flavour  is the actual head and  a bit of a specifier  (Aarts 1997) or a quantifying 
classifier. The distribution of modification for the literal sense of  flavour  is given in 
92
Chart  1  while  Chart  2  shows that  of  the  metaphoric  sense.  These  are  followed  by 
example sentences from the BNC illustrating each permutation.
Literal sense, pre-modified:
[19] With its clever combination of egg and lemon, it has a pleasant, but slightly 
tart flavour.
[20] It has a rich nutty flavour and a full bodied bouquet.
Literal sense, post-modified:
[21] A chill sharpened the flavour of the water.
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Chart 1: Modification of literal flavour
50%
10%
13%
28%
Pre- only
Post- only
Both
Neither
Chart 2: Modification of metaphoric flavour
42%
30%
21%
6%
Pre- only
Post- only
Both
Neither
[22] Plucked straight from the brine, the flavour of the olives can be overpowered 
by the salt.
Literal sense, both pre- and post-modified:
[23] It's a different flavour altogether, it's lovely, isn't it!
[24] It contains all the flavour of common salt but only a third of its sodium.
Literal sense, no modification:
[25] Mozzarella cheese adds flavour and an unusual texture to any salad
[26] The flavour should be almost viscous for a white wine, rich and succulent for 
a supposedly dry wine.
Metaphoric sense, pre-modified:
[27] It is a handsome conversion and gives a  catholic flavour to a street which 
used to be the exclusive preserve of contemporary Western art.
[28] Despite that, the book has a curiously impersonal flavour, which is a pity.
Metaphoric sense, post-modified:
[29]  The  results  were  stunningly  successful  and  caught  the  flavour  of  Sixties 
London and the generation gap.
[30] I have tried to give a flavour of life in Bishop's Castle from the turn of the 
century to the 1920s.
Metaphoric sense, both pre- and post-modified:
[31] This route gives you a good flavour of the West Country.
[32] Here it is only possible to give a general flavour of this case-history
Metaphoric sense, no modification:
[33] The Irish attitude, in contrast, tends to be traditional and to regard rugby as a 
pastime and an international tour mainly adding to the flavour.
[34] We will  see top players  from the rest  of world,  Brazilians,  Argentinians, 
Dutch and Germans to enhance the flavour.
It's easy to misread these charts so that the literal  sense has pre-modification 
50% of the time, but it needs to be remembered that the 'Both' category also includes 
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pre-modification, so this sense is pre-modified, in fact, 63% of the time. Table 3 makes 
this explicit, while Table 4 collapses the data further yet,  showing the distribution of 
uses that are simply modified or not.
Starting with Table 3, we can see that, at the most top-down level, the two sense 
are not modified equally, but as Table 3 shows an even distribution in pre-modification, 
the discrepancy is in the post-modification—the metaphoric sense is post-modified 28% 
more often than the literal—and those uses in which there is no modification (the literal 
sense is bare over a quarter of the time while the metaphoric sense is rarely unmodified, 
only about once out of 16 occurrences, returning us to the unaddressed point which 
ended the previous section on comparatives. All uses of more flavour employ the literal 
sense of  flavour  because the metaphoric sense is quite rarely used without a word or 
phrase denoting the kind of flavour. To answer why one sense is frequently used alone 
and the other not, it's necessary to look at how the word is modified. 
To do this, we will examine the L1 collocates (that is,  words that occur five 
times or more to the immediate left) of both senses. These were calculated separately, 
the colligations  (function words) were removed by hand,  and the remaining content 
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Table 3: Pre- and Post-modification of flavour 
combined with 'Both'
Literal sense Pre-mod, combined 63%
Post-mod, combined 23%
Metaphoric sense Pre-mod, combined 63%
Post-mod, combined 51%
Table 4: Modification of flavour combined
Literal sense Modified 73%
Not modified 28%
Metaphoric sense Modified 93%
Not modified 6%
words  were  imported  into  a  spreadsheet  program  which  compiled  two  lists:  those 
collocates  unique to the literal  sense and those unique to the metaphoric.  These are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6.
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Table 5: Lexical collocations of literal 'flavour'
Word Total WORD Total WORD Total
FULL 45 FIND 9 FRAGRANT 5
TEXTURE 30 EVEN 8 TEST 5
SLIGHTLY 26 LITTLE 8 AFTER 5
COLOUR 26 ROUNDED 8 JUICE 5
RICH 22 MEAT 8 COFFEE 5
DELICATE 21 KEEP 8 VARIETY 5
GOOD 20 USED 8 DURING 5
SWEET 16 RATHER 8 FRUITY 5
FOOD 15 ADDED 8 WHISKY 5
BETTER 15 NICE 8 BLACK 5
LIKE 14 SIMILAR 8 BEER 5
FRUIT 14 DEVELOP 8 ENJOY 5
FRESH 14 TRADITIONAL 8 WATER 5
BITTER 14 EXCELLENT 7 DRY 5
AVERSION 14 DEPTH 7 SHARP 5
ADD 13 SPICY 7 ORANGE 5
AROMA 13 ADDS 7 SAUCE 5
EXPOSURE 12 LEARNING 7 ATTRACTIVE 5
MILD 12 SCENT 6 PLENTY 5
BEST 12 RELEASE 6 PUNGENT 5
TASTE 12 ENHANCERS 6 FISH 5
NUTTY 12 YOGURT 6 RECIPE 5
NEW 12 WITHOUT 6 COOKING 5
SUBTLE 11 SMOKY 6 LIGHT 5
STRONGER 11 CREAM 6 FRAGRANCE 5
EXTRA 11 TART 6 TANGY 5
FULLER 10 APPEARANCE 6 MELLOW 5
DELICIOUS 10 DIFFERENCE 6 NATURAL 5
BRING 10 HERBS 6 BLAND 5
LEAVES 9 FRUITS 6 SPICES 5
CHEESE 9 LOVELY 6 FOUND 5
QUALITY 9 PLEASANT 6
FINE 9 HOT 5
It should be immediately obvious that the number of L1 lexical collocates of the 
literal sense dwarfs the corresponding set for the metaphoric. This was mentioned in 
3.1.1: the literal sense of flavour is bound to one domain, the culinary, so it naturally is 
found  in  culinary-related  contexts,  garnering  culinary-related  collocates,  while  the 
metaphoric sense applies not to one but to a wide variety of situations. It is not so much 
the domains which determine the number and range of collocations but the status of 
being 'tightly bound' which garners them and that status of being 'loosely bound' that 
allows them to slip away.
Returning to the point that  introduced these lists,  the ways in which the two 
senses  are  pre-modified,  we  examine  the  L1  collocates.  I  won't  pretend  the  rigid 
criterion  of  'L1  collocates'  gives  a  complete  picture  of  pre-modification  but  it  does 
provide a convenient snapshot. A close look at the two lists reveals that these words are, 
when adjectives,  derived  forms  of  other  English words  (nutty  from  nut,  spicy  from 
spice, distinctive from distinct, etc.) 17% of the time for the literal sense but those of the 
metaphoric  are  derived  forms  57%  of  the  time  (international,  French,  and  again 
distinctive). At this point the reader may well begin to worry about the level of detail 
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Table 6: Lexical  
collocations of metaphoric  
'flavour'
Word Total
INTERNATIONAL 17
FRENCH 8
DISTINCTIVE 8
SPECIAL 7
AMERICAN 6
LOCAL 6
POLITICAL 6
SPANISH 5
WORK 5
GENERAL 5
COUNTRY 5
CONTEMPORARY 5
this  analysis  will  go  into,  but  I  raise  this  point  because  what  it  reveals  is  rather 
important.  To  invert  these  numbers,  the  literal  sense  has  dedicated  adjectives  (i.e., 
simplex forms (Bauer 1983), not derived from other words) 83% of the time while the 
metaphoric is about half this at 43%. The literal meaning of flavour functions within the 
domain it was custom made for. The notion of flavour and the larger context of eating 
are fundamental human experiences so it's not surprising that the words associated with 
it are also dedicated words. They are fundamental, rudimentary even, both semantically 
and morphologically.  On the other hand, the metaphoric use of  flavour,  is a derived 
form itself, though not one formally marked (i.e., the process sometimes known as zero-
derivation), and has adapted to its new environment by collocating with words that are 
also derived. It's not, of course, a matter of 'like attracting like' but of one adaptation 
(the conversion of the word form to its metaphoric meaning) mandating another (the 
environment)  like ripples  in a pond:  the word is  adapted,  a process that  triggers  an 
adaptation  of  its  environment.  There  are  very  few  simplex  adjectives  which  fit 
comfortably with the metaphoric sense and these are very general in meaning (distinct,  
special);  it  is  the derived  adjectives  that  impart  the usage with specificity—i.e.,  the 
difference between a town having a special flavour or it having a French flavour6. 
The Darwinistic, well, flavour of the above is a matter of convenience on my 
part, and my goal is not to propose a survival-of-the-fittest, adapt-or-be-killed paradigm 
for emerging senses, though such a case could probably be made. It is only the message 
and not the metaphor used to convey it that I will defend.
The question, then, of why the literal sense of flavour is commonly unmodified 
while the metaphoric sense seldom is, is not so different. The literal is the base sense, a 
6 The  distinction  between  derived  and  inflected  forms  is  important  here.  The  literal  sense  has  an 
additional  12% of inflected  adjectives  (fuller,  best,  added)  while  the metaphoric  has  none in  the L1 
position, even when expanded to include any word that occurs twice or more. This corresponds to the 
ability of literal sense to be modified by -er adjectives but not the metaphoric.
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sense therefore tightly bound to its semantic domain and, furthermore, already primed 
by its context (primed not in Hoey's sense but in the sense that, one we've read the word 
hospital,  the word  doctor  may be primed or 'readied'  by the brain);  the metaphoric 
sense,  on the other hand, needs additional support to override its  default  reading,  to 
create  a  context  in  which  it  can  function  as  intended.  In  the  few examples  of  the 
unmodified metaphoric flavour, the type of flavour is often found elsewhere. In [35], for 
example, the type of flavour is found in the predicate (or theme) rather than within the 
NP, while the same is found in the ensuing discourse of [36] (which I've included) and 
[37] (which I don't believe needs to be presented a second time). In [33] and [34] above, 
the  type  of  flavour  is  pragmatically  supplied  and  therefore  no  doubt  more  clearly 
defined to the more traditional readers of the text rather than those of us pulling isolated 
segments out of it.
[35] The flavour is altogether more lower middle class and middle middle class, 
rather than middle middle and upper middle.
[36]  The  event  is  now  a  well-established  tradition,  but  for  the  benefit  of 
newcomers, a word about its flavour. It is very much a family event which in 
recent  years  has  attracted  more  than  1,000  participants  and  at  least  as  many 
spectators.  It's  a  welcome  outdoor  diversion  after  the  usual  indoor  festivity. 
Although the event attracts some serious runners, it is essentially a fun-run for 
mums, dads and grandparents, young children and youth.
[37] A few examples may give a flavour.
So  while  these  uses  may  not  be  modified  within  the  NP,  the  information  is  still 
presented in another manner. In fact, such uses may forbid direct modification because 
the information is too complex for the limits, liberal as they are, of modification and 
cannot be squeezed into adjectival status. 
Hoey's claim that the different senses of a polyseme are primed differently is 
largely supported by the fact that the NPs they head are, largely, modified differently. 
This claim will, however, be re-examined and modified before this chapter concludes.
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4.2.4 Compositionality and compounding 
We turn now from how flavour is modified to how it modifies, to those instances 
of flavour modifying another noun that were removed from the previous section. Only 
two nouns fit  the R1 slot  five or more times and these are  aversion (14 times) and 
enhancers (six) (with the singular enhancer occurring four additional times). However, 
this reveals a quirk both of the corpus and the  Concord  program. All 14 instances of 
flavour  aversion  are  from the  same  text,  and  Concord  does  not  allow one-per-text 
filtering as some other programs do. However, the full range of nouns that occur, even 
once, in the R1 slot (of which there are 38, all but five occurring only once so I will not 
produce the complete list here) reveal that only the literal sense of flavour can occur in 
the attributive position. If this data seems awkward with its 14 instances from one text 
and preponderance of hapax legomana, native-speaker intuitions bear this out: there is 
no noun that the metaphoric sense can comfortably combine with, and certainly not with 
a  scope  extending  beyond  nonce  usage:  the  right  NP  in  illustration  1  cannot  be 
completed if flavour uses its metaphoric sense.
The claim is only that flavour, and not all polysemes or even lexical metaphors, 
is restricted in this matter. The word seed, introduced in 3.3, is a lexical metaphor where 
both the literal, in [38]. and the metaphoric, [39]-[40], occur in the attributive position:
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Illustration 1: flavour as left element  
in compound noun formation
[38] The new Colour Schemes seed mixtures come in five different colour [sic]: 
yellow, orange, pink, blue and white. 
[39] They're  out looking for seed money and a board now with a deadline  of 
December. 
[40] HWIM and Hearsay-II focus the search by predicting the words on either 
side of a seed word found bottom-up
A different word here is more illuminating of the variation. Several senses of the 
very  polysemous  battery  occur  immediately  before  other  nouns,  as  in  battery  
compartment,  battery action  (i.e.,  a legal action against  assault  and battery),  battery 
guns. However, the sense seen in a battery of tests does not reveal any R1 nouns nor can 
I come up with any (battery testing defaults back to the 'power cell' sense). Moreover, 
yet another sense, that associated with a method of raising chickens (in British English a 
least), occurs  only  in this position; thus we have  battery hens, battery cages, battery 
eggs,  etc.,  but  no  possibility  to  use  this  battery  as  a  standalone  noun.  (The  phrase 
battery  charges is,  incidentally,  a  rare  example  of  double  polysemy  co-occurring 
without evoking humour.)
4.2.5 The computer sense of flavour
About the computer sense of flavour there is precious little to be said, and what 
observations are made are done so for the sake of completeness and constitute little 
more than a sidebar. There is a paucity of available data in the  BNC—13 instances—
partly because this  would seem to be a sense of recent vintage (not included in the 
SOED though obviously old enough to be in the  BNC) and partly because it can be 
considered  technical  vocabulary.  The  following  instances  are  typical.  See  also  [1] 
above.
[41] Unikix is easily ported to any flavour of Unix required.
[42] Mainlan GTI now comes in a Windows flavour as well as DOS, and it's the 
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Windows side of things that we'll examine
The only collocate is Unix, which occurs in just over half of the instances, seven times, 
and with a proper noun denoting computer software of some kind in twelve (92%, but 
percentages  can be very inaccurate  with so little  data).  This  use of  flavour  is  post-
modified by an of PP, as in [41], in eight of the occurrences, although it may be more 
accurate to say that flavour of is the specifier and not the head of these NPs.
4.2.6 Zeugmatic uses of flavour
We turn now to those zeugmatic instances of  flavour  removed from the above 
analysis and to the larger issue of creativity and language play. There were ten such 
cases out of the total data pool of 1,495. All of these are, I would claim, really instances 
of the metaphoric use, but in the context generally dominated by the literal. Some of 
these feel more zeugmatic than others, and the following example are arranged roughly 
from the 'less zeugmatic' to the more.
[43] (=[4]) Capture the flavour and atmosphere of Italy with grilled chicken with 
herbs on a bed of rice
[44] Try a taste of yesteryear, but with an oriental flavour.
[45] Sipping a Sling does not have the same flavour of nostalgia when you are not 
sitting in the old hotel with the arches and verandahs imagining you are Somerset 
Maugham.
[46] ...and afternoon coffee takes on a flavour all of its own when enjoyed with a 
fresh pastry cooked before your eyes.
[47] Even the regional flavour of the menu has been lost.
[48] This nutritious and hearty soup with a delicious Italian flavour is suitable for 
a light lunch, or as a starter for an evening meal.
The first and final of these may not even seem to be cases of zeugma at all at first 
glance. In [43], the metaphoric reading of flavour is clearly reinforced by coordination 
with atmosphere, while in [48] the metaphoric meaning can be easily missed. As noted 
earlier,  however, for the literal  sense to work in any of these cases, the meaning of 
flavour would have to be that of flavouring, i.e., a specific (countable) flavour, which is 
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never  the  case.  (Note  that  example  [44]  is  further  compounded  by  the  pragmatic 
polysemy of coffee and [47] by that of menu.)
This brings us to the second part of Hoey's hypothesis, to which I've not attended 
since its initial mention: when one sense is found with the primings of the other sense, 
the  result  is  either  ambiguity  (momentarily  or  permanent)  or  humour.  To  various 
extents,  examples  [43]-[48]  bear  this  out.  Especially  with  the  given  task  of 
disambiguation (which would be less important, certainly less explicit, if encountering 
such  cases  naturally),  sometimes  it  is  necessary  to  stop  and  think  which  sense  is 
employed because all of them either occur in contexts related to food or drink ([43], 
[45]-[48]) or engage in language play by extending the metaphor (i.e., the co-occurrence 
of taste with flavour in [44]). Two similar attested instances are presented in [49] and 
[50].
[49] Voice over The family flavour is savoured at nearly 100 pubs in and around 
Swindon and the Cotswolds.
[50] (=[2]) Variety's the very spice of life. That gives it all its flavour 
This language play is simply what language users do and flavour  is far from alone in 
this behaviour. 
[51] It may stop your dream from turning into a nightmare.
[52] I've known a lot  of women in my time,  and --  'In the Biblical  sense,  no 
doubt!'
[53] He saw God as a glorified combination of boat and helicopter, not unlike 
Jules Verne's The Terror .
I make no claim that wordplay is always intentional. I certainly have reservations that 
the zeugma in [53] (the polyseme being glorified) was a deliberate attempt. 
Humour tends to make more explicit use of the other sense's lexical primings, 
using lexical collocates for example, as seen in Groucho Marx's 'You haven't stopped 
talking since I came here. You must have been vaccinated with a phonograph needle.' 
The following examples of polysemy-sourced humour are my own: I take the the blame 
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for each.
[54] I'm an organ donor. I figure if I'm dead I won't be playing it any more.
While the noun donor firmly evokes the biological sense of organ, making it the object 
of the verb play calls up the musical related one.
[55] He communicates with spirits every night, usually tequila. 
The  word  communicates  and  tequila  are  associated  with  two different  meanings  of 
spirit.
[56] I used to live next door to a guy who made really nice tennis rackets. But I 
couldn't sleep. Every night he made such an incredible racket.
The 'noise' sense of racket is commonly an object of the verb make, a reading reinforced 
by its modification by incredible.
[57]  Later  I  heard  he  made  money  by  organising  illegal  gambling  on  tennis 
games. That's what's known as a tennis racket. 
Here, an inability to interpret the final NP literally forces a new reading to align with the 
earlier information.
[58] When I was teaching my wife tennis, I had to let her beat me. Sometimes I 
wouldn't score a single point. Now that's love.
This is a case that actually works well, if unhumorously, entirely on the literal level. The 
humour is perhaps triggered by the larger discourse: our topic is humour and polysemy 
so  a  humorous  double  meaning  is  expected.  In  another  discourse  mode  the  double 
meaning might go unnoticed or even be unintended or (if intended) might be followed 
by a more overt trigger such as 'Get it? Love!'
The humour can be conveyed even when the form is morphologically altered to 
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one not allowed by both meanings.
[59] I prefer intransitive verbs to transitive ones. They're not as argumentative.
However, lexical primings do not explain all instances of polysemy in humour. 
[60] Try some goat's milk. Kids drink it every day.
[61] 'I don't believe in polysemy!' the man ejaculated.
There is nothing in [61] to trigger the sexual meaning of the final word. In these cases, 
the  humour  seems  to  result  entirely  from the  contrast  between  a  rare  sense  and  a 
common one.  This kind of humour cannot  work with polysemes with two common 
senses, such as  dream. The humour of [61] may also stem from an awareness of the 
existence of the 'dirty joke' genre.
We have taken a lengthy departure from our examination of the polysemy of 
flavour because no one word can show the range of effects  that  mixing  the  lexical 
primings of one word with the use of another can have, nor have I completely done so 
as I have not demonstrated ambiguity and vagueness which Hoey has written about. I 
have, I believe, shown just how important lexical primings are to polysemous senses, 
that they can be flouted but with very specific results.
4.3 Discussion: Expanding on Hoey
Our return to  flavour  is accompanied by an explanation of why this particular 
word was chosen. Lexical metaphor is an area which slips through the cracks of Hoey's 
analysis.  He claims that  each polysemic  sense will  avoid the primings  of the other, 
illustrated with analyses of  consequence  ('result'  and 'importance') and  reason  ('logic' 
and  'rationality'),  both  of  which  are  balanced  polysemes.  Indeed,  my own work  on 
battery  and  racket bears  this  out.  Lexical  metaphor,  however,  shows  a  different 
behaviour. A metaphoric sense not only does share some the literal's primings but, it 
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seems, must do so to convey the metaphor (or at the very least needed to when the 
metaphoric sense was first coined and began to develop currency, if you'll pardon the 
wordplay). 
First of all, the two senses of flavour share certain lexical collocates, as table 7 
shows7. 
Another way of looking at this data is that table 7 shows what remains once we have 
stripped away all the lexical collocates unique to either sense. We noted earlier that the 
simplex, lexical collocates of the metaphoric sense were rather vague in their semantic 
contributions, lacking the specificity of the derived forms, but here, our list of collocates 
shared by both senses is composed entirely of similarly vague forms. These words have 
a focusing effect, telling us not the kind of flavour but how it relates to other possible 
flavours (i.e., there's more of it, it's stronger, more distinctive, unique or different8) The 
adjectives distinctive and strong mirror the behaviour noted above regarding more: they 
do  not  modify  the  otherwise  bare  metaphoric  flavour  but  there  is  always  another 
modifying element present, either in the pre- or post- position.
But it is the verb give that perhaps most clearly shows how the metaphoric sense 
imports certain aspects of the literal's subcategorisation. (I should note that while give 
7 If it surprises that more should be a collocate for the metaphoric flavour after our lengthy discussion 
of  more flavour  always employing the literal  sense, the cases here all involve  more modifying an 
adjective which in turn modifies flavour, cf. [17] above.
8 All instances of  different  premodifying either sense of  flavour  denote contrast with another flavour, 
sometimes explicitly stated with a from PP, and do not convey the meaning of 'usual, atypical.'
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Table 7: Lexical collocates shared by the 
literal and metaphoric senses of 'flavour'
Word Total Literal Metaphoric
GIVE(S) 54 32% 69%
MORE 45 73% 27%
DISTINCTIVE 34 79% 21%
STRONG 33 52% 48%
UNIQUE 15 47% 53%
DIFFERENT 15 60% 40%
and gives were combined in table 6, the uninflected give was always the most frequent 
shared collocate.) Both senses occur as the object of give ([62] – [68]), with or without a 
to  PP ([64]-[65])  to  denote  SOURCE, and they both  occur  as  direct  objects  of  the 
ditransitive form ([66]-[68]) but neither can appear as the indirect object.
[62] Add a bit of orange peel, it you like, and a crushed dried and seeded chilli 
gives a nice flavour.
[63] It is a long way short of defining the format, but gives the flavour.
[64] Orange and a touch of coriander, to give an unusual flavour to the lentils.
[65] It is a handsome conversion and gives a catholic flavour to a street which 
used to be the exclusive preserve of contemporary Western art.
[66] It is peculiarly English and should be bought from a round loaf, covered in 
strings of fat which give it flavour.
[67] I am delighted to commend this booklet to you which I hope will give you a 
flavour of the variety and interest available to solicitors in local government.
[68] (=[18]) Hereford beef is more fatty which gives it more flavour, and that's 
what the customer wants. 
There are, however, at least two dissimilarities within these frames. First of all, 
if  flavour,  as the direct object of give,  is post-modified with an of PP, the meaning of 
flavour  is invariably the metaphoric. It is difficult to compose a convincing sentence 
with  give  +  flavour  of  using  the  literal  sense,  my  best  attempt  being  [69],  the 
awkwardness of which attests more to the questionable use of this formation than to its 
potential. 
[69] ? The cocoa gives the cake a/the flavour of chocolate9.
Second, when the metaphoric sense appears to the right of ditransitive give, the indirect 
object is always  you in the  BNC, as in [67] above, but for one example of  us. At any 
rate, is seems that only a person (or people) to whom information is being conveyed can 
fill  this  slot.  Literal  uses of  flavour  in  this  construction  are  possible  only when the 
speaker is a cannibal and the interlocutor his next meal. 
9 Native-speaker reactions to this sentence have been mixed, some finding it awkward, some perfectly 
acceptable,  while  still  others  are  distracted  by a perceived  redundancy.  Some language  users  see 
cocoa and chocolate as different entities (the latter being a fermented form of the former) while others 
see them as identical or are not aware of exactly what the difference is.
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None of this necessary threatens Hoey's claims but it calls to task the level of 
detail  in  the  analysis.  That  both  senses  occur  as  objects  of  give might  suggest  that 
primings of two senses can be  shared, jeopardising the validity of the claim, but the 
closer  we examine,  the more  disparities  turn up,  thus  reinstating  it.  Hoey (personal 
communication, 2008) writes his case may have been overstated. 
Conclusion
So far, this thesis has alternated theoretical chapters with in-depth examinations 
of specific words, the monoseme crawl in chapter two and the polyseme flavour here. 
The intent of the earlier  case-study was to illuminate a larger issue with the goal of 
making generalisable  claims regarding monosemy,  that  many words whose status of 
polysemy is assumed are in fact monosemic if pragmatics are factored out. The survey 
that forms the current chapter, however, makes no such claim. With one exception, the 
behaviours noted of flavour are observations of this word only and not of other lexical 
metaphors, and certainly not of other polysemes. 
That  one  exception  regards  those  elements  common  to  both  the  literal  and 
metaphoric senses of lexical metaphors. It seems that metaphoric meanings are primed 
to import certain elements of the literal source sense, that this is a necessary step in 
sense formation. A meaning cannot be metaphoric (in the single-lexeme sense we have 
been  working  with)  without  borrowing  some  components  from  the  literal  sense's 
subcategorisation.  Exactly  which  elements  are  ported  over  is  not  something  I  am 
prepared to declare, partly because lexical metaphor is a rarer category than vicariant 
polysemy  or  homonymy,  and  within  this  category,  nouns  are  only  one  type,  but 
necessary for  a  comparison  with  flavour.  It  can,  however,  be safely said  that  those 
elements that are common to both senses will exhibit a degree of vagueness—that is, 
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they cannot be bound to the specific domain of the literal sense but must be able to 
generalise to the wider spectrum of metaphoric uses.
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Chapter five: From the  ory to application  
With the previous sections focusing on polysemy as a theoretical issue forming a 
foundation for us to build upon, there are now several directions in which the remainder 
of this thesis could be structured. At the most rudimentary level is the issue of whether 
to focus on the direct teaching of polysemes or to arm learners with strategies to apply 
when encountering them. It is because this issue is primary and because, as we shall see, 
each approach complements the other, that it would be a disservice to the students this 
thesis seeks to help to focus on one approach at the expense of the other. Both, that is, 
are considered valid.  The remainder  of this thesis, then, will be divided to into two 
unequal  parts.  The first  concentrates  on the  explicit  teaching  of  polyvalent10 words, 
addressing  such  subtopics  as  how  many  homonyms  exist,  which  homonyms  and 
polysemes are the most useful to learners at any given stage of development, whether 
polysemous meanings  should be taught  together  or delayed,  to  what  extent  Lakoff's 
system  of  cognitive  metaphor  presents  a  teachable  paradigm,  etc.  The  second  half 
focuses  on  whether  learners  can  pinpoint  polysemy  as  the  source  of  discord  when 
encountering  known word  forms  using  unknown meanings,  assesses  their  ability  to 
guess the meaning when they do so, what kinds of polysemous relations exist from the 
learners' point of view and which of these are teachable, and what kind of mnemonics 
learners can employ to retain the new meaning.
This chapter attempts to bridge what has proceeded it, the theoretical, with what 
succeeds it, the applied. If it seems to jump around a bit, this is because a few loose 
ends  need  addressing  before  declaring  our  foundation  complete.  It  will  review  the 
literature of polysemy as a second language pedagogical issue, then examine a model of 
second language vocabulary acquisition proposed by Meara (1997) and finally mould 
10 The terms polyvalent and polyvalency, after Panman (1982), are used here to collect polysemy, pure 
(i.e.,diachronic) homonymy, cognitive (synchronic) homonymy, homography and homophony.
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all  that  has  been  written  thus  far  into  clear  guidelines  and principles  regarding  the 
teaching and learning of polysemes and homonyms.
5.1 Polysemy in teacher resource texts
In  the  first  chapter,  we  briefly  considered  three  introductory  texts  on 
lexicography for their  treatment  of polysemy and found it  wanting.  Sadly,  the same 
approach  yields  much  the  same  results  when  we  examine  polysemy  as  a  second 
language  pedagogy  concern.  Limiting  our  scope  to  books  devoted  entirely  to  the 
teaching of second language vocabulary, whether written to discuss theoretical matters 
or to present techniques (i.e.,  'recipe books'),  we examine those written or edited by 
Morgan and Rinvolucri  (1986), McCarthy (1990), Hatch and Brown (1995), Schmitt 
and McCarthy (1997), Nation (1990, 2000) and Read (2000), all of which have the word 
vocabulary in their title.
Morgan  and  Rinvolucri  (1986)'s  text  is  entitled  Vocabulary  and  is  part  of 
Oxford's Resource Books for Teachers series. It describes 101 activities, but not one is 
concerned with learning additional meaning. Moreover, the activities, including a whole 
section devoted to dictionary use, downright ignore the fact that other meanings exist. 
The implication here is that there is a 1:1 correlation between form and meaning, that 
although we are given many techniques to do so, the goal is mostly to associate a word 
form with that one meaning. (To be fair, this book is otherwise a very useful one; it 
diminishes because we view it for something it didn't intend to present.)
McCarthy (1990),  also entitled simply  Vocabulary,  fares better.  Not a recipe 
book of pre-planned classroom activities but a user-friendly text that, like others in its 
series,  raises  issues  but  lets  the  instructor  form  her  own  opinion,  certainly  an 
understandable approach for a book not devoted to polysemy. It raises the distinction 
112
between polysemy and homonymy, suggests that etymology can sometimes resolve the 
issue but also confuse matters, mentions monosemy, implies that there may be a finite 
number of polysemous senses, and asks how we can know when a learner has learned a 
polysemous word—a question addressed in the following section of this chapter. Also 
examined are the notions of central and peripheral meanings and Kellerman's (1986) 
research on learners'  expectations of peripheral  meanings. Generally,  learners do not 
expect that non-prototypical uses of L1 words will translate to the L2 (even when they 
can do so: see also Kellerman (1985), not mentioned by McCarthy). 
Raising the issue of polysemy while stopping short of suggesting what to do 
about it is found in another teacher-training text: Vocabulary, Semantics and Language 
Education by Hatch and Brown (1995). Again, meanings are thought of as core-like or 
moving away from the core.
In Schmidt and McCarthy (1997), Nagy discusses Ruhl and the notion that what 
passes  for polysemy can be attributed  to  reference  specification,  though he does  so 
largely to counter him. He cites examples  such as  dog,  cat,  fox  and  viper  that  have 
meanings that depend on metaphor, that canine and dog do not share the same range of 
meaning, from which he draws the following conclusion: Hence, the kind of multiplicity  
of meaning represented by such contextualized metaphors needs to be represented in 
the mental lexicon (1997:68). If the word mental weren't in there, the sentence could be 
taken  as  a  justification  of  inclusion  of  metaphoric  senses  in  the  dictionary.  (Ruhl, 
remember,  offers no suggestions on lexicographical practices.)  However, as it  is the 
mental  lexicon being discussed here, I find it odd that the inclusion of such senses is 
being justified, almost prescribed, with the words  needs to be. But it's no stretch, and 
probably not a controversial  claim anyway,  to extract from this that different people 
construct their mental lexicons differently; we've already been using the terms lumpers 
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and splitters to describe two contrasting ways in which we do so. That said, however, 
I'm not convinced the animal examples he gives are ones that Ruhl would disagree with 
in the first place. His case is constructed on words with highly abstract meanings, such 
as  the  verb  bear,  rather  than  words  that  are  'natural  kinds.'  As  with  flavour,  the 
distinction between literal and metaphoric dogs is quite clear-cut and does not represent 
a case where the real meaning patterns out from the combined uses. 
As mentioned in chapter three, Nation (1990, 2001) introduces the concept of 
'underlying meaning' and reports on the work of Visser (1989), which finally presents a 
pedagogical  procedure  for  teaching  polysemes.  Students,  working  in  groups,  are 
presented with two meanings of a polyseme in context and are given a simple task for 
each meaning.  After this,  they are asked to state what features are common to both 
senses. For example, for the word emerge, they are given, in the first column: 
To emerge means to come out of an enclosed space such as a room or vehicle or from a 
position where you could not be seen. 
Describe how a chicken is able to emerge from its shell. 
In the second column:
If you emerge from a particular state of mind or of existence, such as sleep, you change  
from one state to another, for example by waking from sleep.
Describe what can happen if you emerge from a bad dream.
And in the third: 
Say what the similar features/ideas are in columns 1 and 2.
While I do not necessarily see these two uses as different senses, any criticism on these 
grounds is negated by the result which, after all, seeks to merge them. It encourages 
deep processing and flouts the prevalent assumption that matching a word form with its 
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commonest meaning is a significant enough burden for any learner. Visser presents this 
technique as a way of introducing new vocabulary—the multiple meanings are learned 
from  the  beginning.  The  question  of  whether  this  is  more  effective  than  delayed 
teaching is one I address below
Finally,  Read  (2000)  tackles  L2  vocabulary  acquisition  from  a  different 
perspective,  that  of  assessment.  He  writes  of  quantity  (or  breadth)  of  vocabulary 
knowledge, the scope or number of words known, and quality (or depth) of knowledge, 
including collocations, polysemic senses, etc. Tests of the former are more commonly 
written  about  because  they  provide  a  more  representative  snapshot  of  a  learner's 
vocabulary level than an in-depth assessment of a few words. He reports an examination 
conducted by Dolch and Leeds on various vocabulary test batteries, they found that only 
the commonest  meaning of each word was tested.  This study was on tests  given to 
American school children (and hence L1) and furthermore was done in 1953, though 
I'm not convinced that the situation for L2 learners 50+ years later is much different. 
Noting this criticism, it is surprising that the book does not have much further to say on 
the assessment  of additional  polysemous senses.  Read (2005) has since developed a 
multiple-choice test in which words are presented in paragraph-length contexts with a 
definition/paraphrase  along  with  distractor  definitions  and the  students  are  asked to 
chose which sense is the appropriate one for the given context. 
A survey of books written for ESL and EFL instructors with vocabulary in the 
title can hardly pretend to be a full account of the subject, but I am leery about being 
comprehensive when a snapshot will suffice. A more exhaustive account detailing every 
journal mention of the relevant terms would indeed be exhausting. Having spent some 
years  researching  the  topic,  I  am  satisfied  that  this  snapshot  provides  the  same 
conclusions: there is little written on the teaching of polysemy to L2 learners, mentions 
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of the concept are usually made without pedagogical suggestions, and the assumptions 
of the individual researcher trump theoretical foundation11. Both the lack of attention the 
topic gets and what little mention it does garner speaks to the unspoken assumption that 
once the word form is matched to the commonest meaning, the learning is complete; 
anything further is the learner's concern, done on her own time, external to the language 
curriculum.  This  thesis  attempts  to  challenge  this  assumption,  though  it  should  be 
obvious by now that I wish to reverse it rather than just examine it.
5.2 Meara's model of second language vocabulary acquisition
Elsewhere in the Schmitt and McCarthy book mentioned above, Meara (1997) 
proposes a model of vocabulary acquisition. In brief, the mental lexicon is a network; 
learning a word is a matter of connecting the newly encountered word to one, or more, 
already known. This could be a first language word or a second language one. Links 
may be one-way or, ideally, two-way. Words connected with one-way links are those 
that  exist  in  our  passive  vocabulary—words  we know when  we hear  them but  not 
necessarily available for productive use. Both native speakers and L2 learners have such 
words. Further, the number of connections varies: the more connections, the more well-
known the word is. 
It is the remarkable simplicity of the model that deflects significant criticism. 
The  counterargument,  that  the  lexicon  does  not  resemble  a  network,  is  the  more 
untenable position. The appeal Meara's model has for polysemy is the ease in which it 
can be developed to accommodate it. 
Applying  this  to  the  current  research  encompasses  four  permutations.  One 
dimension entails whether one meaning is already known or not, and the other involves 
11 My embracing of Ruhl is less a matter of alignment, though I don't deny beginning at a concordant 
position, and more one of gravitating toward the most developed foundation.
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polysemy  and  clearly-related  senses  or  homonymy,  either  pure  or  cognitive.  These 
combine in four ways:
● Homonym, all meanings unknown
● Homonym, one (or more) meaning known
● Polyseme, all meanings unknown
● Polyseme, one (or more) meaning known
The word polysemy here refers to cases where the meanings are pretty clearly related on 
semantic  and  synchronic  grounds,  at  least  to  those  familiar  with  them;  homonym 
includes both pure homonymy (the meanings are completely unrelated) and cognitive 
homonymy (the meanings have drifted apart so that they are no longer connected in a 
meaningful  way,  resulting  in  idiom-like  polysemes).  In  the  first  and  third  of  these 
permutations, it is a matter of learning a new word form and forming multiple links, the 
difference between the two being a matter of how they're linked. With polysemes, the 
connections  are  to  related  concepts  while  those of homonyms  run in quite  different 
directions. In many instances (usually but not necessarily homonyms), expecting these 
to be learnt is placing considerable cognitive demands upon the learner, although in 
some cases the duplicity or multiplicity of meanings can serve to reinforce each other. A 
case-by-case basis is required here; young children being introduced to the word school  
for the first time are not very likely to be ready to know the polysemic sense seen in 
school  of  thought  or  the  homonymic  meaning  in  school  of  fish,  but  older  students 
learning the word nucleus might find the molecular meaning reinforced by example like 
the nucleus of a good relationship.
In the second and fourth permutations,  the word form is  already known and 
established in the network, thus making at least half of the work already done. When 
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polysemic senses are introduced,  the effect is perhaps not unlike our examination of 
crawl in chapter two: the real meaning patterns out. We take what is known and, by re-
analysing it, open it up.
Linking  known word  forms  to  homonymic  meanings  is  a  different  story.  A 
teacher or textbook introducing the word chest with its meaning of 'large, heavy box for 
storing valuable things' is not likely to make mention of the 'upper torso' sense. These 
are cognitive homonyms; the metaphor connecting them is dead, and native speakers 
probably learn both meanings before we're cognitively advanced enough to see how 
they're  related.  The  older  student,  however,  is  probably  more  aware  of  the  formal 
identity than we are. What we have here, but fail to recognise, is, in theoretical terms, a 
perfect opportunity to help link a new meaning to known information, or, in practical 
terms, a very useful mnemonic. Even in pure homonymy where the meanings are not 
related, such as ring 'sound of a bell' and 'band (i.e., around a finger)' can be connected 
to each other mnemonically in a variation of the keyword method, discussed below.
None of these four permutations is more ideal than the others. All four exist in 
the mental lexicons of any L2 learner, from the launched beginner to the advanced, and 
even in native speakers as a browse of the OED will confirm. The question of whether it 
is  better  to  teach  all  meanings  at  once  or  to  introduce  additional  meanings  later  is 
somewhat trivialised by the fact that learners bring to the table this mixed bag of half-
learnt and unknown words. 
This thesis  takes Meara's model  as a starting point.  The goal here is  to help 
students link words new words or add new links to old ones. In many cases, especially 
when older students are involved, the word form is already known as is the concept; the 
only thing missing are the links between them. All learners are familiar with the concept 
of being hungry from not eating. Most will also know the word fast with its meaning of 
118
'quick.' All we need do is help them make a new link.
5.3 Forging a pedagogical approach
Those  texts  above that  address  the  issue of  polysemy can,  along with  those 
discussed  in  previous  chapters,  be  mediated  and  synthesised  to  show the  approach 
outlined in this thesis. Let's return first to the question asked in McCarthy (1990:24): 
'when  can  a  learner  be  said  to  know  a  polysemous  item  as  as  “catch”?'  (italics 
McCarthy's) Answering this question raises several points, some key to our approach. 
First there is the assumption that catch is polysemous, supported by the claim that it has 
'several related but distinct senses in English' shown by the direct objects a bus, a cold,  
a butterfly, someone's remarks and someone stealing money. My readers will, by now, 
no doubt predict that I see this as monosemic, and I will not disappoint: at an abstract 
level, a meaning patterns out, one we cannot paraphrase for all uses with any other word 
(betraying that peculiar assumption that the lexicon should be so perfectly redundant), 
the differences being attributable to the direct objects, and hence, not to catch itself. I 
raise, again, the question: if word meaning is abstract knowledge to which we do have 
access only via the word form can it be taught?
The question may be even more complex than it appears at first sight. At the 
early stages of EFL and some ESL learning situations, L2 words are inevitably learned 
as L1 translations—or rather, one meaning of an L2 polyseme or homonym is learned 
by recourse to its closest L1 equivalent. Any other meanings encountered in early stages 
will most likely be learned as translations of different L1 words. This could conceivably 
interfere with the 'patterning out' of the word's related meanings though, of course, we 
don't have direct access to what takes place cognitively in the learners' minds.
What  I  propose,  then,  is  that  the  learning  of  polysemic  senses  can,  when 
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accompanied by the proper analysis, be an important tool to help learners make the step 
from the L1-dependency to a more autonomous L2 lexicon. New meanings could, at 
least in theory, be learned mechanically via their L2 translation equivalents or the new 
usages could be analysed in relation to the known L1 meaning. The terms I use are 
deliberate: one entails 'new meanings' and the other 'new usages.' New meanings of L2 
polysemes being tacked on via different L1 words will always be discrete, presumably 
more so than they are for native speakers. In the case of catch, which has meanings that, 
for McCarthy, are 'clearly related' or uses that, for me, are really one and the same, a 
commonality  (in  which  a  known  word  is  broadened  to  include  a  more  expansive 
common ground) is ignored in favour of a complexity (in which one L2 word is linked 
to multiple, discrete L1 words); the learning burden is increased, not eased, by recourse 
to  the  L1 over  the  L2,  encouraging  the  learner  to  construct  the  L2 lexicon  in  this 
unproductive,  mechanical  manner.  The deep processing of  polysemous  senses,  then, 
may be a push for learners to construct dedicated second language mental  networks 
rather than ones parasitic upon their L1 lexicons. Visser's (1989) recommendation of 
getting learners to process the underlying meaning is, I believe,  a significant step in 
accomplishing this as the two (or more) uses are learned in relationship to each rather 
than to L1 words. 
I speak here of idealised (if less than ideal) cases but of course do not wish to 
paint these extremes as an invariable reality. At a minimum, we can assume that some 
learners will analyse some of the cases some of the time, and that some learners, the 
ones who seem to grasp language more quickly, do so more often. What needs to be 
done is to help learners to analyse related senses. 
Timing is,  I  should think,  crucial  here—too early,  and we may overload the 
cognitive demands of this restructuring, burdening a fledgling system still needing to be 
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fortified on its own terms with an untimely puberty of sorts. It is for this reason that the 
dedicated teaching of polysemy is something best done at the intermediate stage at least 
(dedicated teaching as opposed to chance  encounters—most learners will probably be 
introduced to certain homophones like the noun can and the modal verb can at an earlier 
stage.) 
A  book  for  teachers  not  discussed  above  is  Lewis  (1997).  Again,  no  direct 
mention is made of polysemy or homonymy, but there are a couple of activities I would 
like to extract for their relevance here. Although no theoretical predisposition is spelled 
out regarding polysemy or monosemy, his attempts to show the variety of collocations 
associated with a word is not so different from the methodology employed in chapter 
two here to show monosemy. A matching activity asks learners to choose from a list all 
the words that collocate with pay, make and give. The words that collocate with make, 
for example, include money, deal and lunch, instances which are accounted for by three 
separate  definitions  in  the  COBUILD  Advanced  Learners'  Dictionary.  A  similar 
exercise asks students to read a word followed by several collocates and one randomly-
placed distractor. They are asked to identify the false collocate by crossing it out.
1. BRIGHT idea green smell child day room
Again, we can expect most dictionaries to enumerate the adjective in  bright idea and 
bright green separately, and indeed they may well translate differently in learners' L1. 
Thus what is constructed here is the monosemy of the word, or at least its root meaning, 
the  reanalysis  yielding  the  cognitive  merging  of  several  discrete  elements  into  one 
continuous whole. 
There  is,  at  least  depending  on  the  learner's  experience,  a  difference  here 
between teaching different uses of one word and expecting them to be able to complete 
such an activity. In the former situation, the instructor teaches the uses to the learner; in 
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the latter, it is assumed that the student already knows the uses but hasn't connected the 
dots. Both cases are perhaps overly ideal; for any given word we may not know how 
much knowledge the learner brings already, but we can always assume that learners will 
have various starting points for various words, that it cannot always be exactly one of 
these situations.
The learning of homonymic meanings is, of course, a different matter as there is 
no analysable relationship that will pattern out into networks or spectra of meaning. 
However, the formal identity of the two words is still a commonality, and an economy 
of language can be an economy of learning, the beginning of a mnemonic relationship, 
to  mangle  Bogart's  words.  For  example,  a  learner  familiar  with  the  'educational 
institution' meaning of school can easily learn the homonymic 'group of fish' meaning 
by connecting the two, seeing a group of fish sitting in desks, perhaps headed by a 
mortarboard-donning  teacher  fish,  etc.  Of  course,  since  native  speakers  (myself 
included, prior to beginning this line of research) might assume these two uses to be 
related,  this  is an overly simple example,  so a few more cases will  be presented.  A 
connection between the kind of ray that swims the ocean and a ray of light that beams 
from the sun (or from a ray gun) can be forged by imagining a water ray being shot 
from a gun or streaming from the sun. Two meanings of  mint  can be connected by 
imagining  peppermint-flavoured  coins.  The  point  is,  there  is  a  commonality  here,  a 
shared trait—the form—that provides a starting point. Learners, in these cases, do not 
have to learn the meaning and the form from scratch as they might with completely new 
words; one element is known already and can be capitalised upon. 
I'm not  prepared to  recommend that  the  teaching  of  all  polysemic  senses  of 
words like  catch  should be done at once, largely because most of the students I work 
with are well familiar with such words (and those that aren't certainly aren't ready for 
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them), but I should think that when introducing new, related senses or usages that as 
many be introduced for which a pattern can be seen and which is appropriate to their 
age level. If, for example, a student knew only the use of  catch related to catching a 
ball, I would certainly show them the range of meanings that McCarthy presents above 
on the basis of the more examples, the clearer the pattern. I would, though, take age into 
account and probably not teach catch someone's remarks to young children. Of course 
there is a difference between demonstrating and teaching. Showing the range of usages 
so that a pattern can be deduced is quite distinct from expecting the learner to remember 
each and every one and demonstrate mastery of on a test. 
5.3.1 What can we abstract from all this?
We stand now at a point where a summary of the entire thesis will help solidify 
what has been discussed so far and direct where we go from here.
● Dictionaries do not represent the mental lexicon in structure nor the property of 
words as they are communally determined; their division of words into discrete, 
countable units of meaning do not necessarily reflect the actuality of words but 
an  externally-applied  artificial  overlay,  not  unlike  transparencies  placed  over 
maps to show socially-determined boundaries within landmasses. 
● The illusion of multiple meanings can frequently be explained by pragmatics or 
syntax rather than semantics, in which case we have monosemy.
● When  the  difference  is  one  of  semantics,  we  have  either  polysemy  or 
homonymy.
● Diachrony is an unsuitable criterion for determining polysemy and homonymy; 
the difference is ultimately one of cognitive distance.
● Homographs are words with the same written form but contrasting oral forms; 
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homophones are words that sound alike but are rendered differently in writing.
● As semantic entities, established polysemic senses (that is, ignoring nonce and 
creative  uses)  are  of  two  varieties:  lexical  metaphor,  when  the  relationship 
between  two  senses  is  clearly  of  a  literal/metaphoric  nature,  and  vicariant 
polysemy, where senses are clearly related but have become independent.
● The establishment of new senses has effects beyond the semantic. The senses of 
vicariant polysemes avoid each other's patterns (collocations, etc.) while those of 
lexical metaphors tend to share some but not all.
● In  the  classroom,  learners  are  generally  taught  only  the  word  form and  its 
commonest meaning.
● Additional meanings are left to chance encounters; there is no system in place 
for teaching these.
● Learners  are  generally  not  tested  on  anything  other  than  the  commonest 
meaning.
● When learners do encounter these words, they will attempt to use the known 
meaning.
● When that fails, they may not necessarily realise the applied meaning is wrong; 
they may well suspect the problem is elsewhere (another word, grammar, or that 
the construction is an idiom, etc.).  The known meaning is, after all,  a known 
element so there is little motivation to look up a word that is already known.
● What may happen is that the sentence/passage is left un-understood, the source 
of confusion never pinpointed.
● When consulting their dictionaries for encoding purposes, many learners are not 
well-equipped  for  knowing  which  L2  word  to  use  (when  several  are  given) 
unless the dictionary's example sentences makes this clear.
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● Additional meanings could be learned by different L1 equivalents or by relation 
to the L2 word; for the latter, the relationship would have to be clear.
● Even when multiple meanings of words are known, students are often confused 
about which meaning to apply, at least momentarily. 
● Homonymic  meanings  are  generally  taught  with  no acknowledgement  of  the 
already known word,  probably because the two words are  so discrete  in  the 
minds of native speakers, even where reference to the known word could serve 
as a foundation to which to link the new meaning.
Conclusion
To label  this  section 'Conclusion'  is  misleading because the only thing being 
concluded is the beginning. What I've presented so far is a summary of the literature on 
the subject of polysemy and related topics and an exposition of my own beliefs on the 
matter.  Rather  than providing a  litany of article  and book titles  with a  few cursory 
comments to demonstrate I've read them, I've instead attempted to analyse a few, most 
notably Ruhl and Hoey. As such, there are some names that readers may be expecting 
whom I have mentioned in passing if at all such as Pustejovsky, Lakoff12 and Rosch13. 
Taken as our starting point, the literature on the subject is a spotty nebula and my goal 
here has been to connect a line between those that form the straightest path to our goal 
of second language pedagogy, stopping at a few key points along the way, as connecting 
12 Of these omissions, the biggest disservice is to Lakoff. Pustejovsky's generative formalism, while at 
times quite interesting,  does  not,  to me, represent  a  cognitive reality.  That  he is  a professor  in a 
computer science department, coupled with the observation that his work and that of his followers has 
had an impact on computational linguistics and artificial intelligence, suggests that modelling human 
cognition was never an intended goal,  and I would therefore hope my slighting of this branch of 
research, which accounts for perhaps the only concentrated cluster of research into polysemy in recent 
years apart from the research into cognitive metaphor spearheaded by Lakoff, is less one of dispute 
than of congruity.
13 Prototype theory (Rosch 1975) is useful for understanding polysemy but the notion of prototypical 
meanings is useful  only to those who know all the meanings (that is, it  is  COIK—Clear  Only If 
Known); its use to the L2 learner is limited to some after-the-fact restructuring and tidying. 
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them all would be an aimless journey full of random turns and sudden jumps, leaving in 
our wake barely visited rest areas. 
We turn next to what students may already know about polysemy and accounts 
of which words have been particularly troublesome for them.
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Part 2: Pedagogical aspects of polysemy
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Chapter six: Introduction to Part II: Forging a pedagogy.
Though  brief,  this  chapter  takes  a  close  look  at  how  a  learner  processes 
polysemy and homonymy when decoding a text.  The learner's  problems are  cast  in 
relief, thus lending shape to the remainder of this thesis which attempts to apply the 
theoretical issues discussed thus far.
6.1 The learner's dilemma
When encountering a sentence in which all the words are known but which still 
fails to make sense, the learner must first ask whether one of the words may have an 
unknown  meaning,  pinpoint  the  candidate  word(s),  and  then  decide  whether  the 
meaning might be related to a known meaning, and therefore potentially guessable, or 
not.  It  is  this  decision  that  warrants  the  discussion  of  homonymy,  but  the  lack  of 
guessability that allows brevity. 
As a pedagogical subject, we can look at the polysemy/homonymy distinction 
metaphorically.  Once  a  learner  has  identified  a  word  as  possibly  having  another, 
unknown meaning,  polysemy represents  an elastic  band that  could,  conceivably,  be 
stretched to  include  a  reasonably correct  meaning by guessing,  but if,  however,  the 
employed meaning is homonymic  to the known one,  then we have a brick wall;  no 
amount  of  guessing  will  lead  the  learner  from,  for  example,  the 'tool  for  weighing' 
meaning of  scale  to the 'reptile skin' meaning. Contextual clues may lead to the right 
answer, but there are no contextual clues whether the word is an elastic band or a brick 
wall; the only way to declare such a word homonymic, without consulting an external 
authority,  is  to  exhaust  the  possibilities  of  polysemy—that  is,  to  stretch  the  known 
meaning  of  the  word  form  until  arriving  at  a  reading  that  makes  sense  (which, 
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understandably, learners never seem very confident of) and if this isn't possible, then the 
word is the brick wall of homonymy. In other words it is a choice based on trial-and-
error guessing whether the new meaning is even going to be guessable. Thus the applied 
aspect of polysemy runs contrary to the theoretical: while we had earlier espoused the 
view of assuming a single meaning until multiplicity has been demonstrated, the learner 
in polysemy encounters, on the other hand, has the almost opposite stance of starting 
with  the  wide  multiplicity  of  polysemy  before  whittling  the  choices  down  to  the 
narrower plurality of homonymy. 
To back up a  bit  and paint  the full  picture,  the entire  process  is  as  follows. 
Reading is  the assumed activity here.  First  the learner  encounters a sentence that  is 
incomprehensible despite all the words being known14. Second, she decides whether to 
deal with it or keep on reading. This choice can be re-evaluated and changed at any 
point, but we'll assume she decides to tackle the problem. Third, she rules out syntax as 
the  source  of  confusion  and  decides  the  problem  is  lexical,  this  being  done  by 
rechecking the grammar and deciding there is no unknown syntactical pattern. Probably 
not all learners do this step. Fourth, she realises that one of the words may have an 
additional  meaning.  As  reported  earlier,  Laufer  (1997)  warns  that  this  very  rarely 
happens;  students  stick  to  the  meaning  they  know.  This  is,  of  course,  the  very 
phenomenon our teaching aims to improve. Furthermore, there could be other factors 
that  render such a sentence difficult  to comprehend (misreadings,  faulty analyses  of 
earlier  discourse,  etc.).  Fifth,  the  learner  must  now decide  whether  the  meaning  is 
related or not, which is done by testing potential 'stretches' of the known meaning—that 
is, guessing how, and if, the encountered usage might be related to the known meaning. 
From here, three possible outcomes manifest. 
14 This is, admittedly, oversimplistic. An unknown meaning of a known polyseme or homonym can, of 
course, occur in a sentence in which another word is completely unknown—a far messier situation.
130
1. One of the guessed meanings works, in which case the interaction with the text 
continues.  The  continuation  is  probably  cautiously  done:  the  learner  doesn't 
know the choice is correct but is testing the theory. Further discourse will either 
prove the word inconsequential to the current text (it doesn't occur again so it's 
not important) or provide further opportunities to test the theory (supporting it, 
refuting  it  or  perhaps  neither).  In  other  words,  even the correct  guess  of  an 
ambiguous word doesn't dispel the ambiguity. However if the correct guess is 
continually  reinforced  by the discourse,  the  new sense could conceivably be 
acquired. 
2. One of the guesses 'kind of' works. This isn't much different than the previous 
scenario but is probably more common. The ambiguity is greater, as is the need 
to consult a dictionary or some other authority. 
3. None of the proposed meanings works. Here the word form represents either 
homonymy or a distantly-related polysemic sense (the journalistic sense of beat 
when only the common verbal meanings are known). Of course there's always 
the possibility that the learner just didn't stretch the word in the right direction 
and didn't guess correctly but conceivably could have. In any event, the learner 
is returned to a previous choice: whether to stop and consult the dictionary or to 
continue, hoping either that the remainder of the discourse is not contingent on 
the unknown word or that it will become clear.
This is a bleak picture (that ignores certain aspects such as 'a-ha!' moments where the 
new meaning jumps out at the learner,  cases where the unknown meaning has been 
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encountered but not learnt before thus potentially supplying additional clues, words that 
are similarly polysemous in the learner's L1, etc.), aimed to show the number of choices 
a learner has to make and the diminishment of confidence with each one. 
The beginning of this thesis promised to discuss strategies learners can use for 
guessing unknown meanings. At this point we may begin to wonder if arming learners 
with such strategies  is  all  that  worthwhile.  Perhaps  we should merely introduce the 
concepts  of  polysemy and homonymy to increase  their  awareness  of  known-words-
with-unknown-meanings  so they will  consult  their  dictionaries  when they otherwise 
might  not have.  Raising their  awareness of how incomplete  their  knowledge is,  and 
aiming it in the right direction, is, in fact, a considerable learning accomplishment. The 
whole problem of polysemy and homonymy may, in fact, stem from the way words are 
first presented (L2 word = L1 equivalent)—that is, a lack of understanding how words 
'work,'—and a lack of dictionary skills. Strategies for guessing polysemic senses are, as 
we shall see, a valid aid to the learner in decoding; after all, the sooner they can rule out 
polysemy, the better can declare homonymy.
This brief account, then, raises all the issues which the remainder of this thesis 
addresses. Chapter seven examines specific techniques for raising a learner's awareness 
of homonymy and polysemy so that the problem of unknown, additional meanings can, 
at the very least,  be a suspected cause of confusion, and advocates not just teaching 
dictionary skills but suggests specific skills related to polysemy and homonymy. Two 
subsequent  chapters  tackle  homonymy,  first  arguing  that  the  burden  of  learning 
homonymic meanings be reapportioned to educators rather than the students and then 
offering practical  information  on how to present them.  Finally we will  examine  the 
'guessability' of polysemic senses and offer some teachable guidelines.
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Chapter seven:  Polysemy encounters and the dictionary  
Awareness requires a rupture with the world we take for granted; 
then old categories of experience are called into question and revised.
Shoshana Zuboff (1988)
Raising awareness of the concepts of related and unrelated meanings is the most 
rudimentary step in the chain of decoding polysemy encounters. Without it,  learners 
will not suspect a known word form of having an unknown meaning, and without this, 
any further steps in the flowchart are not reached and the blame for not understanding 
the sentence is mis-allocated, perhaps onto the syntax or onto learners themselves.
7.1 Awareness raising
I am sometimes struck by the fact that learners are well aware of polysemy and 
homonymy in their  first  language  but  generally  fail  to  find candidacy for  it  during 
problematic junctures in their second. To be sure, they know it exists, and even many 
low proficiency learners can even name a few L2 homonyms, but the ability to suspect 
lexical polyvalence, as Laufer has claimed, is often surprisingly unavailable. 
In the various pilot studies and other work I've done with students in preparing 
this research, when the topic of polysemy or homonymy did not need to be masked, I 
occasionally needed to activate the subjects' knowledge fairly quickly, and this could be 
accomplished by following a simple process that can be applied to classroom treatments 
of the topic.  The first  step is  to provide examples  of each in their  first  language to 
activate their existing awareness and make them aware of the contrast. The next step is 
to supply some in English where they can safely be assumed to know both meanings. 
Such homonyms include  can the modal verb and the common noun denoting a small 
aluminium container,  bowl the dish and the leisure activity, and  miss the title and the 
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verb  (the  'I  miss  you'  being  more  well-known  than  the  'I  missed'  sense  in  my 
experience).  For polysemes  there are  light  denoting the opposites of  heavy  and  dark 
(etymologically a homonym but its meanings are cognitively related for most users), the 
two senses of dream associated with sleeping and the future, and speaker 'a person who 
speaks' and the clipped form of loudspeaker. The students can then be asked to supply 
their  own  if  they  are  not  already  doing  so,  though  in  my  experience  they  are 
volunteering  some  at  this  point.  When  known,  some  words  that  are  similarly 
polysemous in both languages can be presented. (As rare as this would be expected to 
be, it does happen. The Korean words for flavour (of the book) and loud (ties) can both 
be used in the same metaphoric way as the English equivalents.)
Sentences  using  high  frequency  polyvalent  words  employing  low  frequency 
meanings, contextualised in such a way that the common, presumably known, meaning 
doesn't make sense, can then be given to alert the learners of the importance of knowing 
the full range of meanings. Examples of this include:
[1] The soldier loaded the new magazine into his gun.
[2] After a long battle, the army finally captured the battery.
[3] They developed a new culture to make yoghurt. 
This helps to activate an awareness that there are unknown aspects of known elements, 
that there is more to be learnt. 
As with the highlighting of any learning problem, there is a slight problem here, 
which is that polyvalence has been primed, and thus it is not especially hard for learners 
to  suspect  it  in  such cases,  and this  may not  accurately represent  actual  encounters 
where any number of reasons may be the source of confusion. But the goal here is to 
provide a kind of scaffolding, an increased awareness of one of those problems which 
will then be available to them.
It has been my experience that there is a blinkering effect at play here. If—but 
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only if—polyvalence is suspected, it is generally pretty clear which word it is likely to 
be.  It's  not  a  matter  of  every  word  in  a  sentence  suggesting  itself  as  a  potential 
polyseme. Even in cases where multiple candidates are possible (perhaps yoghurt in [3] 
above),  the  learner  is  not  overwhelmed  with  choices,  and  it's  hard  to  imagine  a 
naturally-occurring sentence (as opposed to one constructed to confuse) containing as 
many as three or even more.
This structure—raising first an awareness of what they know and then of what 
they don't—can be followed in the classroom to introduce the topic of polyvalence. The 
remainder of this chapter examines how, when learners do recognise the need to stop 
and consult a dictionary, they can better do so. 
7.2 Polyvalence and learner use of the dictionary 
The use of dictionaries by language learners is a controversial issue among their 
teachers. Some see it as a support that students need to be weaned off while others see it 
as a tool that it would be foolhardy to rob the learner of. I've been quite vocal about 
certain  problems  within  the  dictionary,  but  have  only  implicitly  weighed in  on  the 
debate. If guessing meanings from context were an infallible, teachable skill then there 
would be little use for dictionaries, but, this not being the case, I believe there are times 
when a dictionary, replete with all its problems, is the best tool available to the learner. 
We've  seen  already  that  homonyms  are  a  source  of  interference,  that  for  a  learner 
familiar only with the 'young student' meaning of pupil to guess the 'centre part of the 
eye' meaning will need a preponderance of contextual clues to uproot her belief that the 
word is already a known element of the sentence and further clues to lead her to the 
correct meaning. It is cases like this where the dictionary can aid the perplexed learner. 
We still  need  that  spark,  that  'Hey,  I  wonder  if...'  moment  when she questions  her 
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certainty and suspects an additional meaning, but given that, the dictionary becomes a 
valuable source of information, to confirm her guess or else to supply the correct answer 
when a guess is wrong or not forthcoming. The biggest problem lies not in if but in how 
the dictionary is used. 
Dictionary consulting essentially takes one of two forms: it is consulted quickly 
for an immediate communication need or it  may be more leisurely consulted. In the 
latter,  the  user  can   spend  more  time  with  the  word  and  can  apply  some  of  the 
techniques detailed below. But for many learners, the former in-a-pinch and on-the-fly 
use, summarises the sole function of the dictionary. This chapter argues not against such 
uses but for expanding the user's repertoire. 
I  argued  earlier  that  the  purpose  of  dictionaries  is  ambiguous  or  at  least 
multifaceted. At an ideal, perhaps prototypical, level they exist to help users learn the 
meanings of unknown words, but there is more to them than this. Dictionaries, some 
more than others, record and catalogue language at the word level. But this diversity of 
function has resulted in a book, the learner variety somewhat excepted, marketed for no 
one particular audience; any dictionary will contain information not needed by every 
user. (Who, besides linguists and logophiles, uses etymologies or even knows how to 
decipher  them?)  This  isn't  meant  as  a  criticism—in  no  way  am  I  implying  that 
dictionaries should remove all information not relevant to a specific target audience—
but is intended simply to point out that the dictionary is a complex tool that many users 
are not trained to mine the full benefits of. 
This problem is more serious than just ignoring a word's etymology or frequency 
rating. In a case study reported on in the next chapter, one subject, when presented with 
a  list  of  familiar  words  with  rare,  homonymic  meanings  that  she  didn't  know, was 
surprised that so many words she thought she knew well were only half-learnt. After 
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looking them up in the dictionary as part of the task, she replied, 'I only knew the first 
meaning.  I  always  read  the  first  meaning,  then  stop.'  This  is  probably  an 
oversimplification of the situation (most of the words presented were high frequency 
word  forms  learnt,  I  strongly  suspect,  quite  early  on,  via  her  teachers  and  early 
textbooks rather than from a dictionary), but her assessment is one I've heard repeatedly 
over the past several years of conducting this research, done primarily in Korea. 
My recollection of my own dictionary training in school is like this. We were 
presented with a list of unrelated words and had to write F, M or B to indicate whether 
we would initially turn to the front, middle or back of the dictionary to hone in on the 
word. Finding words was facilitated with guide words, the words in the upper margin 
indicating the first and last entry on a page. We were also taught that the dictionary gave 
us the spelling, syllabification15, meaning, and pronunciation of any word and that there 
would usually be an example sentence. We were, I believe, made aware of run-on words 
(the -ly form, for example, being tacked on to root headword rather than being presented 
as  a  separate  entry).  We were  not  taught  to  read  etymologies  which  is,  of  course, 
understandable,  not least  because our dictionaries didn't include them, nor was there 
training in regard to dialectal uses, archaic meanings, etc. We were not instructed in 
how polysemic  senses  were  sequenced,  nor  could  we  have  been  when  there  is  no 
uniform method employed. Again, this is all justifiable, but perhaps we can conclude 
that what schoolchildren are taught to use are, in fact, schoolchildren's dictionaries. We 
were trained, mostly by hands-on practice, to use the dictionary but only to extract the 
knowledge  required.  The  dictionary  is  a  resource,  something  momentarily,  and 
infrequently, consulted. 
It can be argued that that is enough. The average native speaker doesn't need the 
15 Landau (2001) argues against the continued presentation of syllabification in modern dictionaries, it 
being a holdover from days of typeset documents. He also questions why any dictionary would show 
the syllabification of words such as an.y which should never be divided in the first place.
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more advanced features of a dictionary, nor need to spend 'quality time' with the book, 
any more than most computer users need to know each and every feature of a word 
processor or spreadsheet program. But the L2 learner frequently gets lost in the shuffle. 
Some  are  taught  bilingual  dictionary  skills  in  foreign  language  environments, 
particularly  when  the  L1  and  L2  are  completely  different  scripts,  but  this  training 
seldom extends beyond the children's dictionary set of skills. It is the L2 learner, not the 
L1-speaking  adult,  who  is  more  severely  constrained  by  having  only  the  most 
rudimentary  working  knowledge  of  the  dictionary.  Frankenberg-Garcia  (2005),  in  a 
study involving fourth-year translation majors consulting various translation resources 
(having  at  their  disposal  monolingual  and  bilingual  dictionaries,  monolingual  and 
bilingual corpora, a collocation dictionary, internet search engines and still other tools), 
observes that only rarely did they notice that 'a look-up hadn't worked, and when they 
did, [the subjects] were not very persistent at moving back and forth between different 
resources to find answers to the problems that remained unsolved. More often than not, 
they simply gave up searching.'
To  be  clear,  there  are  two different  things  here:  one  is  advanced  dictionary 
features and the other is advanced dictionary skills. The former entails elements of the 
dictionary that learners may ignore because they weren't taught about them, such as a 
word's  frequency  rating,  while  the  latter  involves  knowledge  of  how  to  use  the 
dictionary,  including not just the advanced features but any aspect of use beyond the 
rudimentary skills discussed above. The lesser-used features are a rather small set while 
dictionary skills are far more encompassing. 
In Dictionaries (1998), in Oxford's Resource Books for Teachers series, Wright 
offers 98 activities plus variations involving L2 students using dictionaries in various 
ways including  increasing familiarity with syntactic, register and dialectal information 
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as well as phonetic symbols, working with affixes and improving spelling skills, etc. A 
few activities involve polysemes and homonyms.
One such activity entails  a worksheet that is divided in two. In the first half, 
students are presented with eight sentences, each of which contains an underlined word 
that they are instructed to look up. Instructions ask them which meaning fits the given 
uses. In the second part, they are presented with eight new sentences, each with a blank 
which they are asked to fill using one of the underlined words from the section above. 
The  correct  word,  of  course,  uses  a  different  meaning  than  used  previously.  For 
example, the first part has a sentence 'I was in bed with a cold for two days' while the 
second part has, not in the same sequence, 'The coffee has gone _____. Could I have 
another?' No distinction is made between polysemes and homonyms. (Or rather, Wright 
considers  any word with multiple  meanings  a  homonym.  Generally  only theoretical 
linguists or lexicologists distinguish polysemy and homonymy.) 
Another activity, called the 'Multi-meaning bluff,' asks students, put into groups 
of four,  to  look up four given  polyvalent  words (arm,  bank,  deal  and leave  in  one 
example) and look them up, finding at least two different meanings for each and then 
make up one 'wholly wrong' definition for each. Two people in the group do this while 
the other two do the same with four other words. When this is finished, the two students 
read the definitions for each word, one at a time, while the other two are to guess which 
word is the invented one. 
A third activity is called 'Body Language,' but this is a pun as it entails language 
about the body rather than gestures. Students, on a worksheet,  are asked how many 
body  parts  they  can  name  in  five  minutes.  This  seems  to  be  to  prime  knowledge 
solicited by the remainder of the worksheet, which asks students to chose the right word 
in sentences such as 'She put her coffee down on the arm/hand of the chair.' A variant 
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for more advanced options uses the same sentences but with blanks, the list of words 
given at the foot of the worksheet. By way of wrap-up, learners are asked to discuss 
what  the  connections  are  between  the  physical  body part  and  the  use  given  in  the 
sentences, and then asked for similar expressions in their own language. 
A  fourth  activity  involves  a  short  text,  such  as  newspaper  article,  which  is 
divided into half. In the first part, all the polysemes and homonyms are underlined while 
in the second part they are not. The students are told to look up each word and write 
down the number of the definition that fits. (In this scenario, the class is using a set of 
identical dictionaries.) They are told that the first definition might not be the right one 
and that they should read through all of them quickly.  For the second half, they are 
asked to underline the words which words they expect might have multiple meanings. 
The following activity involves bilingual dictionaries and takes a couple of class 
sessions. In the first session, half the class are given bilingual dictionaries and the other 
half monolingual. They are all given a short text of about 300 words containing several 
homonyms (or polysemes) and are told to consult the dictionaries whenever they want 
but should read as much information as they can, noting for example syntactic patterns, 
pronunciation, other meanings, usage restrictions, etc. Then pairs who used the same 
dictionary discuss which words they looked up and what they noticed. Following this, 
the students are re-paired with those who used the other kind of dictionary and discuss 
the same issues. In the following session, the activity is repeated but with students given 
the opposite kind of dictionary than what they had used before, which is followed by a 
class discussion of what dictionary they prefer. This activity is not directly related to 
polysemy or homonymy, despite being tagged as such, but the discussion of dictionary 
preference and the raising of learners' awareness of the dictionary's limitations makes it 
worthwhile.
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(By way of anecdote, I would like to add that the book's index entry for 'sense 
associations' looked like a promising venue for more polysemy-related activities. I read, 
with  increasing  confusion,  the  first  activity  and  part  of  the  second  before  finally 
realising that sense here referred not to polysemic senses of words but to the five human 
senses of perception—evidence that even native speakers can be thrown by polysemy at 
times. Even monkeys fall from trees.)
Restricting  this  only  to  dictionary  skills  related,  however  tangentially,  to 
polyvalence,  the  following  are  the  skills  that  I  believe  every  advanced  user  should 
possess. Some of the skills assume an adult level of cognition. These skills apply to both 
monolingual and bilingual learner dictionaries. Along the way, I will also suggest how 
dictionaries could be improved to facilitate these skills. 
7.2.1 Reading entire entries
The first skill is simply reading all the definitions. This may seem obvious to us 
by now but a critical examination reveals why this is frequently impractical. Of course, 
it takes longer, enough for learners to lose the flow of the passage they're reading, but 
it's not simply a matter of time but of cognitive involvement: the learner has to audition 
each  proposed sense.  This  is  not  a  straightforward  process  as  it's  possible  that  the 
learner has to read further in the passage to be certain which proposed sense is at work 
here; the word in question may refer to a concept not otherwise introduced yet in the 
text. It is a much different matter for a native speaker, knowing all the senses of a given 
word, to declare which sense is at work in the sentence than it is for the learner, who has 
incomplete knowledge of both the word and the text, to do so.
Moreover,  if  the  sentence  they  have  encountered  employs,  say,  the  third 
polysemic definition of the dictionary they consult, it could be closely enough related to 
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the first that they can comprehend the sentence without actually having to read that far. 
In many dictionaries and especially the learners' variety, the first definition is either the 
most frequent or the most 'central,'  and therefore the chances of it being the 'correct' 
choice  are  greater  than  for  later  definitions.  And  given,  as  we  have  seen,  how 
dictionary-defined senses have a habit of splitting hairs, the difference between the first 
and later definitions may be so negligible that the meaning can be understood from the 
first  definition  even when a  later  one technically  covers  it  better  as  worded by the 
lexicographer.  As  stated  earlier,  an  experiment  which  attempted  to  recreate  such 
situations in a controlled setting was aborted due an inability to compose an adequate 
number of sentences in which a later definition of an unknown polyseme was employed 
and the first was clearly wrong. We should, at this time, recall Béjoint's (2000) claim 
that his subjects (French learners of English using monolingual dictionaries) couldn't 
understand how the dictionary divided up the definitions. Our own experience should 
bear  this  out:  the  differences  between  two  enumerated  senses  in  a  dictionary  are 
frequently subtle, sometimes contrasting only in which preposition is associated with 
that  'sense.'  Consider  the following excerpt  for  look  in the  CC.  The first  definition, 
given here briefly, is: If you look in a particular direction, you direct your eyes in that  
direction, especially so that you can see what is there or see what something is like.  
Reading on, should he actually do so, the user would soon encounter the following:
 3 look  looks  looking  looked 
If  someone,  especially  an  expert,  looks  at 
something, they examine it, and then deal with it or say 
how it should be dealt with.
  Can you look at my back? I think something's  
wrong.
VB 
  + look 
Also a noun.
  The car has not been running very well and a  
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mechanic had to come over to have a look at it.
N-SING: usu N at n 
Having read two definitions  and one sub-definition  for  this  word,  the learner  gains 
nothing by reading to the third. Although definition 3 is worded in such a way that it 
adds  additional  information  (i.e.,  expertise),  the  wording  of  definition  1  does  not 
exclude the cases covered by the third. Therefore if 1 was read in isolation and fully 
understood, there is no need to read 3. Definition 3 carves its own niche, but there is no 
niche until it does so. There may be a need for such information for encoding purposes, 
but  such  fastidious  segregations  add  nothing  but  burden  for  the  learner  using  the 
dictionary for decoding: treated homonymically in the COBUILD for active and stative 
uses, there are 18 numbered definitions for look1 and seven more for look2. Dictionaries, 
then, give their users a mass of senses and then very little reason to sift through them 
all. 
My goal here is not to say that learners need to read entries and then champion 
the cause for not doing so, nor is it to continue taking swipes at lexicographical practice, 
but it is merely to show the challenges faced by a desire get students to read a complete 
entry.  When they fail to do so, we should not think learners lazy or inattentive but, 
rather, overwhelmed with minutiae. We need to realise that in asking learners to read 
entire  entries  that  they  frequently  have  good  reason  not  to.  Not  all  words  are  as 
'polysemic'  as  look,  which  I  don't  even  consider  an  extreme  case  with  a  mere  25 
definitions, but the learner has no idea how many definitions there will be until the word 
is looked up. 
And yet,  the learner still has to read through the entire entry to rule out better 
candidate senses. We still have the issue of discrete polysemic senses (suit  relating to 
clothing or legal cases, or the noun defect  and the verb defect)  and homonyms (cape). 
The  subtle  distinctions  of  alleged  senses  potentially  blind  the  learners  to  the  major 
143
spheres of meanings, giving them trees (or branches!) when forests are more vital. 
7.2.2 Knowing how—or if—polysemy and homonymy are distinguished in 
dictionaries
Fortunately,  the  burden  of  reading  of  the  entire  entry  can  be  lessened  by 
knowledge of how the dictionary distinguishes polysemy from homonymy. Again, this 
is  not  unproblematic.  Although  the  commonest  practice  is  to  provide  separate 
headwords for homonyms while containing polysemic senses in just one, there has been 
a trend in learner dictionaries to collapse homonymy into single entries, resulting in less 
obvious presentations of later homonymic meanings. Furthermore, dictionaries can be 
internally  inconsistent,  probably  contingent  upon  the  views  of  the  individual 
lexicographers.  In  the  COBUILD,  for  example,  the  homonymic  bridge  (regarding 
infrastructure and the card game) are treated together as are those of ball ('round object,' 
'social  event')  and  date  (the nut and the calendar-related meanings),  and yet  bank  is 
given three. The word look, as we have seen, has two, one branch denoting the action 
verb and related nouns ('Look at me') and the other the stative verb ('It looks to me....'), 
despite  that  these  uses  are  clearly  related.  Sound  has  two entries,  neither  of  which 
includes  the  'sea inlet'  meaning.  Even the  SOED,  where  we might  expect  a  stricter 
stance, makes unclear distinctions.  Aspiration,  with meanings regarding future dreams 
and a phonological trait, is treated as single headword even though shown to stem from 
two  different  verbs  (aspire  and  aspirate,  respectively).  Kudo  and  kudos  are  given 
separate status although the former is marked as a back formation of the latter. 
In case studies I have done, albeit ones aiming to examine other variables, I have 
observed that  use of  the  dictionary  for  homonyms,  when they  are  distinguished by 
different headwords, has resulted in students being oblivious to the second homonymic 
entry.  This  is  in  spite  of  the  number  appended  to  the  entry  word  (as  in  look1). 
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Homonyms are so rare, or so rarely looked up, that learners may not have developed an 
awareness of how they are separated, or at least have not developed the habit of looking 
for separate entries. This requires further examination but, if true, lends validity to the 
case for collapsing homonymy. 
Ideally,  however,  the  distinction  is  made,  and  the  users,  aware  of  how 
homonymic meanings are differentiated in their dictionaries, can scan the entries for the 
major spheres of meaning and then fine-tune their search. If they fail to do so, then what 
happens  is  they  end  up  reading  all  the  minor  distinctions  of  meaning  for  the  first 
homonymic  entry and only  then encounter the second one, and that's assuming they 
happen  to  see  the  second  entry...and  that's  assuming  they  didn't  stumble  upon  the 
second entry first,  a  situation  I  have  observed.  I  therefore  believe  quite  firmly that 
homonymic meanings need to be distinguished in a way that will allow users to hone in 
on the major, discrete differences first, but this discernment is meaningless if the users 
are not aware of it or its importance. Instructors, for our part, need to make sure students 
are. It's reasonable to argue that learners should be taught how to look for homonymic 
entries in their dictionaries, but not reasonable to assume that they have been. I'm yet to 
see  a  dictionary  that  doesn't  provide  a  warning  to  users  that  there  is  an  adjacent 
homonymic entry; look1 clues the user to look for look2 while look does not, but this is a 
detail apparently overlooked by many users, or else its significance is unknown. It is 
another  number  signifying  different  meanings  in  a  book  already  using  numbers  to 
signify  different  meanings.  The  knowledge  of  how  a  given  dictionary  classifies 
homonyms  as  opposed  to  polysemes  coupled  with  the  skill  of  looking  for  their 
indicators will help the learner in both decoding and encoding and lessen the burden of 
reading entire entries.
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7.2.3 Relating new information to old
Recalling  Meara's  (1997)  network  model,  the  more  links  a  word  has  in  a 
learner's mental lexicon, the better it is known. A new word linked to its L1 equivalent 
is not poorly learnt because of its L1 dependency, but it will be weak if that is its sole 
connection  to  the network.  There  are  a few ways  in  which  words can be linked to 
previously  established  material,  all  again  entailing   improvements  either  to 
lexicographical conventions or to the users' skills.
In  an  article  suggesting  simple  changes  to  dictionaries  to  facilitate  learning, 
Nation (1989) writes:
Where  it  is  helpful,  dictionaries  should  include  simple  etymological 
information. Such information is helpful where the meanings of the word 
parts  can  be  related  to  the  meaning  of  the  word.  Thus,  providing 
etymological  information  for  despicable is  useful.  But  providing  it  for 
destine is not useful as it is difficult to see how the meanings of the parts 
relate to the present meaning of the whole word. A useful addition to this 
kind of information is the indication of related words. So the entry for rank  
should indicate its relationship to arrange. This type of information allows 
learners to connect previous learning to the learning of the new items. 
Thus the learning of words such as rank can be linked to the network not just via its L1 
equivalent but reinforced via a link to arrange (which is, in turn, also reinforced). 
Since these are both very high frequency words (arrange  from the first 1000 
band and  rank  from the third), let's  consider the learning of less frequent words via 
recourse to a high frequency ones—examples, that is, of incorporating new vocabulary 
items into a more advanced network. The verb fabricate, situated in the 9000 frequency 
band of English words, would likely be learned well after the word  fabric, from the 
4000 frequency band, has been acquired. The meanings of the two are different enough 
that  they  can  be  considered  two  separate  words—the  object  of  fabricate  is  rarely 
something  made  of  fabric—so  the  new  lexical  item  can  be  linked  to  the  older. 
Dictionaries, Nation writes, should provide etymological information pointing this out. 
Likewise, the word  vacation  is in the 6000 frequency band (and no doubt noticeably 
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higher in American English due to its polysemy there) so a learner would generally 
learn the verb vacate, from the 8000 band, later. The connection between the two words 
may not be completely obvious at first. There is, again, a contrast of meaning between 
vacate  and  vacation  that  differs  from  the  contrast  of,  for  example,  vaccinate  and 
vaccination;  vacating  a  building  can  hardly  be  referred  to  as  a  vacation  (in  either 
America or England!). But differences aside, the learner may benefit from having the 
relatedness pointed out.
In cases such as these where the meaning of an affixed form is  not entirely 
predictable from its root (vacate yielding  vacation), the relationship is not a matter of 
historical  trivia  but is  important  for  a  full  understanding  of  the word.  An advanced 
learner  familiar  with the word  lofty  but  not knowing what  a  loft  is  has a markedly 
different  understanding  of  the  word  than  I  do.  This  shouldn't  impede  her  ability  to 
understand or use the word (ultimately the most important aspect), but I would suspect 
it to be a different cognitive entity than my own. I suspect few languages, especially 
those not close or directly related to English, would translate these words accordingly, 
in which the translation equivalent of  lofty  is also an affixed form of the translation 
equivalent of loft—meaning that the words are very likely to be completely different in 
the  first  language  and  connected  only  in  the  target  language.  Thus  providing  this 
information links the words in a way they otherwise wouldn't be—an L2 network is 
being forged independently of the L1.
It's worth noting that, as semantic entities, the difference between loft/lofty (and 
vacate/vacation  and  fabric/fabricate) and the two meanings of  flavour  is minimal  at 
best.  Lofty  denotes  a  metaphoric  extension  of  loft that  is  formally  marked  by  the 
terminating  -y  (triggering  and/or  triggered  by  a  syntactic  change,  from  noun  to 
adjective) while  flavour  is not. The literal/metaphoric divide is the same, but different 
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processes  of  word  formation  have  come into  play,  resulting  in  one  form being  (or 
appearing) polysemous and the other,  merely 'related,'  a  distinction that would seem 
entirely based on the formal distinction. We have, then, further insight into the nature of 
polysemy:  it  is,  in some cases,  essentially a by-product of the morphological option 
called conversion.
Although learner dictionaries are stripped of such information, the learner is not 
without options. The skill to be fostered here is to examine adjacent and nearby words. 
Even in a dictionary as large as the two-volume SOED, vacation is adjacent to vacate, 
and lofty and fabricate are near their roots, with only other related words intervening. 
This is a hit-or-miss technique but one in which the hits would be of great assistance. 
The fact that this skill would fail to show the relevance of rank to arrange shows why 
the cooperation of lexicographers in making such links explicit would be beneficial. 
The connecting of new words to previously learnt material is developed further 
in chapter nine.
7.2.4 Marking in dictionaries
One technique I used to like to instruct  my students in has become virtually 
impossible,  at least  in Korea, as technological advances have recast dictionaries into 
hand-held calculator-like items and even as features of cell-phones. The technique is to 
star, with a pen or pencil, each visited word, including those you have already starred. 
This keeps track of words you have already encountered so that when you encounter a 
word that already has two stars, you know the word is important enough to warrant 
dedicated attention. This technique can be modified to include the marking of which 
sense  (or  cluster  of  senses)  is  relevant,  thus  providing  the  user  with  information 
regarding  the  relative  frequency  of  each  meaning  or  sense  cluster.  Many everyday 
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words are jargon in some fields (glide and liquid to phoneticians,  round to musicians, 
love  to  tennis  players  and fans,  etc.)  and  aren't  even  known to  all  native  speakers. 
Despite claiming above that users should read entire entries, and even nearby ones, I'm 
not stating they need to memorise each one. In fact, the starring technique is especially 
beneficial for occasions when the dictionary is consulted quickly and time-consuming 
techniques  are  impractical  since  starred  words  can  be  returned  to  later.  The  best 
dictionary technique a learner can foster is simply to use the dictionary when they don't 
need to.
As stated,  technology has  not  been  cooperative  with this  technique  although 
there is  no reason (other  than expense,  which is  a  pretty good one)  why electronic 
dictionaries cannot be annotated by their users, as some electronic book readers are, or 
even equipped with a simple 'star' function. With internet dictionaries, the same results 
can  be  effected  by  bookmarking  the  consulted  words—I  do  this  myself—though 
browsers  generally  don't  inform  you  when  you  are  bookmarking  a  page  already 
bookmarked. A variation that would facilitate this is to save such pages in the same 
folder, where you would be warned of overwriting an existing file of the same name. In 
cases where the product simply offers no option,  a  small  notebook to  record which 
words are consulted will suffice. 
Most  of  this  chapter  has  assumed  print  dictionaries  but  these  more  modern 
versions deserve attention. Very little research has been published on the differences 
between electronic or computer-based dictionaries and the print varieties, and none of 
what  does  exist  examines  their  treatment  of  polysemy.  Relying  then  on  personal 
observations, this is probably because there are no significant differences. Electronic 
dictionaries are simply versions of existing print dictionaries edited for the new media; I 
am unaware of any that  was created from scratch for the electronic  format  without 
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recourse  to  print  editions.  Although  many  computer-based  dictionaries  are  also 
transplanted versions of existing editions,  some,  especially on-line dictionaries,  have 
more  independence  in  this  regard.  Websites  such  as  wikitionary.com,  and  Collins' 
Living Words  (Lan 2005) have words and definitions contributed by users rather than 
trained, professional lexicographers. 
Despite the greater volume of information that electronic dictionaries might be 
expected to accord, at least considering their size, some appear to be highly truncated 
versions, with example sentences removed16. This may be a concession to the computer 
memory available—especially as many are not dedicated dictionaries but one function 
of PDAs (personal digital assistant), cellular phone, etc.—an effort to fit entire entries 
onto small screens, or perhaps both. 
There is however, one advantage provided by these non-print versions. When a 
given word form has multiple entries, generally signifying homonymy, the user may be 
first taken to a menu of headwords. For example,  typing in  bridge in the CD-ROM 
edition of the SOED calls up a menu showing bridge1(n), bridge2 (n) and bridge (v) The 
unnamed dictionary in my cellphone shows all the options available for the sequence of 
letters, updating the list with each letter entered. Thus bridge shows:
bridge
bridge
bridgeable
bridge bank
bridgeboard
plus  others  available  by scrolling  down.  There is  no reason available  why the  user 
should chose bridge2 over bridge1, but it does make more explicit that there are multiple 
options that need to be read than print editions do, where users who are not in the habit 
of reading adjacent entries or recognising the superscripted numbers (or aware of what 
16 This is based on an observation of the unnamed Korean-English dictionary contained in my Korean 
cell phone. My claim that portable, electronic dictionaries are abbreviated versions of a printed source, 
and exactly how they differ in terms of content, will be the subject of a future project.
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they mean) may easily miss them and potentially read the wrong entry. 
Conclusion
The skills presented here have some relevancy to polyvalent words but a well-
rounded  programme  in  dictionary  skill  enhancing  needs  to  touch  on  more.  I  have 
received notes from students discussing 'my one's older brother' because they are not 
familiar with the dictionary practice involving one's or how to alter it to accommodate 
their discourse. An awareness that some words do not translate, for example, and what 
to do in such cases, would be helpful as well.
Finally,  it's  worth  noting  that  the  'jump'  from  bilingual  dictionaries  to 
monolingual entails more than just a collapsing of the languages used.  A monolingual 
dictionary defines while a bilingual dictionary presents synonyms and is therefore more 
akin to a thesaurus (replete with the same caveats for L1 and L2 users regarding the 
potential  misuse  of  unknown  words).  Such  definitions  use  certain  conventions,  for 
example substitutability (discussed in 1.1 above, i.e., definitions of nouns being cast as 
noun phrases, verbs as verb phrases, etc.).
To  examine  a  few  of  these  conventions,  the  SOED contains  the  following 
information about happy:
3. Of an action, speech, etc.: pleasantly appropriate to the occasion or circumstances; 
felicitous. Of a person: dexterous in hitting on the action, words, etc., appropriate to the 
circumstances. LME.
Four of the five definitions supplied begin with a similar 'of' phrase which is intended to 
focus the scope of the definition. The following is an excerpt for happiness: 
3. Deep pleasure in, or contentment with, one's circumstances; an instance of this. L16.
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All three of this word's definitions terminate with this redundant 'an instance of this' 
(which  occurs  1,154  times  throughout  the  dictionary).  It  is  akin  to  the  'HORSE:  a 
representation of a horse' example discussed earlier, telling us nothing about the word. 
But  my  point  is  not  to  belabour  my  nitpicking  of  dictionaries  but  that 
monolingual dictionary definitions form a linguistic genre, one that is marked by certain 
conventions  unique to  itself,  and that  learners,  particularly second language learners 
used  to  the  thesaurus-like  construction  of  bilingual  dictionaries,  are  frequently  not 
taught to read them. 
As teachers, we need to be mindful of this and of all the problems the dictionary 
user faces. The teaching of dictionary skills, it seems to me, is a buck that never stops 
anywhere. There's always another teacher who should be teaching it rather than us.
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Chapter eight: Teaching homonyms, part 1
Compared  to  the  shades  of  polysemy  and  the  vagueness  of  monosemy, 
homonyms  are  refreshingly  solid  entities  with  clearly  delineated  parts.  There  are 
exceptions—we've  seen  where  the  homonymic  meanings  of  ear are  frequently 
construed as related—but for the most part, words like lie 'to be prostrate' and lie 'to tell 
a falsehood' are units of meaning so discrete that one's not likely to be confused for the 
other by those familiar with both meanings.
This  unconnectedness  of  meanings  facilitates  a  pedagogy.  Unlike  polysemy, 
which entails  knowing when and how to use a  certain  sense appropriately,  learning 
homonyms does not differ much from learning other words—that is, the meanings of lie  
are  as  unrelated  as  the  meanings  of,  say,  red  and  coffee  are.  There  is,  however,  a 
difference—the identical word form—and this can be made an advantage because the 
two  unrelated  meanings  can  be  connected  to  serve  as  a  mnemonic.  The  following 
chapter  will  report  on such  a  technique  while  the  goal  of  the  current  chapter  is  to 
examine which homonyms are relevant to learners and addresses the question of how 
many words in the General Service List (West 1953) are homonyms.
Frequency lists have long been employed in deciding which words should be 
included in vocabulary curricula, Thorndike (1932) and West (1953) being two of the 
most famous and longest lasting, but such lists, including the plethora of publishers' in-
house lists that have developed since the computer revolution, routinely ignore the issue 
of homonymy. That lead (as in 'lead singer') and lead (as in 'lead poisoning') are treated 
together in corpus-based lists when they are not semantically related,  etymologically 
linked nor even pronounced the same reveals that the written form is the sole criterion 
for inclusion on such lists. It would be ridiculous to lump hour  and our  together as a 
single unit just because they are formally identical in the spoken realm, but no more so 
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than to indiscriminately cluster words with the same written form such as lead and lead 
or the Germanic bowl referring to the dish and the Romance bowl associated with the 
sport of bowling, yet this is the situation before us. 
 Since  meanings  are  also  not  considered,  their  relative  frequencies  are  not  a 
factor, yet their potential impact on such lists is significant. The word school has a rare 
meaning referring to a group of fish (not etymologically related to the more common 
meaning), a meaning that, by my estimate of corpus data, occurs once for every 10,000 
instances of the word form. Accounting for it would not pose much threat to  school's 
status  on a  frequency list,  but  the two meanings  of  bowl  represent  a  50/50 split  of 
occurrences of the word form, a factor that must certainly knock the word form down in 
frequency if not off certain lists altogether. That words should be catalogued solely by 
their written forms is simply untenable and at times absurd, a convenience unworthy of 
academic respect. Using a computer to generate a list of word forms should be a starting 
point, not the final word on the matter. The human researcher still has work to do, and 
this work is what the current chapter attempts to start. A list of frequently occurring 
homonyms  is  presented.  Separate  lists  of  cognitive  homonyms,  homographs  and 
homophones are supplied as appendices. 
8.1 Methodology
 To compile  a  list  of  frequent  homonyms,  the  source  of  words  used  for  this 
project was West's (1953) General Service List (GSL). Each word was examined in the 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (SOED), CD-ROM edition, which treats homonyms 
as separate headwords. When different headwords are used for different parts-of-speech, 
the etymologies were examined, with those with contrasting histories being considered 
homonymic. The verb  file  meaning 'to store in a filing cabinet' was not distinguished 
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from the related noun as their difference is more a matter of syntax and word formation 
than  semantics.  Meanings  marked  archaic,  obsolete,  rare,  or  dialectal  were  ignored 
while slang meanings were treated on a case-by-case basis. Homophones, homographs 
and cognitive homonyms were noted on separate lists.
 Each  homonym  was  then  examined  in  a  corpus  to  determine  the  relative 
frequency of each meaning. Because of the high frequency of each word form, a small 
corpus was used, both the written and spoken components of the  Wellington Corpus, 
each one million words. The British National Corpus XML Edition  (BNC) was used a 
few times, either when the Wellington Corpus had too few instances of a word form or 
when, in conducting previous research, I had already analysed a particular word using a 
much larger sample in the BNC. 
 The search token was not just the uninflected form but also all the inflectional—
but  not  derivational—morphemic  variations.  This  has  a  significant  effect  on  certain 
words. Both homonymic meanings, for example, of file  (something you put in a filing 
cabinet or the tool for making rough objects smooth) inflect the same: file, files, filing,  
filed. For some words, only one meaning inflects, as with can where the content word 
can be  cans, canned  or  canning  but the modal verb is fixed in one form. Finally, the 
meanings  of  some  homonyms  inflect  differently  as  with  die  where  one  meaning  is 
realized as die, dying, died and another as die and dice (instances of the verb dice being 
removed by hand). In some cases, a rare meaning was present only because its inflected 
form  was  included;  the  rare  meaning  of  down,  for  example,  related  to  dune  (i.e., 
downlands) probably appeared only because downs was included in the search. 
 Using Wordsmith Concord, random samples of between 150-200 instances were 
drawn for each homonym. The Central Limit Theorem states that a random sample of 
30 instances is sufficiently large to approximate the distribution of a population but a 
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larger  sample  was  used  here  as  many  words  have  quite  rare  meanings.  Using  the 
program's  tagging  feature,  each  instance  was  assigned  a  category  denoting  which 
meaning was employed, the results of each recorded in a spreadsheet program. 
8.2 Results
 Table 8 shows the distribution of homo-types in the GSL. 
Table 8: Distribution of homo-types in the GSL
A  liberal  approach  was  taken  for  the  homophone  count.  A  word  was  considered 
homophonic if one form, bare or inflected, phonetically corresponded to another word, 
bare or inflected, included in the GSL or not. That is, not just were eye and I counted but 
also  scene  and  see  because  the  latter  inflects  as  seen.  Also,  some  word  forms  are 
homophonic with more than one other word, such as  write  (right, rite) and, in some 
dialects,  metal (medal, meddle). This approach yielded a higher number than a stricter 
account would have. In all, 9.4% of the  GSL—that is, nearly 10% of the 2,284 most 
frequent words in English—are of the three homo- types. 
Table  9  summarizes  the  distribution  of  homonyms  according  to  the  more 
frequent meaning,  including one 50/50 split  (which will  be included in mentions  of 
commonest meanings throughout although it technically would not be considered one). 
There are,  for  example,  20 homonyms  in  which the  common meaning accounts  for 
100% of the corpus data, these 20 forming 27% of all the homonyms found. Note that 
the categories  are  not  uniform,  with  the bottom four  categories  each  representing  a 
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Category #
homonyms 74 34% 3%
homophones 133 62% 6%
homographs 9 4% 0.4%
total 216 100% 9.4%
% of homo- words % of total words in GSL
range of ten percentage points, the next one up (90-94%) representing five, etc. 
Table 9: Distribution of homonyms by 
percentage of commonest meaning 
The first four rows, from 97% to 100% constitute half the entire list. For thirty percent 
(i.e.,  the bottom four rows) of the homonyms in the  GSL,  the commonest  meanings 
account for between 10-50% of the corpus hits. Less than half, 43%, see the commonest 
meaning  occurring  98,  99  or  100% of  the  time,  which  is  the same  percentage  of 
instances in which the commonest meaning occurs 90-99%.  Seventy percent of these 
GSL homonyms have the commonest meaning occurring 90% or more. 
 Table  10 presents  those 54 homonyms  in  which at  least  two meanings  have 
demonstrable  currency,  and  the  relative  frequencies  of  each  meaning  based  on  the 
random sampling. The meanings signified by brief notes are not intended as delimiting 
definitions,  and  in  many  cases  each  homonymic  meaning  represents  a  range  of 
polysemic senses. The common meaning of bridge, for example, encompasses the kind 
designed by engineers and the kind put in by dentists as well as the verb as these are 
clearly related.
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Commonest meanings accounts for #
100% 20 27%
99% 7 9%
98% 5 7%
97% 4 5%
96% 6 8%
95% 3 4%
90-94% 7 9%
80-89% 10 14%
70-79% 7 9%
60-69% 1 1%
50-59% 4 5%
74 100%
% of GSL homonyms
ARM
body part 74%
weapon 26%
BALL
round object 96%
social event 4%
BAND
group of people 81%
hoop/ring 19%
BANK
financial institution 93%
embankment 7%
BEAR
(verb) 92%
animal 8%
BOIL
(verb) 97%
swelling 3%
BOWL
dish 50%
game 50%
BOX
container 95%
sport 5%
BRIDGE
infrastructure etc. 92%
card game 8%
CAN
(modal verb) 98%
tin 2%
CASE
situation 98%
container 2%
CHECK
(various polysemic meanings) 99%
pattern of crossed lines 1%
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DATE
related to calendar 99%
fruit 1%
DIE
to stop living 95%
singular of noun dice 5%
DOWN
opposite of up 98%
downlands 2%
feathers 0%
EGG
produced by females 99%
to egg on 1%
FINE
good/small 95%
penalty 5%
FIRM
business 56%
solid, strong 44%
FOLD 
to bend 99%
enclosure for animals such as sheep 1%
HOST
of a party, etc. 80%
multitude 19%
sacrificial victim 2%
LAST
previous/final 92%
to continue 8%
LAY
to place 98%
non-clergy 2%
LEAVE
to depart/bequeath 88%
direction (inflected as left) 9%
permission 2%
plural of leaf (inflected as leaves) 1%
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LIE
to be prostrate 92%
falsehood 8%
LIGHT
opposite of dark 80%
opposite of heavy 20%
LIKE
to resemble (including preposition, conjunction forms, etc.) 78%
opposite of dislike 22%
LINE
geometric figure 97%
to apply lining 3%
MATCH
game 97%
small wooden stick 3%
MEAN
to have meaning 96%
cruel 3%
average 1%
MISS
fail to hit 75%
(title) 25%
NET
web 63%
total 37%
PAGE
of book, internet, etc. 99%
to call out 1%
PAN
cooking (including 'to criticize') 96%
to move a camera (from panorama) 4%
POLICY
(as in 'foreign policy') 99%
(as in 'insurance policy') 1%
POOL
water 56%
combined resources (38%)/billiards (6%) 44%
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POT
cookware 96%
marijuana 4%
POUND17
monetary unit (58%)/weight (13%) 71%
to crush 29%
dog pound 0%
PUPIL
students 99%
part of eye 1%
RACE
competition of speed 87%
species 13%
RAIL
horizontal beam 98%
to rail against 2%
REST
remainder 73%
recuperate 27%
RIGHT
correct/opposite of left 85%
legal rights 15%
RING
sound of bell 88%
circle 12%
ROLL
to spin 96%
catalogue/list 4%
SCALE
measurement/weight 96%
to climb (including musical sense) 2%
reptile skin 2%
SET
to place, to be firm 83%
collection 17%
SOCK
garment 94%
to punch 6%
17 Note that the search did not include the monetary symbol (£) and that the search was done on the Wellington 
Corpus and not on the BNC where the monetary meaning could be expected to be significantly higher.
161
SOUND 
audio phenomenon 87%
sea inlet 6%
sturdy 6%
to test or inquire (to sound out) 1%
SPELL
letter-by-letter/incantation 70%
time interval 30%
STEEP
(adjective) 93%
(verb) 7%
TEND
to engage in habitual actions 97%
to attend to 3%
WAKE18
to be awake 71%
a track (in the wake of) 25%
vigil 4%
WEAVE
interlaced thread 85%
to move repeatedly from side to side 15%
YARD
land 57%
36 inches 43%
Table 10: Homonyms in GSL in which more than one meaning appeared in the random  
sample
In  addition,  the  homonyms  in  table  11  are  present  in  the  GSL but  the  rare  sense, 
signified in the parentheses,  did not occur among the random samples.  (In no case, 
incidentally, did the rare meaning occur but the distribution was rounded off to 0%.)
18 The SOED states the 'to be awake' and 'vigil' meanings are partly related.
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BILL (of a duck)
BIT (binary digit)
BRUSH (undergrowth, forest)
CAMP (corny, exaggerated)
COUNT (Dracula, Basie)
DEAL (to distribute playing cards)
EAR (of corn)
EVEN (opposite of odd) 
FAST (to abstain)
FILE (tool for smoothing)
HIDE (skin)
GO (Japanese game)
LOCK (of hair)
PEN (pig pen)
REPAIR (to go)
SCHOOL (of fish)
SHOOT (interjection)
SLIP (garment)
STEP (-mother)
SWALLOW (migratory songbird)
WELL (spring of water)
Table 11: Homonyms in GSL in which only one meaning appeared in the random 
sample
The  notion  of  relative  frequency  of  meanings  can  be  misleading.  Of  these  last  20 
homonyms,  it  would be rash (another  homonym)  to  declare  the meaning that  didn't 
occur as unimportant. It is not, of course, as if these meanings don't exist, only that they 
didn't occur in the random sample. Certainly the rare meaning of repair is so scarce that 
it warrants little or no classroom attention—I can't remember the last time I encountered 
it—but the meaning of even denoting parity is one that students may well need, and its 
unavailability in the data speaks more to the sample size and the dominance of the 
common meaning; as one meaning is a function word, a type of word that naturally 
dominates the 100 most frequent words, and the other lexical, it is not a fair comparison 
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to begin with. That one meaning failed to appear does not necessarily make it a rare 
word, only rare in comparison to those that share its form. Adding one more sentence to 
the sample could have resulted, theoretically at least, in the rare sense appearing. 
I base this comment on nothing more than intuition, but for several of the words 
above, the meaning I would expect students to know, if they knew exactly one, is in fact 
the statistically less common one. This is true of miss where I would expect the title to 
be more familiar to students than the verb when it in fact accounts for less than a quarter 
of the uses, and of firm where the adjectival meaning might be more well known than 
the noun to learners though the distribution in the Wellington Corpora shows that native 
speakers  might  use  the  noun  more  frequently.  That  learners'  knowledge  may  not 
conform exactly to the statistics indicates only that a learner's lexicon differs from a 
native speaker's. Recall, too, that inflected forms were included in the count, thus miss 
included misses, missed and missing; an independent corpus search reveals that the title 
miss accounts for 58% of the uninflected form, thus nudging it into the majority.
8.3 Discussion
8.3.1 Apparent relationships
It's worth noting that several of these historically unrelated meanings actually 
seem related. I suspect that many of us grew up thinking that the fish-related meaning of 
school was related to the  education meaning, a state no doubt reinforced by cartoons 
showing  groups  of  small  fish  following  a  mortarboard-wearing  large  fish.  (Indeed, 
many children probably learn the aquatic meaning from such wordplay.) That  weave 
encompasses two distinct and unrelated meanings is surprising as well, as a car weaving 
in and out of traffic lanes is not unlike a needle weaving through cloth. The fact that I 
and, I suspect, many readers have never considered the relationship between these two 
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meanings, and those of other homonyms above, until pointed out suggests that language 
users don't necessarily develop an awareness of such matters, although we frequently do 
in some clear cases of polysemy (the flavour of the coffee and the flavour of the event). 
This may contribute to the two meanings being fused in our mental lexicons. The two 
meanings of  policy  as seen in  foreign policy  and  insurance policy  are etymologically 
unrelated but were initially difficult for me to disambiguate in the corpus because they 
had previously formed a single lexeme in my mental lexicon. Referring to insurance 
companies as 'policy makers' should be a pun (I'm not saying a good one) but fails to 
trigger  an  awareness  that  it's  even  supposed  to  be  humorous.  While  technically 
homonyms, cases such as these are perhaps better treated as polysemes for pedagogical 
purposes.
8.3.2 Pedagogical implications
The logical starting point is to teach the less common meanings according to the 
relative frequency of the meanings. In other words, the 'solid, strong' meaning of firm, 
representing 44% of the word form's usages, should be one of the earliest homonymic 
meanings introduced. Around the same time, the '36 inches' meaning of yard might be 
taught,  particularly  for ESL students  for  whom it's  probably more  relevant  than for 
learners in countries where this unit of measurement is not used. Generally, the rarer the 
less common meaning, the later it should be introduced. 
Homonyms contrast in this way with other polyvalent words. With polysemes, a 
case could be made for teaching all, or at least a local cluster, of its meanings together 
since they could potentially reinforce each other. With cognitive homonyms, teaching 
the etymology of how one meaning generated a now seemingly unrelated new meaning 
might help connect two otherwise detached meanings. (See (Boers 2000, 2000a) for the 
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related topic of how understanding metaphoric connections aids retention.) But since the 
meanings of homonyms are unrelated,  it  is better to delay the introduction of a new 
meaning unless it's of immediate need.
Apart from the potential interference of each meaning, there is also generally 
little need to introduce two meanings of homonyms simultaneously. Considering when 
students first learn the word school, not inconceivably on the very first day of their very 
first English lesson, the fish-related meaning would be of absolutely no use. Frequency 
needs to be considered when deciding what to teach. Teaching a word form showing a 
100%/0% distribution of meanings above is teaching a high frequency, and therefore 
useful, word coupled with a meaning that learners may not need until much later. While 
the 50/50 split of bowl, however, suggests that each meaning is only half as frequent as 
the word form's presence on the  GSL would indicate, it would be safer to ensure  that 
one meaning is learnt so as to avoid interference. 
What, I suspect, is more helpful is that, when introducing the rarer meaning, the 
teacher or material writer has an awareness that the students are already familiar with 
the form and the more  common meaning,  which we often don't  seem to be.  If,  for 
example, we introduce the 'multitude' meaning of host to students already familiar with 
the meaning akin to hostess, the learners may be trying to work out what the connection 
is and should be told there isn't any. Further, it might be helpful to provide suggestions 
for helping students disambiguate uses when encountered, which can be accomplished 
by  teaching  the  collocations  of  each  meaning,  which  are  almost  always  different. 
Having just learnt the 'strong, sturdy' meaning of sound is no guarantee that the learner 
will correctly identify which meaning is employed in 'the very sound waves produced 
last night' or 'The music teacher offered him some sound advice.' Hoey's (2005) claim, 
we recall,  is  that  such sentences  would generally be avoided because each meaning 
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avoids  the  primings  of  the  other,  but  that  they  can  occur  either  with  momentary 
ambiguity or confusion, perhaps followed by a self-repair, or as humour. 
Conclusion
What needs to be remembered is that the lists of homonyms presented here are 
not  necessarily the most frequent homonyms. The lists are still married to the formal-
based  lists  I  criticised  at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter.  The  word  form  school,  for 
example, is, formally,  one of the most frequent homonyms,  but its homonymic fish-
related meaning is so rare that the word form's frequency construes no argument for the 
teaching of the word as homonym. To the extent, however, that the GSL can be said to 
represent  the  most  frequent  English  words  (bear  in  mind  that  the  GSL  was  not 
composed entirely on frequency),  then  bowl  may well  be the most  frequent English 
homonym in terms of meaning rather than form. The homonymy list runs the gamut 
from very common to very rare, and with a population of only 74, it leaves plenty of 
gaping holes to fill.  How, that is,  would the list of homonyms provided here be re-
integrated  with  the  GSL so  that  the  meanings  of,  for  example,  pool  are  ranked  as 
separate items among the other monosemes and polysemes? I hope to develop a word 
list based on meanings rather than written forms in the future.
Constructing an L2 lexicon is a slow process that, no matter what, takes many 
years and is never complete; this is true even with one's native language. With little 
explicit instruction on the matter provided, learners are left to their own devices when 
help from educators  might  be much more  effective.  The lists  provided  above,  then, 
attempts  to  address  this  situation  by  helping  the  teacher  and  material  writer  make 
explicit the most frequent of these. I intend this only as a starting point since, for many 
learners, many of these words may be already fully acquired, and a list of less frequent 
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words would be more beneficial. The acquisition of polyvalent words would be aided 
by direct  instruction regarding their recognition and strategies for dealing with them 
when encountered. 
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Chapter nine: Teaching Homonyms, part 2
Having determined some words whose homonymy may confuse learners,  we 
now turn our attention to a technique that will facilitate their acquisition. This technique 
is a modified version of the keyword method (Pressley,  Levin, Delaney 1982). In its 
unaltered form,  the keyword technique is used to learn new L2 words, both form and 
meaning. The process is to find a phonetically similar word in the L1 and link it to the 
meaning of the target word. For example,  an anglophone learning French may learn 
stylo  'pen'  by  associating  it  with  the  English  word  steel and  then  visualising  an 
interaction between the two concepts. The visualisation may be like a short movie, and 
the more bizarre and surreal, the more effective the technique proves to be. In this case, 
the learner  may envision  a  famous  movie  star  using a  giant  steel  girder  to  sign an 
autograph (Shapiro and Waters 2005). A Korean learning English may learn the word 
pupil 'young student' by recourse to the L1 word pyo 'spreadsheet table' and the image 
of such a table where each cell contains students struggling to escape. Variants of the 
technique not involving visualisation but rather creating a sentence have been proven to 
be more effective than rote memorisation, but the visualisation element increases the 
efficiency of  the  technique.  Shapiro  and  Waters  (2005)  review the  effectiveness  of 
visual  connections  in  comparison  to  other  techniques  such  as  composing  linking 
sentences.
The modified  form presented  here entails  not  an acoustically  reminiscent  L1 
word but the formally identical L2 word. Thus, the Korean learner above now familiar 
with the 'young student' meaning of pupil can use this known element to remember the 
'centre of the eye' meaning in much the same way: the target meaning (part of eye) is 
linked to the known element, say by envisioning (apologies in advance!) a classroom of 
pupils whose pupils are melting and dripping out of their eyes. The question this chapter 
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answers  is  if  this  modified  version  is  effective.  This  will  be  called  the  homonym 
keyword method here.
The hypothesis  explored here is  that  it  is  an effective  method for  remember 
homonymic meanings, at least provided that the known meaning is indeed known and 
fully  available  (a  situation  deliberately factored out  of  the current  experiment).  The 
elements that make the keyword method work, the cognitive effects of visualisation and 
the outrageousness, are firmly in place. 
9.1 Research design
Apart from the differences in the technique,  there are several elements of the 
research that differ from previous work on the traditional keyword method. One is the 
scale of the experiment, which is deliberately small, and the other, very much related, 
regards the data being assessed. Some justification of these are necessary. 
First, the study was deliberately small scale because while a larger study would 
offer  statistical  validation,  it  would  also  prevent  the  examination  of  the  cognitive 
processes and details that were sought. Statistical-based studies on the keyword method 
examine  the  end  result  without  regard  to  the  process.  The  researcher,  that  is,  is 
interested in whether,  having been taught  the keyword method,  the learner  can then 
demonstrate  recall  of  a  given  set  of  vocabulary  items.  How  recall  is  achieved  is 
generally not tested but is assumed to be the keyword method which the group has just 
been  instructed  in.  My worry  is  that  the  subjects,  when  not  beginners,  have  been 
studying  vocabulary  for  some  years  prior  to  these  experiments  and  may  well  have 
developed  their  own  methods  that  are  employed  instead  of  or  in  addition  to  the 
researcher-targeted technique. Furthermore, there is the phenomenon of 'fast mapping' 
in which the occasional word is instantly and effortlessly learned, in which case either 
no  technique  is  applied  or  it  is  done  so  artificially  to  satisfy  the  researcher.  More 
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damning, in cases involving control groups not presented with the keyword method, is 
the  potential  that  some  subjects  may  be  using  a  form  of  it  intuitively.  Given  the 
complexity of human learning, it is insufficient methodology to assume that any learner 
is using exactly one technique for any given word let alone a list of them. 
For this reason, the current experiment solicited not just evidence that the words 
have been learned but the visualisation as well. This does not completely preclude the 
coupling of other techniques  nor does the possibility that  the technique was applied 
artificially vanish, but it at least ensures that the subjects have employed the homonym 
keyword method and are therefore learning the method, making it available for future 
use. As descriptions of the visualisations can be quite involved, solicitation was done in 
individual  interviews.  The  subjects  were  asked  to  convey  their  visualisations  either 
verbally or by drawing pictures.  This is why the scale of the study was kept small, 
almost at a case-study level, and conducted individually, because if conducted in large 
groups,  the solicitation of learner-generated  imagery could potentially  (if  not likely) 
influence those by other subjects. That is, in a group setting, asking one subject for his 
individual visualisation would be heard or seen by another subject, who may judge it 
superior to the one she had developed and instead adopt or adapt his. The result could 
be  communally-constructed  visualisations  which  is  not  what  this  research  aims  to 
measure.  This,  again,  necessitated  a  smaller  study  in  which  the  subjects  were  met 
individually,  as  such  solicitations  involved  drawings,  which  themselves  frequently 
required verbal explanations, which could not be gathered en masse. 
While not necessarily rubbing against the grain of established research, there is a 
third point on which I feel I should make explicit my stance, that regarding researcher-
supplied  or  learner-generated  imagery.  There  is  no  hard  consensus  here;  different 
experiments have answered the question differently, but in situations that are themselves 
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so  different  that  the  results  of  one  experiment  cannot  be  said  to  disprove  those  of 
another. There are two points I should like to address. First, while I can see the benefit 
of teacher-provided links for young learners, I think that by the time we are dealing with 
learners ready for rare homonymic meanings that reliance upon the teacher to provide 
the mnemonics for individual words will preclude the effectiveness of this technique. In 
other  words,  without  the  ability  to  compose  effective  visualisations,  the  homonym 
keyword technique is of little use. A second point is one I've yet to see so much as 
mentioned in the literature yet seems a valid and feasible explanation: the researcher has 
far  more experience in composing visualisations  while the subjects are,  in theory at 
least, absolute beginners. My own experience with the technique (as a language learner 
and as a researcher) has improved with practice, and I have seen pilot-study subjects 
refine their skills as late as our discussions following the delayed post-test. If, as stated 
above,  bizarreness  is  a  factor  in  retention,  then  this  may  be  something  that  needs 
developing  over  time.  Many  subjects  initially  develop  rather  pedestrian  scenarios; 
without guidance,  they may find the technique ineffective and stop using it.  Hence, 
comparing the effects of research-generated imagery to those that are subject-provided 
is treating two very incompatible variables as equal. The methodology employed here 
was researcher-generated  imagery for  the teaching  of the technique,  guided learner-
generated  imagery  to  demonstrate  an  understanding  of  the  technique,  and  finally 
unguided learner-generated imagery for research collection. 
9.2 Methodology
Seven subjects, all Korean, were asked to participate, all of whom were known 
to  me  so  I  knew  their  approximate  level,  and  all  had  demonstrated  a  sense  of 
responsibility,  which had been an issue in a pilot  study on this  technique.  All were 
relatively fluent speakers in that they generally did not need to pause to construct an 
172
utterance, had no issues with understanding my spoken English, but did not quite have 
native-like mastery of grammar or vocabulary. Instruction could therefore be conducted 
in English, although references to Korean were made. The following list summarises 
their composition.
1. university student (mine, current), female, 20
2. elementary school teacher, female, 28
3. university student (mine, current), male, 21
4. housewife, female, 'upper thirties' (US-university educated)
5. coffee shop employee (preparing for overseas study), male, 21
6. university student (mine, former), female, 21
7. university student (not mine), female, 22
The homonyms to be learnt were selected randomly but were chosen personally 
based on my assessment of the students' existing knowledge; the selected words were 
words I felt the learners knew one meaning of (high frequency) but with a meaning I 
felt  they  wouldn't  (low  frequency).  This  is  important  because  there  is  a  potential 
difference between this case and applying the same technique to homonyms that come 
up in context. In the latter, the new meaning is applied immediately to the discourse and 
the homonym keyword technique is a method to reinforce it.  In the current research 
paradigm, however,  the subjects  are learning decontextualised words and,  hopefully, 
storing them for future use when such a context arises. 
The  choice  of  homonyms,  culled  from the  list  in  the  previous  chapter,  was 
initially a matter of educated guesswork, word forms common enough I could assume 
(and verify) the subjects would know but with rare meanings they wouldn't be expected 
to. The choice of items was refined over a series of pilot studies, seeing the removal of 
words like  die (as the subjects knew the noun dice, thus rendering this a grammatical 
distinction,  and one that  native  speakers  don't  always  observe at  that).  Because  the 
subjects  and  I  were  meeting  individually,  their  lists  could  in  theory  be  adjusted  to 
disallow word forms they didn't know at all or those with meanings that they did, but 
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this was not necessary.
At  the  initial  meeting  with  each  subject,  the  concept  of  homonymy  was 
introduced.  Unsurprisingly,  all  subjects  had  some  familiarity  with  the  concept.  The 
topic of polysemy was also discussed, albeit only to be dismissed, to make clear that 
only the concept of unrelated meanings was relevant to the discussion. Their existing 
knowledge of homonymy was activated first by recourse to Korean homonyms. These 
included  the  words  sagwa  ('apple,'  'apology')  and  the  three-way  homonym  bae 
('stomach,' 'ship/boat,' 'pear'). This demonstration continued with English homonyms I 
could safely assume each subject would be familiar with such as can ('tin container' and 
the modal verb) and bat ('club,' 'winged mammal'). 
To introduce the technique, I then introduced some common English words for 
which I could assume they would know only one meaning (an assumption borne out in 
each case). The first such word was temple, and all the learners were familiar with the 
religious meaning but none knew the anatomical one. To facilitate visualisation, I asked 
the subjects to describe a temple they had been to (regardless of religious beliefs, any 
able-bodied Korean university will have visited several as they are part of the mountain 
hiking experience, one of the most common pastimes in Korea), soliciting visual detail 
when  necessary.  I  then  explained  the  rarer  homonymic  meaning,  verbally  and  by 
pointing.
Then the homonym keyword method was introduced. Subjects were told they 
could use the known meaning of  temple to remember the new one. In this particular 
case, I suggested the imagery of the subject repeatedly banging his/her temples upon a 
wall or ornament of the temple which had just been described. Attention was drawn to 
the elements of the technique at work here, specifically the use of both meanings and 
the  bizarreness  of  the  story.  To  emphasise  the  importance  of  imagination,  I  also 
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introduced alternative scenarios such as a giant ripping a temple (building) out of the 
ground and banging it into his temples, or the giant laying down on the ground and 
pounding his temples into the religious building. I explained that the technique does not 
require such violent images but that they are a form of that vividness that facilitate the 
effectiveness of the technique. 
A  similar  homonym  was  introduced,  that  of  China,  the  country,  and 
China/china,  the  porcelain  dishes,  the  latter  meaning  being  unfamiliar  to  all  the 
subjects.  Mention  was  made  of  the  fact  that  the  chinaware  usage  is  inconsistently 
capitalised but this was not brought up again. The suggested imagery, replete with my 
hand-drawn  map  of  Asia,  was  of  the  country  China  having  human-like  arms  and 
throwing china dishes at other countries. 
At  this  point,  we  returned  to  the  earlier  homonym  bat and,  although  both 
meanings were known, the subjects were asked how they might connect the two. Their 
replies could be given either orally (with gestures) or by drawing or a combination of 
the two. Details aside, essentially two images emerged, either the animal was being hit 
with  a  bat  or  it  was  doing  the  hitting.  The  oral-only  solicitations  were,  in  my 
assessment, generally weak, conveying simple sentences rather than vivid imagery, such 
as 'I hit the bat with a bat.' Pressley, Levin and Delaney (1982), in their meta-analysis of 
the  keyword  method,  conclude  that  visual  imagery  only  slightly  outperforms  the 
sentence version of the technique. I therefore accept that the simple 'I hit the bat with a 
bat' might work but preferred to ensure the subjects were visualising this clearly—not 
because vivid imagery is inherently superior to sentence construction but because of the 
afore-mentioned claim that it is the depth of cognitive processing that determines the 
effectiveness  of  the  technique.  The  sentence  produced  here  is  simple  and  can  be 
construed on a vague, abstract level with minimal visualisation or cognitive processing. 
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It seemed, in other words, simply safer to push for clearer visualisations. I argued earlier 
that a possible cause of the range of results in the use of the keyword method is that its 
effectiveness increases with practice, so I saw it as my role not merely to introduce the 
technique but to train the subjects in its use. When subjects gave me a sentence such as 
the above, I would ask questions such as 'Where are you?', 'What time of day is it?', 
'What colour is the (baseball) bat?', 'What does the (winged) bat do when struck?', etc, 
to encourage visualisation and cognitive processing.
Other words chosen at  this guided stage were  ball  (as in baseball  and social 
ball),  down  (the  direction,  feathers),  and  bill  (financial  statement,  duck  mouth). 
Solicitations of the visualisations followed the same pattern but the sentence subjects 
were more forthcoming with visual detail. While none of the subjects knew the word 
down with this particular meaning, one did make a connection with down jacket, a term 
she knew but never understood. 
The subjects were then given the following list of homonyms which, again, they 
were  expected  to  know  only  one  meaning  of.  The  target  meaning  is  included  in 
parentheses.
magazine (rifle cartridge)
scale (reptile or fish skin)
fast (abstinence)
ear (corn cob)
school (group of fish)
sock (to hit)
mint (where money is manufactured)
egg (as in 'to egg on')
pen (where animals are kept)
Each word was discussed in turn, to ensure that the word form was known and that it 
was the only known meaning. While none knew the word fast with the target meaning, 
it's a safe bet they all knew breakfast. I did not draw attention to this since, as with the 
down jacket instance, this connection could potentially override the homonym keyword 
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method.  Each  subject  then  consulted  an  English-Korean  dictionary  to  look  up  the 
second meaning, which they paraphrased in English to ensure their meaning was the one 
I intended (and not, for example, the musical meaning of scale). They were then asked 
to apply the technique on their own and we would meet again a week later. 
I met with each subject, again individually, the same time the following week. 
The goal here was not to assess if the new meanings had been learnt but to solicit their 
visualisations.  This was again done orally or by drawing, most opting for the latter. 
Some homonyms did not lend themselves well to visual imagery and sentences were 
given. The following examples are typical:
magazine using a rolled-up magazine as a rifle
scale slapping a scale with a fish 
(although the not-very-bizarre image of a fish on a scale was given by 
three subjects)
fast (sentence) I've been fasting so I want to eat fast.
ear an ear of barley sticking out of a person's ear
school studying in school when suddenly attacked by a school of fish
sock a  ball  in  a  sock  used  to  hit  someone  with  (frequently  a  sibling  or 
husband!)
mint a mint press in which candy is inserted, the press comes down then raises 
to reveal a coin
egg throwing an egg at someone (president) 
pen (sentence) The pig in the pen stepped on my pen.
Following these second sessions, each subject was thanked and no mention was 
made of any further session for this project.  Since knowledge of a delayed post-test 
would likely have resulted in review or study, I simply waited at least four weeks until a 
future encounter  with the subject as I  had continued contact  with each (via  classes, 
campus events, clubs, frequenting the same businesses, etc.).  The quickest  time was 
exactly four weeks (my current students) and the longest was 36 days. Each subject was 
therefore completely unprepared for the post-test. Knowing they would be asked again 
might result in reviewing, which might result in little more than extending the range of 
medium-term memory. This 'cold-call' testing was the best way to assess the hypothesis 
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that the homonym keyword method resulted in actual learning. 
What  was  assessed  this  time  was  different  data:  not  the  visualisations  but 
whether the subject could produce the meaning when given the word. For example, I 
would ask, 'We use a scale to weigh something...What is another meaning of scale?' The 
ultimate goal of this technique is not to stockpile surreal images but the meaning of the 
words. These were solicited orally. Reactions were not timed but it was visually clear if 
recall  was  1)  quick/instantaneous,  or  2)  delayed  as  they  tried  to  remember.  When 
subjects were unable to produce the correct meaning, I prompted them to remember the 
visualisation, rather than the meaning, and in cases where they were still unable to, I 
gave them a hint to the visualisation they had supplied me earlier without giving away 
the meaning. Such cases were marked as 'couldn't remember' however.
9.3 Results
The scale of this study is too narrow to warrant statistical analysis, so the data is 
treated as a collection of case studies. Patterns are identified but are not statistically 
validated; they point to future research that could be conducted. 
With  one  exception  discussed  below,  the  results  suggest  that  the  homonym 
keyword method is a successful technique. Two subjects were able to produce all the 
correct answers, albeit with noticeable hesitations on a few words as they recalled the 
visualisations. Most of the others were able to recall at least half. There are, however, a 
few points that I should like to address.
One noticeable issue was that subjects seemed to improve their recall the more 
they were asked to do so. In other words, not expecting to be asked about these words 
again, they frequently found the first question harder to answer but the last one easier. 
The sequence of homonyms was different for each, so it could not be a matter of the 
first ones just being harder examples. There may be an unintentional reinforcing 'time 
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cluster'  effect  in  which  a  set  of  words  studied  together  can  be  recalled  together. 
Assuming the keyword method had not been employed in the intervening time, recall at 
this stage may largely be a matter of remembering the stories of the last time we had 
met;  having activated  recall  of  one or  two visualisations,  the  rest  were primed and 
therefore easier. If, for example, I tried to recall the stories told over dinner with friends 
from a month ago, remembering one or two would activate the memories of others. If 
this  is  the case,  then even the correctly  answered items  would not indicate  that  the 
meaning  was  learnt.  It  might,  however,  be  the  case  that  if  the  technique  had  been 
applied in the meantime then actual recall might be better because the visualisations 
would not form a single, isolated cluster of uses. 
One  subject,  however,  was  unambiguously  problematic,  and  there  had  been 
evidence of this through each session. During the second session when the links were 
solicited, while sometimes providing sentences, she would other times try to list traits 
common to both meanings, and was also unprepared overall. In discussing the situation 
with her, it seemed at least in part an apathy to words and meanings she saw no use for: 
the 'fish skin' meaning of scale, for example, was something she didn't think she would 
ever need. Another possible reason for this rests in her language skills as she is a very 
fluent and confident speaker whose grammatical and lexical knowledge are noticeably 
less developed. She confessed to a boredom with the 'details,'  a fact which connects 
both reasons. Perhaps cause perhaps effect, but she would make the occasional attempt 
to change the subject away from the research project. In the delayed post-test, she was 
able to produce the correct meanings for fast, sock and ear. The answer for magazine  
was 'About guns,' which suggests the meaning was not quite learned. The verb egg was 
defined as 'throwing eggs at someone,' and school was 'Fish going to school,' which was 
part of the sentence link she had given earlier but of course not the target meaning. Her 
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response to  mint  was 'Fish skin...? No.' For the remaining words,  scale  and  pen, she 
could not produce an answer. 
It should be noted that although she did not know this meaning of  fast at the 
beginning, she later said she sometimes engages in the activity with members of her 
church. The word is therefore useful to her. There is, however, also the possibility that it 
was known but momentarily inaccessible when I attempted to verify its status in her 
mental lexicon; it's not inconceivable that even native speakers, when confronted with 
the question 'The word  fast  means “quick,” but what's another meaning?'  along with 
several similar questions regarding unrelated words, might draw a blank in at least one 
of them. The question essentially cognitively primes one meaning and then asks the 
subject to ignore the information that has just been fired up and then provide completely 
unrelated information. The prompted meaning is like the elephant you're not supposed 
to think about. 
On a related note, when asking, 'We use a scale to weigh something...Do you 
know  another  meaning?'  and  similar  questions  during  the  initial  session,  subjects 
sometimes replied with a polysemic definition rather than the intended homonymic one, 
such as 'Like a scale for rating.'  Even if the subject did know the target meaning,  it 
would  presumably now be even harder  to  access  with  one meaning  fired  up and a 
related  meaning  reinforcing  it.  I  would  ask  the  reader  (if  not  a  lexicographer)  to 
consider,  having  read  this  far  in  this  thesis,  whether  words  that  had  hitherto  been 
unconnected  have  now  formed  some  kind  of  link—for  example  perhaps  the  two 
meanings of  bowl, hide, cricket  or  bridge  had been completely unconnected, with no 
full awareness that the two meanings shared a common word form, until it was pointed 
out. This has certainly been the case in writing. The knowledge is there—obviously we 
know the two meanings of bowl—but not linked together unless conscious attention is 
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drawn to them, which may happen in metalinguistic treatments such as this or in jokes 
(Groucho Marx's famous quip 'I've a good mind to join a club and beat you over the 
head with it.') or the odd word that just happens to catch our attention. I propose simply 
that homonyms are not necessarily stored in our mental lexicons this way though they 
can be made so. All this is to say that the initial method of soliciting whether the word 
form  was  known  but  the  rare  meaning  wasn't  may  be  problematic  and  that  most 
methods would be problematic as well.
Conclusion
Recalling Meara's (1997) model  in which the mental  lexicon is a network of 
nodes that are linked in various ways, what the homonym keyword method offers is a 
new link to established knowledge; where this differs from the L1 network is that this is 
done in the phonetic (and graphemic) realm. This is not common (though it's certainly 
possible)  in the L1 in that  we generally aren't  aware of homonyms unless we draw 
conscious attention  to  them.  Learners,  then,  would have a  more  acute  awareness of 
homonyms than native speakers do, and they have a greater need the extra assistance. 
The neural link to the new homonymic word form is an alternate, additional path for 
recall. The word is more connected than it otherwise would be.
It may well be that cognitive effort has a profound effect on recall and that the 
keyword method merely provides a defined focusing of cognitive resources. This study 
suggests  that  the  homonym  keyword  method  has  potential  but  that  some  further 
research is necessary.  Future work should provide a clearer indication that the target 
meaning  is,  in  fact,  unknown,  though  doing  so  without  inadvertently  teaching  it  is 
problematic. The inadvertent reinforcement effect of words learnt together facilitating 
the recall of each other can (if true) possibly be circumvented by using the technique to 
learn  other,  distractor  words  in  the  interim,  and  on  a  few  different  occasions.  
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Further, the success of the homonym keyword method, and perhaps the original 
Keyword Method, may depend on a learning style not overly influenced by affective 
factors that weigh the cognitive demands of learning against the usefulness of the word, 
at least when used for learning words out of context as was done here. 
Though there  are  some problems with  the  current  project,  nothing  serves  as 
evidence  against  the  technique,  only  that  its  effectiveness  has  not  yet  been  fully 
demonstrated. The success of the original keyword method encourages future research 
regarding this modification. 
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Chapter ten: Afterword. Some loose thoughts on polysemy, 
meaning and learning
It  is  not  enough  for  the  perfection  of  language,  that  
sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can 
be so made use of as to comprehend several particular  
things:  for  the  multiplication  of  words  would  have  
perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a  
distinct name to be signified by.
John Locke 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Since you begin doctoral work without the knowledge you will have gained by 
the end, I should think most dissertations don't end up anywhere near where they were 
expected to go at the beginning. Mine has been no exception. The expectations I had 
when  beginning  this  work  seem  simple  in  retrospect,  thinking  this  would  be  a 
dissertation on learners tacking a few new meanings on to some words they already 
knew, when it, in fact, has led me to a new understanding of the functioning of language 
as a whole. The work and thinking I've done regarding polysemy became a Socratic 
elenchus: my once-clear knowledge of polysemy (I knew what it was, ironically, in a 
dictionary-definition sort of way) dissolved and disappeared the closer I examined it. 
An  understanding  of  polysemy  strikes,  sooner  or  later,  at  the  very  heart  of  the 
philosophical  aspects  of language,  and there were days  in which I  was dangerously 
close  to  claiming  that  language  didn't  exist—and  probably  would  have  were  I  not 
paying so much to write a thesis on it.
Although I took a number of chapters to describe the concept of polysemy, there 
is, generally, a considerably easier way at our disposal, as language users, to convey the 
concept: simply to use the word polysemy. This is one aspect of language I have come 
to admire during this project: we can actually have a term for a concept we don't fully 
understand and proceed to talk about it as if we did. I say admire with no tones of irony. 
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Words are shortcuts to complex aspects of reality. Naming a concept doesn't eliminate 
its  unknown elements  but  brushes them aside,  for better  or for worse.  Words make 
expressible the inexpressible. They do this inaccurately (as in  cup and  bird  famously 
referring to such sloppily defined sets of referents) and yet they do it very economically 
(again, with cup and bird being able to cover all their different uses). It's no coincidence 
that discussions of polysemy tend to be either the briefest of mentions, relying on the 
communally-understood  concept  to  which  the  word  form  links  (and  invariably  the 
example of bank), or else book-length explorations, which that gut-level understanding 
of  the  word  can't  support.  Discussions  of  any  length  on  polysemy  soon  delve  into 
philosophy because the popular understanding only takes us so far before it collapses. 
I know things now I didn't know when I started this work, but I believed things 
then that I don't necessarily believe now. I believed that referents of concrete nouns, like 
that linked to the word form dog, existed in the real world. It's not that I've become a 
dyslexic agnostic, questioning the existence of DOG, but that I've come to see that even 
real-world referents are ultimately as conceptual as abstract nouns. I can use the word 
dog effectively even without having encountered all the varieties of dogs in the real 
world, let alone every single dog. My conceptualisation is constructed from my own 
experience, based in no small part upon the French poodle that was a companion for the 
first ten years of my life, the only dog I have ever had and thus, largely, my prototype. 
Therefore my conceptualisation of DOG will certainly differ from my interlocutors', and 
yet  we are perfectly able to use the word  dog  with no problem because we are not 
talking about that French poodle but an abstraction of all the dogs we have encountered 
or  know  to  exist.  And  though  we  may  conceptualise  it  differently,  there  is  a 
considerable overlap that allows us to discuss it unproblematically. And this is why the 
word  isn't  polysemous  for  every  dog,  or  breed  of  dog,  in  the  world.  Language  is 
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economical. A single word covers an expansive range of referents. (A proper noun is 
essentially a word whose range is restricted.)
But then there's that 'She's a dog' usage. Isn't that polysemy? I have to answer no. 
It is our conceptualisation of the world (She's a human being. Dogs aren't human beings. 
Therefore she can't  literally be a dog.) that makes it seem so. Our ability to understand 
the sentence stems from our ability to process metaphor. Calling a person a dog ties 
directly into the same abstraction of all canines that allows two people with different 
backgrounds to use the word dog. If it were a different meaning of dog, then it would 
not be the insult  it  intends to be. Allocating the word a new sense to cover female 
humans defangs the word of its hurtful goal. 
But what if we used simile rather than metaphor? If the speaker were to say 
instead, 'She's like a dog!' or 'She looks like a dog!' this is more clearly the original (and 
so far  only)  meaning.  The  ability  to  choose from metaphor  or  simile  to  compare  a 
person to a dog undermines the choice to call the usage a new sense. (Consider also how 
the usage can be optionally modulated phonetically: She's a dooooog! but not *I went to 
the  pet  shop  and  bought  a  new  dooooog,  a  contrast  that  highlights  the  pragmatic 
conflation.)
Words are artefacts. They have no existence outside those who use them. When 
the last speakers of a language die, the words die along with them. They are constructs 
of  the  mind and require  the mind to  keep them alive.  They mean  what  they mean 
because we make them do so. Words do not have meaning. They need existence to have 
property.  What there are are culturally-  and individually-determined word forms and 
culturally- and individually-determined concepts that are cognitively and communally 
associated with each other. 
For communication to work efficiently, each participant must have a reasonably 
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similar conceptualisation of the referents involved and know the proper word form to 
access it. If I came from a culture that knew only one kind of dog, say a teacup poodle, 
and I was talking to someone whose knowledge of dogs consisted entirely of pit bulls, 
communication might eventually break down. We would be talking about two different 
things though it might take a bit of discourse before we realised what the problem is. 
This  is  an  exaggerated,  unrealistic  example,  of  course,  but  conceptualisation  is 
determined both by culture and by individuals. 
Some  examples  from  an  entirely  different  domain,  mathematics,  may  help 
illustrate this. The algebraic expression 2(a+b) is not a paraphrase of 2a+2b because 
they  are  exactly  the  same  and  nothing  is  lost.  These  two  expressions  are  more 
synonymous  than  any two words  are.  An example  of  a  paraphrase  in  mathematics 
would be using 3.14 to express π. We use the Greek letter π to represent a number that 
cannot be expressed in standard notation, but which nonetheless exists as much as any 
other number does. Yet when solving an equation that calls for it, most of us will use 
the number 3.14. The exact and otherwise inexpressible number is very similar to the 
concepts that we've been discussing, while the Greek letter  is like the word-form. It 
gives us direct access to the concept and allows us to convey the inexpressible in a very 
concise manner. 
For communication to work, the listener must know both the concept and the 
form we use to express it. So what happens if the listener doesn't know one or both of 
these and asks what it means? In the case of π, we could say it means 3.14, or we could 
say 3.14159,  or  we could say it  is  the ratio  of  the circumference  of  a  circle  to  its 
diameter. Each of these would be a paraphrase. The first two differ in their accuracy and 
the last one is a definition, but a definition is always a paraphrase of some sort. The fact 
that there are three, and in fact more, paraphrases does not mean that π is polysemous; 
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the concept (the actual number) that is its referent is a very specific number and does 
not divide into separate senses. The middle school student who solves an equation using 
3.14 and the engineer who solves it using 3.14159 or an even longer expression are not 
employing different senses of π, just allowing for different degrees of accuracy, which 
may be akin to the qualia structure of Pustejovsky (1995) or Cruse's (2000) ways-of-
seeing  (in  which  the  word  dog may  mean  different  things  to  a  pet  owner  and  a 
veterinarian but this does not threaten its monosemy).
Like  any  analogy,  this  one  will  fall  apart  before  long  if  forced  beyond  its 
intended use, but an examination of the divergence may be just as useful as its overlap. 
For our discussion, there are two kinds of mathematical expressions. Numbers such as π 
and the square root of 2 are irrational numbers.  The numbers  they refer to are very 
specific;  they  cannot  be  expressed  using  what  are  called  'real  numbers,'  but  their 
meaning can still be conveyed. The other kind of expression is that set of real numbers. 
Both of these are short-cuts to very specific numbers, numbers which are essentially 
concepts  and  don't  have  any  real  existence.  (Two is  a  very  useful,  important  and 
fundamental  concept, but there is nothing in the physical  world that can be called a 
'two,' not even the various written forms, except the idea constructed in our minds. Like 
π, it is a concept that exists because humans say it does.) However, bringing this back to 
the linguistic/cognitive phenomenon, the concepts that words like dry or  jump refer to 
have very fuzzy boundaries, which is not the case at all for π. It means exactly the same 
thing in 2π as it does in π+32. Different things are being done to it in that it is being 
multiplied in one and having something added to it in the other, and the end result of the 
full  equations  are  different,  but  the  meaning  of  π  does  not  change  in  the  two 
expressions. This appears to be not the case with  dry clothes and dry wine. We could 
argue that dry has different meanings here, or we could argue that the meaning of dry is 
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extremely vague (involving lacking something, be it water or sugar, or oil in the case of 
skin,  mucus  or  phlegm in the case of cough,  or  emotion  in  the cases  of voice  and 
humour), but neither argument is applicable to π which has but the one meaning which 
is far from fuzzy.  (I am, incidentally,  not unaware of other meanings of π which are 
specific  to  the  fields  of  electricity  and  physics/chemistry,  but  these  don't—to  my 
admittedly  limited  understanding  which  here  must  rely on  dictionary  definitions—
partake in the meaning of the mathematical concept; they seem to pivot on the form 
rather than the meaning, the Greek letter being employed to refer to unrelated concepts 
just as the English letter x can refer to 
algebraic variables, the crossing out of something, etc.)
Furthermore, an expression like  dry county (a county in America in which the 
sale or consumption of alcohol is illegal) seems to have something else happening to it. 
I  can  perhaps  accept  for  the  sake  of  discussion  that  dry  clothes is  a  simple  A+B 
formation in that  the two words combine in an obvious way, but there is a jump in 
meaning in dry county. Despite my perceived need to explain the term, the combination 
is intelligible  and therefore cannot be dismissed as idiomatic.  There is  what will  be 
described here as a 'latent metaphor'  though this example is drawn  not to illustrate a 
specific kind of word combination but only to illustrate that words combine in different 
ways, that an overall meaning can be more than the sum of its parts. The word  sum 
(surely part of a Lakoffian metaphor system) brings us back to the mathematical aspect: 
in mathematics, an equation can never be more than the sum of its parts. 
Words, then, are not polysemous; they are polysemised,  an act performed by 
their users and recorders. Polysemising is a reification of a word's meaning(s) or at least 
a formalising of them. Polysemy is not a property of words or meanings. It is a by-
product of formalising them, of thinking meanings are discrete, manageable things. It is 
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not  that  new  meanings  are  created  but  that  the  old  one  is  stretched.  Or,  more 
pragmatically, the word is applied to contexts where it had not been found before, but 
not in contexts so novel that they could not possibly be understood. This stretching is an 
act of creativity on the part of the producer and also requires him or her to assume that 
the receiver will be able to comprehend the new re-contextualisation with little problem. 
The new use may stop right there and be a nonce usage or it may garner currency. This 
perhaps is  the allure  of formalism:  in  ascribing form to the formless,  we now have 
something to talk about. But this is also the problem: we are one step further removed 
from the referent. 
If  my stance  on polysemy is  decidedly  anti-formal,  it  is  because  formalism, 
when applied to polysemy,  becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Once one meaning is 
formalised, there can always be cases, new or established, that don't fit. Like pistachio 
nuts, you can't eat just one. Formalism creates polysemy,  or the illusion of it, or the 
need for it. It starts with the form and then sees meaning as a property; following this, 
meaning then itself becomes formalised as a definition. It breaks it down into seemingly 
countable chunks.  Formalism in linguistics is largely associated with the Chomskian 
school  but  it  has  always  been  around.  Lexicography  is  ultimately  so  formalistic  a 
discipline that I would not even call it a precursor. Words are looked up by their form, 
and meanings are divided into forms. 
If words were really entities 'out there'—forms in the Platonic sense—then their 
form would have to be amorphous. As long as words are used, they are in flux, except 
perhaps for fossilized entities like (to and) fro. Any user with a decent command of the 
language and a justifiable trust in her interlocutor can stretch a word; it is a privilege we 
enjoy as language users. What is new is not the meaning but the context. 
To draw upon another philosopher, words are akin to Descartes' piece of wax. 
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Descartes had a piece of wax and noted its properties, its appearance, its feel, its smell 
and its  taste.  He then  took it  to  a  candle  and melted  it  so  that  all  these  properties 
changed;  it  no  longer  smelled  or  tasted  the  same,  having  now  been  burnt,  and  it 
certainly no longer looked the same. Yet he knew it was the same piece of wax. It is this 
conclusion (rather than his ultimate one, which was the senses alone are insufficient to 
grasps the nature of an object but that the mind is necessary for this) that is important to 
us here. 
The Descartes simile can be applied to both form and meaning. Many words can 
be spelt differently (such as spelt) and many more have changed their accepted spellings 
over  the  centuries.  Furthermore  there  is  the  matter  of  individual  differences  in 
handwriting  and  typesetting.  And there  is,  of  course,  more  variation  in  the  spoken 
forms, including not just dialectal differences but the vast array of idiolectal diversity. 
No two people  will  pronounce  a  given  word  exactly  the  same  (given  the  different 
timbres of their voice in addition to other aspects) nor will one speaker pronounce the 
word exactly the same all  the time (given the differing stress patterns of its  various 
contexts),  yet  no one argues that these constitute  different forms. Even form,  for as 
solidly  delineated  as  we consider  it,  is  an  abstraction  that  idealises  away immense 
differences. Like the piece of wax, we know it is still the same word because our minds 
tell us so.
But  it  is  meaning  that  primarily  concerns  us  here.  When  a  word  is  put  in 
different contexts (such as  compose in  He will compose a symphony next and He will  
compose himself in a moment), we may be tempted to say it has changed, but to do so is 
to say that the piece of wax is no longer the same entity. Sometimes this may well be 
the case but it needs to be demonstrated rather than  assumed. When assumptions and 
intuitions are the sole criteria for sense distinction, there is no process to keep these in 
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check.
Suppose, however, Descartes had shown the piece of wax in its original form to 
a friend, and then, behind closed doors, took the wax to the flame and reformed it, his 
friend, upon examining the 'new' piece might well assume it to be an entirely different 
piece. This is a reasonable metaphor for lexical change as a historical process. Descartes 
was privy to the process of the changing the wax, but on the whole, language users were 
not present when new uses of words are coined. We do not see the process, only the 
effects, and we do not generally theorise about the relationships. Only in cases where a 
metaphoric sense is clearly bound to a more frequent base sense, such as flavour, do we 
seem to have an awareness of the relationship. We may, of course, be aware of other 
such instances, but these seem to vary from individual to individual; we all, that is, have 
an awareness of certain sense relationships because a particular word just happened to 
catch our attention or because of a misunderstanding or misreading, etc. The reason why 
chestnut can refer to an old joke or lemon to an unreliable car may be lost to history or 
folk etymologies but these do not prevent us from using the words effectively.
Ultimately, in order to have a well-developed understanding of polysemy, you 
have to have a theory of meaning that allows for it,  and in trying to form one, you 
realise how slippery it is. Hanks' (2000) article entitled 'Do word meanings exist?' and 
Kilgarriff's (1997) 'I don't believe in word senses' (both discussed in Appendix 1) are 
refreshingly honest. Earlier in the life of this thesis, I sought out anyone professing to 
understand polysemy;  now I would view them with suspicion,  a misgiving  that  can 
probably only be overturned by hearing them admit that the concept is either false or 
unknowable. 
Homonymy is not an entirely different matter.  To say that homonyms have the 
same form betrays an assumption that something different already exists. Looking at it 
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in a strictly formal setting, two words that have the same form should, after all, be one 
word.  If  I  said  that  the  (nonsense)  word  prohtic  was  homonymic  with  prohtic,  it's 
because I see a difference between the two, a difference that has nothing to do with 
form. Else why would I claim there are two words denominated prohtic instead of just 
one? 
So we have two elements to a word already: the formal and the non-formal. The 
form is received; it existed prior to any analysis we perform on it (barring my use of a 
pseudo-word above). The non-formal element, by which we obviously mean the word's 
meaning (and perhaps other elements not relevant here) is a different case. Meaning is 
not formal. It can be formalised but this is a far cry from the pre-existence of form. 
Formalisation  is  problematic.  Ask  100  native  speakers  to  spell  the  word  tree and 
presumably you'd get 100 identical answers; ask them to pronounce it and there would 
be  very  little  variation  at  the  phonetic  level.  Ask  them,  however,  to  draft  lists  of 
semantic traits and you'd probably get near 100 different lists. Form is, to some extent, 
socially constructed or at  least  agreed-upon; formalisation is  usually the work of an 
analyst  or  group  of  analysts.  While  I  don't  doubt  that  such  work  can  be  purely 
exploratory,  there  is  quite  often an  agenda of  sorts.  If,  for  example,  I  attempted  to 
formalise meaning so that I could demonstrate that two meanings are related, I could 
keep listing semantic traits until I've proven so, and stop doing so once I have. 
Meaning is extremely resistant to the formalisation process. At best, we are done 
listing  traits  when we can no longer  think of  any more  to  add.  Except  perhaps  for 
troponyms (a semantically more specific word, scribble being a troponym of write) and 
chestnuts like  bachelor  and  spinster  that are polytrophic upon other words (male  and 
unmarried  for example) there is frequently no clear finishing line to cross; there can 
usually be more traits to add. The notion of semantic primes, while once a promising 
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prospect, has failed to realise its promise. 
Further, you could argue that the word form is the formalisation of the meaning. 
There is, for example, a familiar occurrence for most people of water falling from the 
clouds. Sometimes it is heavy and sometimes light. Sometimes it is accompanied by 
thunder  and/or  lightning  and  sometimes  not.  This  occurrence,  or  this  variety  of 
occurrences, is formalised as rain. ('Formalised' since rain certainly existed well before 
any language had a word for it.) This word gives us direct access to the concept and 
renders individual variations (light, heavy, etc.) immaterial. Listing semantic traits, then, 
is  an  effort  to  bypass  the  received  form  and  replace  it  with  another,  much  more 
cumbersome one. 
Formalism has a certain appeal in its ability to make aspects (here, of language) 
discrete and analysable, but this is denied us here. Meaning is not discrete. Despite the 
way dictionaries present them, as numerically delineated, sequenced or nested entities, 
the  meanings  of  polysemes  often  bleed  into  each  other.  This  makes  discussion  of 
monosemy,  polysemy and homonymy rather messy.  Claiming that  animated  has two 
meanings for animated movies and animated discussions is to presuppose that these are 
already different entities rather than one unified one, and on some level, these meanings 
really are just one. (And on another level, they are different. The monosemy/polysemy 
distinction  is  little  more  than  a  predisposition  to  the  level  of  analysis  one  prefers.) 
Again, it is not good practice to change one word to prove that another has changed.
The monosemist approach applied in this thesis (which is not that words have 
only one meaning but that we should assume one meaning until additional meanings can 
be demonstrated) not only adheres to Occam's Razor but provides the best starting point 
for a non-formal  analysis.  Multiple  entities imply countability which in turn implies 
discreteness which in turn implies form. There are cases of related meanings that I think 
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would be fairly uncontroversial (the literal and metaphoric meanings of  flavour), but 
there  are  many  others  that  have  less  clear  boundaries,  like  the  word  good  and the 
multitude  of  words  it  can  associate  with.  Again,  the  word  boundaries  implies 
discreteness, and my point is not that some words have discrete meanings and some 
don't,  but  that  discreteness  is  something  that  should  be  all  together  avoided  when 
meaning is discussed. 
It becomes important to talk of levels of meaning—not enumerable levels like 
those of a building but relatively-defined levels of 'deep' and 'surface.' That these terms 
already have currency in linguistics, and in formalism no less, is perhaps unfortunate as 
they should not be seen as parallels to Chomskian syntactic structures. Rather, these 
terms (and I believe two are sufficient) describe levels of polysemy. The deep level is 
relatively stable,  susceptible  only to  historical  drift,  while  the surface level  is  more 
robust and susceptible to contextual changes, which I've argued throughout represents 
only the illusion of polysemy. We've seen this already with the examples of animated 
above: the surface level accounts for how animated discussions  and  animated movies  
seem so different while the deep accounts for how these concepts are really the same. 
It  is  this  notion  of  deep  and surface levels  that  poses  the problem faced  by 
learners.  Native  speakers  may have  at  least  a  subconscious  awareness  of  these two 
aspects, the relatively stable deep level of meaning (where denomination means exactly 
one  thing)  and  the  highly-susceptible-to-contextual-effects  surface  level  (where 
denomination  refers variously to financial coinage or religious groups). But even this 
subconscious level of knowledge is not available to the learner with a still-developing 
mental lexicon. Words are, generally speaking, learnt by their surface level traits. The 
religious  meaning  of  denomination  may be  learnt  years  before  the  financial  one  is 
encountered, or vice versa, and they may be seen as different words, particularly if they 
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are learned  via  recourse  to  different  L1 translation  equivalents.  The stability  of  the 
established L1 lexicon trumps the nascent L2 structure, retaining its division into two 
detached concepts unless the learner,  clued in by the same word form, analyses and 
integrates the two. 
This is why it is important for the user to read the entire entry of a given word in 
a dictionary—not to learn every meaning, a notion that would add considerably to the 
learning burden of a good many words, but because a bird's-eye-view of all the surface 
effects  is  necessary  to  see  the  whole.  Recall  Ruhl's  methodology  of  the  otherwise 
intangible  monosemic  meaning  patterning  out  over  a  wealth  of  attested  uses.  If 
dictionaries are recorders of word meanings at the surface level, the Ruhlian deep level 
can be gleamed by observing all of them. The deep level, for native speaker and second 
language learner alike, is the abstraction, the whittling away of the surface  effects, a 
smoothing  out  of  extraneous  details.  It  is  a  forest-for-the-trees  scenario,  and  many 
learners are led to, and left at, the trees. 
Despite my diatribe against the over-polysemising of words by lexicographers, a 
sufficient number of such surface-level accounts are necessary. The 20 definitions given 
by the COBUILD for  the word time (ignoring the 53 phrases) remains excessive in my 
mind, with one sense denoting 'what we measure in minutes,  hours, days and years' 
(exemplified with 'Time passed...') and another referring to 'the period that you spend 
doing something' ('...you need more time...') bordering on atom-splitting and weighing 
the entry down with fussy, hard-to-distinguish discernments. But if dictionaries take it 
upon themselves to chronicle words' surface effects, they should present just enough 
that the deep meaning can be ascertained. 
The  way  we  view  the  deep  level,  the  underlying  meanings,  need  not  be 
etymologically accurate. The vast majority of the words we use existed long before any 
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of their  current users;  we were born quite late  into their  timespan and witness only 
relatively, or seemingly, stable entities rather than the gradually shifting sands of word 
meaning, except for a handful of words which undergo spurts of revolutions rather than 
evolution (man 'humanity' for example). As a lifelong record, and later CD, collector, I 
used to see an abstract connection between the word  album  in its 'record album' and 
'photo album' usages, but it was abstract only until the first time I saw an album of 78s, 
which was very much like a photo album, book-like with each page housing a disc in 
much the same way as the pages of a photo album hold photographs. The phonographic 
use  of  the  word  simply  continued  on,  outliving  78s,  until  the  late  1960s  when  it 
reinvented itself to distinguish LPs of new material from compilations (and even then, 
some albums of new material can be more 'album-like' than others). But this doesn't 
invalidate my original vague conception of the word, which was essentially a collection 
of individual items stored together. 
The bottom line is that word knowledge cannot be complete until the learner has 
some knowledge of both levels of word meaning. Surface-level-only knowledge, where 
many learners  seem to get stuck, is rife with seemingly unrelated variation and does 
require each new sense to be tacked on, and then only when the known fails. Cultivating 
an awareness of the deep level of a word's meaning, though perhaps requiring an initial 
bit  of  cognitive  investment  not  necessary when the goal is  simply to  learn the first 
meaning,  will  ease  the  overall  learning  burden  of  a  polyseme,  providing  an  aerial 
snapshot rather than mistaking a close-up of a single aspect for the whole. 
Dictionaries, by and large, fail to facilitate this. In the example-sentence chestnut 
The students are revolting, we can see an abstract connection between the two senses 
evoked by revolting—both entail a turning away, the sudden taking of a new direction 
from something deemed undesirable (be it by people or one's head/line of sight). There 
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is nothing, however, in the Collins-COBUILD that unites these two senses; in fact, they 
are explicitly discrete by revolt (four senses, all entailing the political use) and revolting  
(one  sense:  'horrible  and  disgusting')  being  two  different  headwords,  though  the 
thesaurus function of the CD-ROM version, not available in the print edition except as a 
separate volume, does give synonyms for both senses of revolt. Again, this is why it is 
useful for learners to read adjacent and nearby entries, but the editors of dictionaries 
could make this much easier by cross-referencing such words. 
Definitions could be ordered in such a way to highlight underlying meanings. 
Nesting the definitions would help group local uses together, but nesting would be aided 
not by simply numbering definitions as 'II.1.b' (I doubt most users actually 'read' the 
numbers) but by physically indenting senses, thus 'wasting' space but making physically 
clearer the notion of subsenses. An added benefit is the potential eliminating of such 
senses, deeming them not worthy of the extra space. 
The  surface-deep  level  paradigm  does  not  apply  to  all  words  or  even  all 
polysemes,  only  to  those  which  are  more  susceptible  to  surface  effects.  Not  all 
polysemised words have senses that sum to the underlying meaning.  Again, the two 
meanings of stool do not pattern out to an underlying meaning. A dictionary could unify 
the two uses by referring to the 'commode' usage. I would like to think that the goal of a 
learners' dictionary is to help the learner learn an entire word, not to pinpoint a specific 
use. Flavour, too, does not hinge upon a deep analysis of the surface uses since there are 
essentially only two uses which are clearly related. Furthermore, deep analysis is fruitful 
only when the underlying meaning is not one of the actual, established uses; the closest 
thing  to  the  underlying  meaning  of  flavour,  for  example,  is  the  literal,  prototypical 
sense, which is not particularly interesting. Contrast this with fork where the underlying 
meaning is not the utensil (presumably the prototype for today's user) so much as its 
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shape.
Lexical metaphor, in fact, requires an awareness of the metaphor itself. I'm sure 
there are many learners who could, from a dictionary, grasp the metaphor of calling a 
person a  square  (i.e.,  unexciting and predictable),  but I should think there are many 
others  who  would  not.  This  could  be  spelt  out  briefly  by  the  lexicographers  with 
'...because of its unexciting shape' or something similar. (There are, incidentally, at least 
two separate metaphors stemming from the word square, the other entailing fairness—
presumably because both the shape and such a  person are  'straight'  and 'even'—but 
neither is presented in the Collins-COBUILD.)
The research laid out here suggests many avenues of future research. First of all, 
I would like to modify the General Service List to accommodate the list of homonyms. 
This means each homonym would be represented twice or more, the frequency of each 
being calculated and, if still eligible, the words would be resequenced, and if not, they 
would be removed from the list all together. 
Another project I would like to undertake entails having learners think about, 
deduce and predict metaphoric senses. Work along these lines which I've conducted in 
pilot studies has shown this to be a complicated issue. As noted earlier, some words are 
similarly polysemous across languages, such as flavour and loud in Korean; learners 
were able to understand the extended meanings quite easily, but it was not clear whether 
they already knew them or were simply hoping they would behave the same way in the 
L2 as in the L1. Metaphors unique to the L1 were a likely source of interference in L2 
acceptability judgement and translation tasks. This overlap of metaphors that work 
cross-linguistically with those that don't make guessing attempts sloppy and unsure but, 
on the other hand, also suggest a possible merit in teaching the metaphors themselves, 
particularly the more complex cognitive metaphor systems outlined by Lakoff and 
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Johnson (1980). One single system (such as ARGUMENT = WAR) could provide clues 
to multiple words and also allow to craft nonce uses when needed, possibly facilitating 
communication when a more proper word is unknown.
* * *
I'd like to finish with one last example of monosemy, a word that I wrestled with 
and  nearly  considered  polysemous  with  two  antonymic  meanings:  idiom,  and  more 
particularly idiomatic. The word idiom is no stranger to applied linguists. A good body 
of pedagogical writings exists dealing with how idioms can be taught and learnt. When 
we  talk  about  idiomatic  English,  we  don't  necessarily  mean  an  English  discourse 
peppered with idioms but rather English that is natural-sounding.
Consider, then, the following BNC sentence: 
There are of course divisions of opinion as to the idiomatic nature of Brahms's writing,  
and none of these pieces lie easily within the hands. 
The problem here is that  idiomatic  sets Brahms off from other composers, which is a 
markedly different situation than the use of the word with English. If idiomatic English  
is  the kind  that  all  native  and near-native  speakers  produce,  a  variety  that  is  either 
unmarked or else marked by its adherence to normality, then how can the same word be 
used to denote that which is marked by its own set of peculiarities? How can describing 
English as idiomatic  refer  to its  un-idiosyncratic  nature while  describing Brahms as 
idiomatic  refer  to  the  very  idiosyncratic  nature  of  his  writing?  It  would  seem that 
idiomatic is an auto-antonym, a word that is its own opposite. 
Chapter two discussed the risk of paraphrasing, that we remove a word from the 
equation  and  analyse  rather  the  glosses  we  substitute  it  with.  Idiomatic is  not 
polysemous because we can gloss it with both 'idiosyncratic' and 'un-idiosyncratic.' We 
know that nearly every word can occur  in a variety of contexts and that contextual 
effects can be very robust. That the word form itself remains constant is reason enough 
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to look for unity rather than division. 
As usual, pragmatics is not far away. There is a variety of English which we may 
refer to as 'idiomatic English,' but there is no such baseline for classical music. Each 
composer is a separate idiom and there is no 'idiomatic classical music' from which they 
all stem and deviate.  Language users and composers both create their product, but the 
former create, as in 'produce,' while the latter requires creativity, thus precluding such a 
baseline  from  being  established.  However,  this  is  not  completely  unparalleled  in 
language. Hemingway's English could certainly be called idiomatic in the same way that 
Brahms'  music  can.  My  own  use  of  English  could  technically  be  referred  to  as 
idiomatic,  as  could  anybody's,  though  we  reserve  the  term  for  the  more  artistic 
deviances. Natural-sounding English is an idiom—not idiom in the sense of a group of 
words  with  an  unclear  meaning  but  idiom  as  in  'genre,'  in  the  sense  that  technical 
English and conversation English are two different genres. 
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Part 3: Appendices 
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App  endix one: A review of Fontenelle (2008)  
The year 2008 saw, as this dissertation was nearing completion, the publication 
of Practical lexicography: A reader (Fontenelle) which, as the subtitle implies, reprints 
previously  published  articles  on  dictionary  making.  Suggesting  that  my  earlier 
observation on the shying away of the topic of polysemy in such texts may have been 
overstated, this volume contains three articles on polysemy as it relates to lexicography. 
However, the points they raise are largely, though not entirely, in line with those I have 
spelled out. This appendix, then, will review and discuss these three articles.
Culled from a variety of journals, proceedings and other sources, all the articles 
have been recontextualised  into this  new volume,  and this  new context  warrants  an 
examination  of  its  own.  Although the  first  chapter  of  reprinted  material  is  Johnson 
(1747), all other chapters date from 1984 (a polysemy article in fact), with some 86% of 
the chapters having first been printed since 1990, and over 27% since 2000. Dismissing 
the Johnson as an outlier,  the range of articles  encompasses  22 years  (1984–2006), 
during which time lexicography has seen much change with the personal computer and 
the development of corpus linguistics, conceivably the most compact change the field 
has known. Although reaching slightly further back in time, one article reprinted herein, 
Atkins (2002, 2008),  addresses this  very topic,  contrasting  her  first  experience  with 
(bilingual) lexicography in 1967 with the methods she employed at the time of writing. 
Reviewing its history, I believe the field has indeed changed but not just in techniques 
and technology but, at least to the extent that Fontenelle (2008) represents the field, in 
its goals and very conception. 
Of immediate concern is that over a quarter of the reprinted articles come from 
journals or conferences dedicated, at least in part, to computer science, and several other 
articles could just as well have been printed in computer-dedicated journals. There are 
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two aspects of the computer in modern linguistics: one being its use as a tool, something 
I have employed throughout, and the other, its use as a model, and it is this second 
aspect  that  warrants  discussion.  Computational  approaches  generally—there  are 
exceptions—offer little in the way of how language actually works, focusing instead on 
how  it  can  be  simulated,  which  is  fine  but  these  explanations  frequently  end  up 
portrayed or interpreted as the way language actually works. I have no problem with 
programming computers with the ability to process and understand human language (I'd 
like  to  tell  mine  a  thing  or  two),  but  the  computer  is,  at  best,  an  odd  choice  for 
modelling human language, especially when we ignore the limitations of the metaphor. 
It may be true that the human brain has yet to figure itself out, but an understanding of 
how computers work isn't exactly culturally-shared knowledge among language users 
either, nor, for that matter, among computer users. The end result is not humanising the 
computer but, via metaphor, computerising the human brain's unique ability to use that 
which it itself has created: language. Yet it has become so deeply ingrained that we may 
not  even recognise  as  computer-sourced  such  metaphors  words  as  input,  output,  
monitor, process, etc. Certainly, these words had established use long before the word 
computer, dating from the mid 1600s, was used to refer to what it refers to today, but 
they  surely  didn't  become  linguistic  jargon  by  sidestepping  their  computer  science 
meanings. Just as linguistics, as noted by Ruhl, was pre-dated and therefore influenced 
by  lexicography,  so  too  did  the  Chomskian  revolution  coincide  with  the  computer 
revolution,  becoming  mingled  together  in  the  process.  Formalism  lends  itself  to 
computer  models.  These  terms  shared  by  computer  science  and  linguistics  are  not 
without merit, especially in a Lakoffian conceptual metaphor system where they help us 
talk about the topic of language, but modern linguistics was (and is) still developing and 
those  conceptual  metaphors  naturally  evolved  and  reified  into  models.  The  use  of 
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computer models for programming computers is an obvious necessity, but their use in 
understanding  the  brain  needs  to  be  regarded  as  nothing  more  than  analogues  and 
approximations.  The  relationship  works  both  ways—computer  science  deals  with 
'computer language' and 'syntax errors'—and this certainly increases, bolsters even,`the 
expansive  range  of  the  metaphor.  It  is,  frankly,  absurd  that  a  machine  that  cannot 
effectively process language is used to model the brain, which can. It is important to see 
how the era in which we live, dominated to the extent it is by the role of the computer in 
today's society, colours our perceptions of things not directly related to microchips. This 
current paradigm will probably age as poorly as the tabula rasa has for many linguists 
today.
The reason I raise this point is not to place the current age in historical light but 
to discuss what I see as a potentially troubling consequence. It is worth recognising as a 
zeitgeist the fact that computer science texts regarding word sense disambiguation and 
the development  of artificial  intelligence are intermingled  in  Fontenelle  (2008) with 
texts culled from 'pure' (I use the term non-judgementally) lexicography journals with 
no differentiation. In fact, the source context is a poor delimiter as several of the pure 
linguistics-sourced  articles  freely  draw  from  computer  science.  This  implies,  very 
strongly if these articles can be said to represent the field(s),  that  the disciplines of 
lexicography and artificial intelligence development have fused together and now share 
at least some of the same goals. Apart from the brief biography of Fontenelle on the 
back  cover  identifying  him  as  Senior  Program  Director  with  Microsoft's  Natural 
Language Group, there is nothing in the title, blurb or cover graphics that would mark 
the book as a computer science volume—quite the reverse in fact as the front cover 
prominently bears the  Oxford Linguistics imprimatur. I'm certainly open to the belief 
that  the  practitioners  of  one  academic  field  can  learn  from  other  fields  (Leonard 
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Bernstein's  Chomskian  analysis  of  Mozart  springs  to  mind,  as  does  Cruse's  afore-
mentioned application of the ring species to lexical semantics), but the articles are not 
presented as cross-curricular exchanges but lumped together indiscriminately. We are 
asked to accept that improvements in AI have some relevance to language users and 
learners who consult the dictionary and therefore belong in a book entitled  Practical  
lexicography. This stance is so self-evident to the editor that no justification of it was 
deemed necessary.  (Had the book, of course,  been titled  Practical  lexicography for  
programmers  or  something  similar,  my  complaint  would  have  been  completely 
neutralised.)
The second aspect of lexicography, as well as semantics and any other field that 
finds itself tackling polysemy, that needs addressing prior to turning our attention to the 
articles is that of lexical ambiguity, a concept I have downplayed throughout. Ambiguity 
is  frequently  considered  synonymous  with  polysemy.  The  problem here  is  that  the 
number of utterances that are ambiguous in real-life communication is extremely rare. 
We need only try to recall  the last time we had such an experience.  Polysemes and 
homonyms can be used in contexts—and in fact almost always are—where they aren't 
remotely ambiguous. While a computer may well have to chose between two or more 
meanings, a human in a worse case scenario would, I should think, be more likely to 
choose the wrong meaning rather than be stumped on which of the multiple 'candidate 
meanings' to apply. Recall, for instance, how I had misinterpreted the index entry of 
'sense associations' in a book entitled Dictionaries; the meaning intended by its author 
was  never  in  the  running  in  my  brain.  Such  rare  cases  may  say  more  about  the 
misinterpreter rather than about the functioning of language.
In  one  of  the  three  articles  in  the  polysemy  section,  Hanks  (2000/2008)19 
19 Citations  will include the article's  original  year  of publication so as not to muddle their historical 
placement.
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examined 1,000  BNC instances  of  bank  finding  that  not  one of  them was remotely 
ambiguous  for  the  two  meanings.  While  there  is  no  objective  reason  why  1,000 
instances  should  be  taken  as  adequate  proof,  the  claim  stands  on  its  own:  lexical 
ambiguity  is  not  the  same  as  polysemy.  Except  for  rare  instances  of  actual 
misunderstandings, lexical ambiguity is the near-exclusive domain of semantics texts. It 
does not reflect actual language use. Ambiguous sentences can be composed to support 
nearly any point its author wishes to make regarding ambiguity or polysemy.
Further, polysemes and homonyms would indeed be ambiguous to computers 
even  when  they  aren't  to  humans,  in  which  event  this  may  be  a  solid  case  of  the 
computer model interfering with our understanding of human use of language. To claim 
that 'I need to get to the bank' (my example) is ambiguous is to assume the listener of 
such a sentence in actual discourse is, frankly, an utter moron. For it to be ambiguous, 
the speaker would not only have to be in a boat on water somewhere, probably within 
sight of land (if not I would expect  land  or maybe  port would be more likely),  and 
therefore have knowledge that it is a bank and not a shore, and he would just have to 
been  discussing  finances  to  the  listener  (otherwise  this  meaning  shouldn't  even  be 
primed). I assume, then, that this is a matter of the computer-as-brain model rearing its 
head, that those who consider this sentence ambiguous do so because they assign to 
humans  the  same  inability  to  comprehend  discourse  that  computers  have,  which, 
frankly, I find a pretty offensive assumption for a linguist to make. 
Where this semantic paradigm really falls apart is that in its efforts to attribute 
not just multiple meanings to words but also the potential for new ones, it now forces 
itself to deal with them by finding ways of discerning them. In other words, its efforts to 
'ambiguate' words now affects the need to disambiguate them. If, as I have argued, the 
first process is unnecessary, at least to the extreme it is commonly taken, the second is 
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obviously even more so. The mistaken belief that word senses are discrete, countable, 
formalisable entities has created an extremely complex set of problems and processes.
We  can  turn,  finally,  to  the  individual  articles.  Two  of  the  three  articles 
composing the polysemy unit in Fontenelle (2008) are taken from Computers and the  
humanities  and  thus  betray  (in  more  ways  than  one,  oddly  enough)  the  theoretical 
standpoints associated with computer science. Presented in Fontenelle (2008) in reverse 
order of original publication,  the first is called 'Do word meanings exist?'  by Hanks 
(2000/2008). Its title and first sentence, 'My contribution to this discussion is to attempt 
to spread a little radical doubt' show the congruity of our views.
Despite his computer background, he is not unmindful that words and language 
have non-computer-defined existence. Meaning, to Hanks, is not a property of words: 
words have meanings only in context. He writes: 
It  is  a  question  of  fundamental  importance  to  the  enterprise  of  sense  
disambiguation. If senses don't exist, then there is not much point in trying  
to “disambiguate” them—or indeed do anything else with them. The very  
term disambiguate presupposes what Fillmore [(1975)] characterized as a 
“checklist theory of meanings”. (125)
There is no evidence from this article that Hanks has read Ruhl—I suspect not—but 
their views are well aligned, as Hanks writes, 'The numbered lists of definitions found 
in dictionaries have helped create a false picture of what really happens when language 
is used.' 
But the two differ in Hanks seeing words as having no meanings while Ruhl sees 
them as  having only one, though it's questionable whether these stances are really all 
that  different beyond their  surface contrast—zero and one both signify non-plurality 
which is the focus of their theories. Meanings, to Hanks, are 'events, not entities.' What 
words have, if not meanings, are 'meaning potentials,' which are not that different from 
the highly vague monosemic meaning espoused by Ruhl. 
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While writings that are ultimately dismissive or at least suspicious of the notion 
of polysemy are relatively few in number, those that continue on by suggesting practical 
solutions are rarer yet.  Hanks proposes not only an alternative but an intriguing one. 
This article originated as a talk at a computer science workshop and was subsequently 
published  in  Computers  and the  humanities but  his  is  a  very  humanistic  approach, 
stating that if 'it's not clear to a human, then it can't be clear to a computer.' What he 
proposes, then, is intended for computers but adapting it to lexicography proper requires 
little imagination or alteration. The approach stems from Wittgenstein's famous account 
of the word game and how the philosopher was unable to find a common trait shared by 
every use of the word. Not all games have competition nor victory and loss (such as 
ring-a-ring-a-roses), nor amusement, skill, luck, etc. Hanks concludes that traits such as 
these are 'probabilistic and prototypical.' 
That  Hanks  chose  to  illustrate  this  further  with  a  homonym  rather  than  a 
polyseme  could  possibly  suggests  he  is  more  extreme  than  me.  I,  like  Ruhl,  am 
generally  satisfied  to  accord  homonymy  an  'exempt  from  monosemy'  status.  The 
homonym he examines is bank with its 'financial institution' and 'slope of land alongside 
a river' meanings (to him, senses). 
By way of sidebar, I'd like to add that I have, incidentally, endeavoured to avoid 
this particular homonym on the basis of it being all too often the only example many 
writers  ever  use  for  homonymy.  The  words  dog and  cup  suffer  a  similar  fate  in 
discussions of prototype theory.  The  field of academic research depends on building 
upon theories developed by others, but the ad nauseam regurgitation of their examples 
is suspicious at best.  If such theories are to be understood to account for a sizeable 
chunk of language,  limiting  the scope of their  application  to  the same two or three 
examples over and over very nearly has the opposite effect. 
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There is, however, a probable reason why  bank has become the cliché it has: 
both meanings  are concrete nouns that are clearly unrelated. Contrast this with other 
homonyms  such  as  can  (one  concrete  noun,  one  abstract  modal  verb),  bowl  (one 
concrete noun, one verb),  arm (two concrete nouns, but one seeming like a polysemic 
extension of the other), cell (the biological sense and the prison sense being related, the 
homonymic  meaning  stemming  from  the  world  of  animation),  lock  (one  meaning, 
regarding hair, considerably rarer than the other), etc. The word bank, then, is neat and 
economical,  getting  the  point  across  quickly.  And this  is  all  the  more  reason to  be 
suspect of its use to encapsulate all of homonymy. It is perhaps the tidiest example of 
the concept rather than the most representative. To his credit, however, Hanks' analysis 
of this particular homonym, however, is a detailed and original one.
Having now painted myself into a corner where I dare not use his example, I 
chose a similar one with which to illustrate his point: pen with its 'writing utensils' and 
'small fenced-in area.' Prototypically, pen1 has these features:
● IS HANDHELD
● IS LONG AND THIN
● CONTAINS INK
● IS USED FOR WRITING
● HAS A TIP THAT IS EXPOSED FOR WRITING BUT COVERED WHEN 
NOT IN USE
While pen2 has these features:
● IS OUTSIDE
● IS FOUND ON FARMS
● HAS A FENCE AND GATE
● IS UNCOVERED
● IS  USED  TO  CONTAIN  LIVESTOCK  TO  PREVENT  ESCAPING  OR 
WANDERING.
Neither  of  these  lists  should  be  taken  as  exhaustive;  they  are  merely  sufficient  for 
illustrative purposes. These traits were labelled prototypical because exceptions exist, 
and many readers will already have found a few. Reeds and quills can be used for pens 
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in place of the manufactured variety, while children may be placed in playpens. 
Use of either pen1 or pen2 generally employs a combination of traits. It's possible, 
however, that a usage may evoke none: a prisoner locked up in 'the pen' doesn't make 
use of any listed above, or to use Hanks' example, a bank of reeds does not use any of 
the  traits  he  sets  forth  for  the  embankment  meaning  of  that  homonym.  The  word 
typically could be prefaced to each trait above. 
Applying  this  to  the  dictionary,  then,  would result  in  a  very different  book, 
offering prototypical traits rather than definitions. The user would still be able to learn 
what a word refers to. L2 learners, for example, unfamiliar with the word pen2 would be 
able to learn what one is by reading the traits, regardless of whether they actually know 
what a pen is (having never seen one, or having no translation equivalent in their L1). 
The caveat is that users need to understand that these are typical traits as it would be 
unreasonable to expect the dictionary to include typically for each trait listed. 
As noted above, bank is an antiseptically clean example among less sterile cases 
(despite Hanks'  surprising and undeveloped claim that one meaning 'shades into the 
other'), and  pen  is very similar in this respect. To further illustrate why I avoid this 
example,  we'll  examine  what  happens  when  applying  this  paradigm  to  less  tidy 
examples  such as our  old friend  flavour  (which,  I  need admit,  is  one of the tidiest 
examples of polysemy I know). We begin with the following traits: 
● IS PERCEIVED VIA THE SENSE OF TASTE, ASSISTED BY THE SENSE 
OF SMELL
● INVOLVES FOOD OR BEVERAGE
The question now becomes: should we list the metaphoric sense as a separate sense or 
keep it as one unified sense? My preference would, of course, be to make just one sense, 
but this is not easily done. True,  flavour1 typically entails food and the sense of taste, 
but does that leave us with 'flavour of the narrative' as a usage that falls outside the 
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range of typicality,  or does it bring with it its own typical traits? If  flavour  typically 
entails food, a narrative is still a possible argument, since, by stating these traits to be 
'typical,'  we've allowed for—and in fact created—non-typical possibilities.  The word 
flavour, after all, is typically used literally. 
The alternative approach is to make the metaphoric a new sense, replete with its 
own range of prototypical traits. I would propose the following:
● INVOLVES SOMETHING THAT IS NOT FOOD OR BEVERAGE
● INVOLVES  SOMETHING  CREATED  OR  DESIGNED  BY  HUMANS 
RATHER THAN FOUND IN NATURE
There is a slight problem with the first one in that there is no typicality involved; the 
thing whose flavour is discussed cannot be food or beverage or else we're back at the 
first  sense.  This means,  then,  that  Hanks'  notion of prototypicality,  while  important, 
might be overstated, that it does not completely supplant the notion of required traits. 
I've no doubt that conventions can be developed to accommodate the distinction were a 
dictionary built upon these principles were to be compiled.
It's  also  unclear  how  detailed  such  traits  need  to  be.  Is  'food  or  beverage' 
enough? Do we want to include the smoke of pipe tobacco? Or is that covered by the 
implied adverb 'typically'? Since it's not covered by the food-or-beverage condition, can 
we assume that the use of the tongue is enough to make someone unfamiliar with the 
word flavour know that it falls under the first sense and not the second? 
We're also back at our old problem: we've just set up flavour to account for a set 
of entities that are either edible or non-edible—in other words, pretty much any entity in 
the universe, raising again the question of whether the distinction is one we need to 
make. 
The second trait,  noting that the argument must denote something created by 
humans, is necessary because, as noted earlier, the metaphoric use of flavour cannot be 
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used to describe clouds, mountains,  etc.  Attempts to do so result in a dissonance in 
which the literal sense is evoked but clashes with the intended metaphoric. 
If flavour is, as I indicated, a tidy example of polysemy, what happens when we 
apply this to downright messy cases of polysemy such as register? Of the many uses of 
this word, none strike me as particularly 'typical.' While I don't agree that the uses of 
bank necessarily shade into each other, I take it to mean that there are two fairly distinct 
meanings but that (to Hanks at least) the border is not well-defined. The verb shade here 
implies,  literally  and  metaphorically,  a  grey  area  rather  than  a  black  and  white 
distinction. Bank nonetheless minimises polysemy/homonymy to two meaning spheres, 
unlike register which is not remotely neat, with far more than two uses branching off in 
different  directions  at  any  given  point,  yet  still  maintaining  a  semblance  of  an 
underlying meaning. Consider the following uses:
[1] please sign the register
[2] cash register
[3] register for classes
[4] You told me but it didn't quite register the first time
[5] an earthquake registering 5.5
[6] an expression that registers surprise
[7] speaking in the appropriate register 
[8] the lowest register of the clarinet
As the last two of these, while clearly related to each other, are a bit more distinct than 
the rest, it would be difficult to treat them in terms of typicality. If something registers, 
does it (proto-) typically entail the writing down (or computer entry) of information? 
Does  it  somehow  involve  a  cline  or  scale  such  as  the  Richter  scale,  the  range  of 
emotions,  musical  or  linguistic  'highness  and  lowness'?  Whatever  underlies  these 
meanings, or even just the first six if we were to remove [7] and [8] for simplicity's 
sake, is not something which lends itself to typicality analysis. 
The end result here is that while prototype theory has a lot to offer lexicography, 
it still does not resolve the problem of lumping versus splitting but imports the same 
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issues, casting them in new guises. The split of the two senses of flavour was still done 
because they were felt to be different and not because of any objective criteria that there 
are,  indeed,  more than one sense at  play here.  Furthermore,  the notion of typicality 
obscures the issue when non-typical uses of a given word are available for use. If a 
word can  have none  of  the listed  traits  yet  still  be the  same word,  can learners  be 
expected to successfully decode such an instance using prototype-based dictionary? And 
while this has always been an issue with traditional dictionaries, the kind proposed by 
Hanks also does not encourage learners to use words in non-typical ways. Despite these 
claims, however, I think there is merit in taking steps in developing such a dictionary. 
These problems can be addressed and resolved, or at least accommodated, but at the 
heart  of  Hanks'  writing  is  a  good idea,  one that  may require  a  lot  more  work and 
promoting that it's currently receiving. 
The second, earlier article reprinted by Fontenelle is the similarly-titled 'I don't 
believe in word senses' (Kilgarriff 1997/2008). The title is from Sue Atkins, spoken at a 
1994 discussion at a workshop entitled 'The Future of the Dictionary,' which Kilgarriff 
borrows and Hanks acknowledges and plays with. The first paragraph seems to place us 
firmly in the computer field by employing words like  ambiguous, WSD  (word sense 
disambiguation), module, human language processor, parser, etc. But, as with Hanks, a 
more  humanistic  approach emerges,  and these terms are  brought  up so they can be 
refuted.  Whereas  I  have  attempted  to  maintain  a  cognitive  approach  to  polysemy 
throughout  and  have  largely  ignored  computational  or  generative  approaches  as 
irrelevant to human pedagogy, Kilgarriff views the two paradigms as thesis (the school 
of thought entailing WSD) and antithesis (the conceptual metaphor system associated 
with  Lakoff,  Johnson  and  others),  but  rather  than  forging  a  synthesis  as  might  be 
expected  from  the  set-up,  Kilgarriff  essentially  continues  to  detail  the  antithesis, 
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presenting it as a primer for proponents of the thesis. 
We can therefore jump to his  concluding  remarks  on the implications  of the 
cognitive approach for programmers. First, Kilgarriff reminds his readers that the sense 
breakdown of any given dictionary is largely determined by its target audience and then 
warns that no such set of editorially-selected word senses should be expected to work 
for other purposes. Word senses are 'only ever defined relative to a set of interests,' 
(2008: 151) interests that may be incompatible with those of WSD. He concludes this 
section, however, with the following statement which acquiesces to the thesis: 
For  the  medium  term  future,  the  appropriate  language-engineering  
response  to  a  use  of  a  word  or  phrase,  for  which  there  is  a  valid  
interpretation  in  the  knowledge  representation  but  where  the  system  is  
currently getting the wrong interpretation because the word or phrase's use  
does  not  match  that  in  the  lexicon,  is  to  add  another  lexical  entry 
(2008:151).
The  third,  and  earliest,  article  is  by  Stock  (1984/2008)  and  simply  entitled 
'Polysemy.'  It  is  the most  traditional  of the three as well  as the most  practical.  She 
begins with an assessment of Ayto (1983) who had proposed practical guidelines for the 
determining of senses by lexicographers.  Ayto's methods include considering a word 
polysemous if its two senses each have differing superordinates. Stock's problem, and 
mine, with this is that it's a post de facto decision. Ayto seems to divide the senses and 
then justifies the division by claiming contrasting superordinates. A second problem is 
knowing  when  to  stop.  Ayto  suggests  making  shape,  size  and  material  criteria  for 
polysemising concrete nouns (which, worryingly, are the only words he examines) but 
apparently not colour. 
Another issue regards the compatibility of superordinates. To use an exaggerated 
example, a table could have as superordinate FURNITURE but also FURNISHINGS, 
EVERYDAY OBJECTS, WOODEN THINGS. Ayto offers no guidelines for ensuring 
that the same level of superordinates are selected. A further problem I have (not voiced 
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by  Stock)  is  the  lack  of  justification  regarding  the  promotion  of  superordinates  as 
criteria.  There  is  an  unproven assumption  here  that  polysemic  senses  automatically 
entail contrasting superordinates and vice versa. 
Using  corpus  data,  Stock  proposes  an  alternate  approach.  (It  should  be  no 
surprise that I'm not persuaded.) First she examines the words with what she considers 
clearly  distinguishable   senses.  There  are  three  procedures  here,  the  first  of  which 
concerns a word's contrasting syntactic behaviour. We've already examined the problem 
of mistaking syntax for semantics or of making the former a criteria for splitting the 
latter.  Note,  for  example,  how  the  phrasing,  'count'  and  'uncount' senses (Stock 
1984/2008:156),  silently  redeploys  syntactic  properties  to  the  semantic  realm.  The 
second procedure entails collocation, which also has been discussed earlier and nothing 
surprising occurs in her account to counter what I've said. The final procedure states that 
words  that  are  ambiguous,  creating  sentences  that  can  be  read  two  different  ways, 
clearly need to be disambiguated, which is surprising when she previously stated that 
non-linguists  would  find  the  use  of  bank  by  semanticists  confusing  since  it  is  not 
ambiguous  to  the  lay  person.  No  comment  is  made  about  how  a  word  may  be 
ambiguous  in  one  context  but  not  in  others.  (I  should  hope  sperm  bank is  never 
ambiguous.)
Stock next turns to 'meanings that are not clearly distinguishable,' my problem 
with which is probably self-evident by now: why should we want to distinguish that 
which  is  not  clearly  distinguished? Why,  that  is,  is  this  preferable  to  unifying  such 
meanings? Stock does address this but her conclusion is weak: 'the lexicographer must, 
given the existing methods of presenting dictionary information, make some sort of job 
of  sorting  them  out  into  different  meanings,  normally  numbered  meanings'  (Stock 
2008:158)
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She prefaces her treatment of such words with the caveat that it does not apply to 
words with figurative or metaphoric meanings. This is fine, but her rationale is quite at 
odds  with  the  evidence  I  supplied  earlier:  'it  would  seem that  figurative  extensions 
typically take the same syntactic environments as the literal sense from which they are 
derived' (Stock 2008:158). 
Stock's  second  type  of  blurring  of  meanings,  after  metaphoric/figurative 
extensions, is in which words 'operate on a cline between two or more meanings' or 
'bring  in  its  train  various  nuances'  She  lists  some 22 corpus  instances  of  the  word 
culture, separating two for the category of 'clearly distinguishable senses,' these being 
those involving blood cultures and cultures of germs. Her justification is that they 'have 
no no semantic  link with the rest  of the examples  (2008:159).  I  disagree.  The verb 
cultivate links, quite clearly, all uses of the noun culture. The remaining uses fall under 
the same treatment of crawl discussed earlier: there are pulls in certain directions but no 
evidence that these represented discrete senses (other than having enumerated senses as 
the only valid paradigm for lexicography). 
Though published the following year,  the following passage from Wierzbicka 
(1985), quoted in Hanks (2000/2008:128), is something I'd like to know Stock's take on: 
An adequate definition of a vague concept must aim not at precision but at vagueness;  
it must aim at precisely that level of vagueness which characterises the concept itself. 
 Fontenelle (2008) was considered here because I felt it too important a work to 
ignore. Two of the articles (Hanks' and Kilgarriff's) I had been aware of but unable to 
acquire, so the publication of the reader was welcome. In the end, I'm no doubt guilty of 
holding up the elements which agree with points I laid out earlier and criticising those 
which do not.  Still,  I  remain alarmed by the silent  alignment  and integration of AI 
development and lexicography and the future it spreads before us.
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Appendix 2: Polyvalancy in the General Service List
A2.1 Homophones in the GSL
A2.1.1 Homophones with at least one corresponding term appearing in the GSL
Asterisks indicate one of the forms is inflected.
BLUE* blew
BUY by
BY buy
DARE dear, deer
DEAR dare, deer
EIGHT* ate
EYE I
FLOUR flower
FLOWE
R 
flour
FOR four, fore 
FOUR for, fore 
HAIR hear, here 
HEAR here, hair 
HERE hair, hear
HOLE whole
HOUR* our, hour
I eye
KNOT not
KNOW no; knew, new
MAIL male
MALE mail
MEAT meet
MEET meat
NEW* knew
NO know
NOT knot
ONE* won
PASS* passed, past
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PAST* passed, past
PEACE piece
PIECE peace
PLAIN plane
PLANE plain
READ* red
RED* read
RIGHT write, rite
SAIL sale
SALE sail
SCENE* seen
SEA* see
SEE* sea
SEW so
SO sew
SOME sum
SON sun
SUM some
SUN son
TENSE* tents
TENT* tents, tense
THAN then
THEN than
THERE they're, their
THEY they're, their, there
THROU
GH* 
threw
THROW
* 
threw, through
TO too, two
TOO to, two
TWO to, too
WAIST waste
WASTE waist
WAY weigh
WE* our, hour
220
WEAK week
WEAR where, ware
WEATH
ER 
whether
WEEK weak
WEIGH* way; weighed, 
wade
WHERE wear, ware
WHETH
ER 
weather
WHOLE hole
WOOD would
WOULD wood
WRITE right, rite
A2.1.2 Other homophones (corresponding word form not in GSL)
Asterisks again indicate one of the forms is inflected.
ADD ad
BITE byte
BOARD* bored
BUT butt
CAPITAL capitol
CENT* sent
CHECK check
CLOSE clothes
COUNCIL counsel
CURRENT currant
DIE dye
DO dew (in American English)
EARN urn
FACT* facts, fax
FAIR fare
GATE gait
GREAT grate
GROUND* (past tense of grind)
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HEEL heal
HIGH hi,hire (higher)*
HIRE* higher
HORSE hoarse
IN inn
KEY quay
LOAN lone
MAIN mane
METAL meddle, mettle
MORNING* mourning
MUSCLE mussel 
NONE nun
NEED kneed
PAIN pane
PAIR pare
PALE pail
PAUSE* paws
PER purr
PRAY prey
PRINCIPLE principal
PROFIT prophet
PULL pool (in some dialects)
RAIN reign
REAL reel
RING wring
ROAD* rode
ROLL role
SEEM seam
SELL cell
SHARE shear
SICK sic (itself homonymic)
SIGHT site
SIGN sine
SLOW sloe (rare)
SORE soar
SORT* sorted, sordid
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SOUL sole
STAIRS* stares
STEAL steel
STRAIGHT strait
SUNDAY sundae
SWEET suite
SYMBOL cymbal
TAIL tale
TEA tee
TEAM teem
TOE tow
WET whet
WHICH witch
WINE whine
WRAP rap
A2.2 Homographs in the GSL
Written form Pronunciations Example
CLOSE /klos/, /kloz/ Close the door before he gets too 
close
LEAD /li:d/, /lƐd/ The lead singer developed lead 
poisoning.
LIVE /lIv/, /laiv/ They live for live concerts.
MINUTE /mInət/, /mainut/     I'll need a minute to go over the 
minute details.
PRESENT /prƐzInt/, /prizƐnt/ In the past, he hated to present 
speeches, but in the present it's not a 
problem.
PRODUCE /prədus/, /produs/ Farmers produce produce.
READ /ri:d/, /rƐd/ Tomorrow I will read the book you 
read yesterday.
ROW /rou/, /rau/ This was their third row in a row. 
(mainly in British English)
WIND /wInd/, /waind/ The wind will wind its way through 
the crevices.
WOUND /wund/, /waund/ The bandages were wound too 
tightly, making the wound worse.
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A2.3 Cognitive homonyms in the GSL
Cognitive homonyms are polysemes that have drifted so far that there no longer 
is a clear connection between them. As such, what constitutes cognitive homonymy is a 
judgement call, and the list below is composed of my own such calls. 
Asterisks here indicate more than two meanings.
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BAR* beam of steel, pub, bar exam, to exclude
BEAR to give birth to, to sustain (something unpleasant)
BELT a strip (of leather, land), to shout or sing loudly, an alcoholic 
drink
CHARGE electrical ~, ~ card, to officially accuse of crime, to make a 
rushing attack
CHEST upper torso, treasure ~
CLUB 'I've a good mind to join a club and beat you over the head 
with it!'--Groucho Marx
COAST to move easily/not work hard, coastlines
COMPANY a corporation, fellowship/visitors
CONCENTRATE to focus one's thoughts, chemical solution of increased 
strength (i.e., juice)
COUNTRY nation, far from the city
COURSE direction or path (including 'of course), an area constructed 
for certain sports (race ~, golf ~)
COURT place of law, an enclosed area, monarch's place of 
residency, to woo/to invite (disaster)
CROSS intersecting lines, angry or ill-mannered
CRUSH to smash, infatuation
CRY to weep, to exclaim
CULTURE customs/refinement, cultivated cells
CURE to treat medically, to preserve (by salting, drying)
CURRENT a flow, the present (adj)
DATE to see romantically, to reveal one's age indirectly (That dates 
me!)
DEGREE unit of measurement for temperature or angles, level of 
completed education 
DRAG* to pull along, ~ race, women's clothing worn by a man, 
boring situation
DRAW to sketch, to pull
DRIVE to operate a motor vehicle, disc ~
DUTY one's responsibilities, a payment enforced by law
FAINT to lose consciousness, hard to perceive
FALL autumn, to descend (often accidentally)
FAST quick, secure
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FENCE surrounding wall, to engage in fencing
FIGURE form, to think
FINE good, very small, sharp
FIRE flame, to dismiss
FLAT ~ tire, an apartment (in British English) 
FOOT body part, 12 inches, ~ the bill
FORMAL correct and serious (~ language, ~ attire), related to form 
(especially in art: formalism)
FORWARD toward the front or future, presumptuous/direct
GAME competition, crippled (limb), certain wild animals
HABIT something done regularly, a piece of clothing worn by nuns
JUST only, fair
KIND gentle-natured/friendly, a class (including kind of)
KNOT a fastening (of rope), nautical measurement
LATE tardy, recently deceased
LEFT* opposite of right, past tense of leave, liberal
LETTER writing character, missive
LOT* much (a lot of), a yard (of land), random resolution of 
disputes, a portion
LOVE the emotion, a score of zero
METRE measurement of length, poetic or musical rhythm division
MIGHT (modal verb), power
MOUSE rodent, computer peripheral
NATURE the natural world, inherent quality
NUT hard fruit, eccentric or crazy person, part for securing bolt
ORDER sequence/(properly) organised, direct command
ORGAN body part that performs a specific function, musical 
keyboard
PARK public area for recreation, to bring a vehicle to a halt in 
order to leave it there
PASSAGE the act of passing (a law, etc.), travel (by sea), a (narrow) 
passageway, a short part of a book considered by itself
PATIENT to have patience, a doctor's client
PICK to pierce/thrust/detach, to choose, to pluck with a plectrum
PLANT flora, a factory
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PRESENT a gift, the current time
PRESS to push/printing press
PRETTY attractive, moderately
PRIVATE not public, military rank
REALISE to become aware of, to bring to fruition (dreams, designs)
RIGHT (see homonyms above), conservative
ROCK stone, to move back and forth, a kind of music
SEASON a division of the year according to weather patterns, to add 
spices or herbs to food
SECOND next after the first, one-sixtieth of a minute
SENSE the five physical abilities, to be vaguely aware of something, 
opposite of nonsense, one meaning of a word 
SENTENCE a linguistic construction, a period of punishment
SHOOT to use a gun or camera, new growing parts of plants
SHOWER a spray of water, a party before marriage or childbirth
SPIRIT ghost, alcohol
SPRING* the first season of the year, a source of water, a coil
STAFF a long pole, people employed together
STAGE a temporal division of development, a place for actors to act
STATE a condition, the government, to make a statement
STONE rock (including jewels), unit of weight (especially of a 
person)
STORY a narrative, a floor of a building
STRIKE to hit, an organised protest
TABLE ~ and chairs, tabulated data
TRAIN railway cars connected together, trailing section of 
ceremonial dress/body of followers
TRIP journey, to fall
TYPE a category, to use a typewriter or computer keyboard
WATCH to see, a portable clock
WHIP instrument for flogging, member of a party in parliament
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